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## SOUTHERN CONGRESSMEN AND THE "NEW ISOLATIONISM"

LONG regarded as one of the great centers of "internationalism", the South—notoriously prone to political volatility—is now going through a remarkable metamorphosis. Southerners today, in a sharp swing away from their former active support of a positive and multilateralist approach to the international problems facing the United States, are instead anachronistically advocating a modernized version of old-fashioned isolationism. This revolution in attitude has already gone so far as to create a constant problem for American policy makers and to raise disturbing doubts about the long-term viability of the still uneasy American foreign policy consensus. As such it merits both study and concern by scholars.

This article attempts to outline the dimensions of the "new isolationism" of the South as it is reflected in one important and continuing issue, the Mutual Security Program, and to advance a hypothesis in possible explanation of the trend. The first part will be based upon an analysis of the series of roll-call votes in the House of Representatives on the several Mutual Security Aid (MSA) renewals since 1952. The second, more speculative section will build upon this statistical evidence and upon the author's affectionate study of and long residence in the South.

The usual scholarly disclaimer that the conclusions reached in this study are not to be thought of as definitive is peculiarly apposite. The vast social, economic and political changes going on in the South (of which the new isolationism is only a part) are still only imperfectly appreciated by social scientists; we still stand in great need of much more detailed research on the Southern reaction to the postwar era. But the data presented here are yet but little discussed in academic circles, and the phenomena to which they relate are obviously important. It is in this light that this preliminary study is presented.



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TABLE I

*Negative Votes in House on Marshall Plan (1948) and MSA Renewals, 1952-1960*

| State | 1952 | 1953 | 1954 | 1955 | 1956 | 1957 | 1958 | 1959 | 1960 | Total 1952-60 | % Negative 1952-60 | (1948) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ala. (9) | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 16/81 | 20 | –/9 |
| Ark. (6) | – | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 3 | – | 4 | 4 | 18/54 | 33 | –/7 |
| Fla. (8) | – | – | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 26/72 | 36 | –/6 |
| Ga. (10) | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 9 | 8 | 8 | 41/90 | 46 | 1/10 |
| Ky. (8) | 1 | 1 | – | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 9/72 | 12 | –/9 |
| La. (8) | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 40/72 | 55 | 1/8 |
| Miss. (6) | 6 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 45/54 | 83 | 1/7 |
| N. C. (12) | 1 | 2 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 10 | 4 | 9 | 7 | 60/108 | 55 | 2/12 |
| Okla. (6) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 17/54 | 31 | 3/8 |
| S. C. (6) | – | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 31/54 | 57 | 1/6 |
| Tenn. (9) | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 24/81 | 29 | –/10 |
| Tex. (22) | 4 | 5 | 5 | 10 | 12 | 14 | 10 | 13 | 7 | 80/198 | 40 | –/21 |
| Va. (10) | 1 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 43/90 | 48 | 1/9 |
| W. Va. (6) | – | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 17/54 | 32 | 2/6 |
| Total South | 23 | 27 | 46 | 52 | 53 | 73 | 61 | 69 | 63 | 467/1134 | 41 | 12/128 |
| Total House | 109 | 108 | 126 | 128 | 122 | 154 | 134 | 142 | 130 | 1153/3917 | 29 | 74/435 |
| % of Total South | 18 | 21 | 37 | 41 | 42 | 58 | 48 | 55 | 50 | | | 9 |
| Southern % of Total | 21 | 25 | 37 | 41 | 44 | 48 | 46 | 49 | 49 | | | 16 |

NOTE. The 126 Southern seats equal 29 per cent of the total House.

## I

In the following discussion, "the South" is given the broadest possible definition: the eleven ex-Confederate states plus Kentucky, West Virginia and Oklahoma.[1] The votes tallied were those of the 126 members of the House of Representatives from these fourteen states. This group was selected because of its relatively large size and of the sensitivity of Representatives to trends in mass opinion in their districts. The MSA renewals provided an almost ideal criterion by which to measure attitude change, because the question came up each year in approximately the same form and involved—at least for the Southerners—the same kinds of choice.

The votes are summarized in Table I. In order to keep the pattern constant, the only votes tallied were the "Nays" actually cast on the final roll call on the passage of the authorization bill each year. No attempt is made to include announced "pairs against", or to check the larger negative vote from the South on the accompanying appropriation bill that came later in each session. Either of these two sets of data would have made the absolute figures larger, but would not have modified the trends of change. The annual opposition totals reflected in Table I, therefore, can be thought of as expressing the hard core of Southern opposition to the principle of "foreign aid", and as representing what we are calling here the "new isolationism" of the South.

The Marshall Plan votes are included in the table because they furnish a convenient base point from which to measure the Southern shift. In 1948 only 12 Southerners voted "Nay" to the Foreign Assistance Act; only 9 per cent of the South's Representatives were opposed, as compared to 21 per cent of all non-Southerners. The South gave rise to only 16 per cent of the total opposition. Thus in 1948 the South was significantly more "internationalist" on the Marshall Plan than either the whole House or its non-Southern portion—and this on the issue that at the time was generally regarded as the acid test of the nation's commitment to a new kind of foreign policy.

Table I sums up the evolution of Southern attitudes toward "foreign aid" since the era of the Marshall Plan. It begins in

[1] This includes the three census groups of South Atlantic, East South Central and West South Central, except for the omission of Maryland, Delaware and the District of Columbia.

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1952, at which time Southern opposition had doubled since 1948 but was still quite small and well below the national figure. From 1952 to 1960 we see a dramatic rise, reaching a peak of 58 per cent opposition in 1957, and hovering at or over 50 per cent ever since.

Just how far the South has moved can be suggested by an enlightening comparison with the performance of the erstwhile citadel of hard-shell isolationism, the Middle West. In 1960, there were 130 negative votes on the MSA bill. Of these, 63, or 49 per cent, came from the South; on the other hand only 52 votes, or 40 per cent of the opposition, were mustered by the Middle West. The South was almost exactly 50 per cent in the negative column, while only 40 per cent of the 129 Middle Westerners joined them. This relative attitude has been consistently demonstrated through President Eisenhower's second term. A good case can be made that the shibboleth of "Middle Western isolationism" must now be accompanied by that of "Southern isolationism", and that (at least on the issue of foreign aid) the new variety is more powerful than the old. For what dubious satisfaction it may be, the South can now claim to be the region of the nation most opposed to foreign aid.

The same general story is told by Table II. Here the South's percentage of opposition to MSA is compared with the opposition shown by the House as a whole and by the non-South:

TABLE II

*Negative Votes in House on MSA Renewals, 1952-1960*

| Year | Total Nays | Southern Nays | % Negative | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Total House[a] | South[b] | Non-South[c] |
| (1948) | 74 | 12 | 17 | 9 | 20 |
| 1952 | 109 | 23 | 25 | 18 | 27 |
| 1953 | 108 | 27 | 25 | 21 | 26 |
| 1954 | 126 | 46 | 29 | 37 | 26 |
| 1955 | 128 | 52 | 29 | 41 | 23 |
| 1956 | 122 | 53 | 28 | 42 | 22 |
| 1957 | 154 | 73 | 33 | 58 | 26 |
| 1958 | 134 | 61 | 30 | 48 | 24 |
| 1959 | 142 | 69 | 33 | 55 | 24 |
| 1960 | 130 | 63 | 30 | 50 | 22 |

[a] Total House membership: 1949-1958 = 435; 1959 = 436; 1960 = 437.
[b] Total number of Southern members = 126.
[c] Total number of non-Southern members: 1948 = 309; 1959 = 310; 1960 = 311.

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This table reveals even more clearly than did the first the extent to which Southern votes form a trend running contrary to the pattern in the House and especially among non-Southerners. While opposition among the Representatives from non-Southern constituencies has been slowly but steadily declining, the South's curve has described exactly the opposite course. The impact of the Southern shift drove the over-all negative vote in the House upward for some years, reaching its crest in 1957; since that year the total has edged downward again in the face of continued Southern opposition. In 1960, the South found itself 20 percentage points more hostile to MSA than the whole House and 28 points out of step with the non-South.

## II

Over-all regional figures are notoriously deceptive, however, when as richly varied a subculture as the South is under consideration. Table I reveals the extent to which the student must be cautious in generalizing about so slippery a concept as "the South".

We see first from the table evidence of a tremendous spread of opinion among the fourteen states. Kentucky, with only 9 negative votes over the nine years out of a possible 72, has a record of only 12 per cent opposition—by far the lowest in the region. On the other hand, Mississippi has been admirably consistent in accumulating the outstanding record of hostility: 45 "Nays" out of a possible 54, for 83 per cent. Louisiana, North Carolina and South Carolina also show over-all opposition percentages of more than 50, while Georgia and Virginia also surpassed the regional opposition percentage of 41. Alabama has been Kentucky's closest rival in support, while Arkansas, Oklahoma, Tennessee and West Virginia are grouped well below the regional mean.

Additional interesting comparisons follow if we break the South down into three groups of states. The Gulf states (Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas) together cast 181 votes out of 405 against MSA over the nine years. The South Atlantic states (Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Florida) registered 201 of 414; the border states (Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Oklahoma and West Virginia) were 85 of 313. The Gulf states were 45 per cent opposed, the South Atlantic states 48 per cent, and the border states 27 per cent.

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At this point we can see one factor appearing clearly: the importance of the border states in holding down the over-all Southern percentage of opposition. If the totals were confined only to the eleven ex-Confederate states, the percentage of negative votes would be 44.4, or 424 out of 954. Our larger sample, by including Kentucky, West Virginia and Oklahoma (whose cultural and political claims to being "Southern" are by no means unquestionable), improves the region's general standing but also throws into sharper perspective the more intense opposition of the Deep South.

The three groups of states have had independent trends of change on the MSA issue. This information is summarized in Table III:

TABLE III

*Aggregate Negative Votes on MSA Cast by Groups of States, 1952-60*

| Year | Gulf States | Per Cent | South Atlantic States | Per Cent | Border States | Per Cent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1952 | 15/45 | 33 | 3/46 | 7 | 5/35 | 14 |
| 1953 | 16/45 | 36 | 6/46 | 15 | 5/35 | 14 |
| 1954 | 16/45 | 36 | 24/46 | 52 | 6/35 | 17 |
| 1955 | 21/45 | 47 | 24/46 | 52 | 7/35 | 20 |
| 1956 | 23/45 | 51 | 24/46 | 52 | 6/35 | 17 |
| 1957 | 27/45 | 60 | 32/46 | 70 | 14/35 | 40 |
| 1958 | 21/45 | 47 | 27/46 | 59 | 13/35 | 37 |
| 1959 | 24/45 | 53 | 31/46 | 67 | 14/35 | 40 |
| 1960 | 18/45 | 40 | 30/46 | 65 | 15/35 | 43 |

Already in 1952 significant opposition existed in the Gulf states, while in the border states it was relatively low. The most interesting of the 1952 figures, however, was the South Atlantic group's mere 7 per cent opposition, based upon only 3 votes; the shift from this near-unanimity to its current better than two-thirds opposition represents the largest change of any group.

The most important trend of change since 1952 has been the steady rise in opposition within all three groups. The South Atlantic states made the first great leap, increasing 37 percentage points between 1953 and 1954. The Gulf states never went as high as the South Atlantic group (although they started in 1952 from a much higher point), and indeed show some signs of stabilizing at a level well below the states to the east. The border states were the last to move up in opposition, but their

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climb (which began in 1957) has been sufficient to move them (1960) beyond the Gulf group. Thus Texas, Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi began as the most hostile group in 1952 and have become by 1960 the least.

The nine-year totals indicate clearly that the rise and fall of the Gulf states' percentage are primarily a function of the Texas vote. The other Gulf states have been quite consistent from year to year, but the Texas total has varied from 4 to 14. In 1960, for example, only 7 "Nays" were registered from Texas, a decline of 6 from 1959. The Gulf state total also dropped exactly 6 votes for a percentage decline of 13 points. Before yielding to the temptation to read too much into this set of figures, however, we should also note that in 1960 exactly 6 Texans who did not vote announced themselves as paired in opposition. Had they been present for the roll call, both Texas and the entire South would have exactly equaled their 1959 totals.

The South Atlantic states clearly qualify as the leaders in the anti-MSA movement. Each of them has at one time or another cast more than 50 per cent of the state's delegation against an MSA bill; only Florida, furthermore, has an over-all opposition percentage below the regional mean and can today be counted as fairly well in support of the mutual security program.

Also striking is the fact that all the South Atlantic states made, at one time or another, a clear about-face on the issue. Florida, North Carolina and Virginia all made their break in 1954; South Carolina and Georgia did not abandon MSA until 1957. None except Florida show any signs of a relaxation in militancy (the drop in the North Carolina vote in 1958 was accidental and was largely offset by announced pairs).

The border states were, until 1957, the most consistent. Even though opposition there has increased very noticeably since then (to the point where, as we have noted, it surpassed the Gulf state figure in 1960), their over-all performance is still the least hostile toward MSA of the three. None of them has equaled the region's 41 per cent opposition over the nine years, and only Arkansas can be thought of as a real center of hostility.

## III

One final comparison may be made among the several states in terms of the dates when the shift into opposition was made.

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During our nine-year period, ten have moved from a position generally in favor of MSA to one in which over 50 per cent of the state's delegation voted against it; only Mississippi and Louisiana have been over 50 per cent ever since 1952, and only Kentucky and Alabama have remained below the half-way mark. The remainder have at one time or another all crossed the 50 per cent Rubicon.

North Carolina and Florida were the first to do so, crossing over in 1954. Virginia followed in 1955, Texas in 1956. South Carolina, Georgia and Oklahoma changed sides in 1957—the year of the South's high-water mark. In 1958, contrary to a general downward trend, Tennessee and West Virginia joined the hostile camp, and Arkansas completed the list in 1959. No new members appeared in 1960.

Of the states that shifted, only Florida presents on the evidence a reasonably clear case for permanent reconversion. Oklahoma, Tennessee and West Virginia have not yet clearly established their bona fides as members of the opposition, and remain poised somewhere near the 50 per cent mark. Perhaps the 1960 Congressional elections will point out the direction they will follow. All the others seem to have come to near-permanent rest in hostility to MSA, and they give the tone to the dominant Southern attitude on mutual security policy.

The hard core of this point of view seems to be located in the arc of South Atlantic and Gulf states from Virginia to Louisiana and Texas. Here only Alabama's status is atypical and Florida's unclear; the rest seem firm and unyielding. On the other hand, the states to the immediate north of this line show no such unanimity; Kentucky persists in violating the regional pattern while the others have fluctuated widely. The opposition to MSA that one finds in the border states, however, serves materially to reinforce the solid blocs to the south, and contributes to the impressive regional obduracy.

## IV

This, then, is the record of the South's changing attitude toward MSA. Is it actually indicative of a substantial shift in the Southern international outlook? Has the South really developed a new stand? Or, as some Southern apologists contend, do the MSA figures only reveal the South's aversion to this form of

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international action and have no bearing on any broader issue? It is the argument of this study that the broad shift has taken place and that it runs much deeper than just a quarrel over "foreign aid".

We must bear in mind that Southern politicians, in revolting against the aid program of the United States, are striking at a long-term project that is of major intrinsic importance and that has also become a powerful symbol—both at home and abroad—of the more sophisticated responses the United States is making to the challenges it faces. There is more to the anti-MSA movement than a narrow reaction to a particular policy; there are many signs that the South's leaders, in striking at foreign aid, know precisely what they are doing.

Other indices, furthermore, corroborate the evidence of the anti-MSA figures. The whole nation is now on notice that the South has turned away from its low-tariff stand.[2] Gallup Polls show that Southern opinion is more opposed to the United Nations and to aid to underdeveloped nations, more militant toward the Soviet Union, and more cynical about prospects for peace than the Northeast, the Middle Atlantic states, or the Far West. Paul Seabury observes that Southern sentiment seems to "approximate more closely that of the Rocky Mountain and West Central states—the traditional 'fortress' of isolationist America."[3]

There are, in sum, reasons for reaching the conclusion that there has been born a new Southern outlook on world affairs and for calling it a "new isolationism". This attitude is closely akin to the dying Middle Western variety but also has strong indigenous roots. It is to the exploration of this belief that we now turn.

## V

Before looking more closely at the new isolationism of the South, however, we ought first to clarify just what it is different from. What actual change has taken place in the international

[2] In the 1958 House vote on the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act, the South emerged as more opposed (26 per cent) to the bill than was the non-South (21 per cent). This was in contrast to the previous vote in 1955, when the South was only 17 per cent opposed, compared to the non-South's 29 per cent.

[3] Paul Seabury, *The Waning of Southern "Internationalism"* (Princeton, 1957), p. 27n.

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attitude of Southerners? Just how internationalist was the South of an earlier day?

Of course, "internationalism"—like so many other words in the American political vocabulary—is a loaded term. Even so, if by the word we mean nothing more precise than a generalized commitment to active American membership in an international society on a full-time basis, the South has little reason for retrospective self-congratulation. The regional attitude toward international affairs never reached even this modest level of homogeneity.

If we look up the stands that Southern spokesmen (in and out of Congress) took on specific issues, and if we can recapture the Southern mood of the fifteen years that began in 1938, we can isolate a number of regional prejudices and traditions that controlled the South's stand on international problems. The following seem to have been the most influential (although of course no priority or necessary relationship among them can be assumed except in individual cases).

First, a strong low-tariff stand, growing about equally from pure tradition and from the realities of economics.

Second, a persistent Anglophilia (except for the Latinized South), rooted in the region's heavy Anglo-Saxon background, its relative immunity to immigration, and a fancied identity between its ruling class and Great Britain's.

Third, an almost defiant attachment to the memory of Woodrow Wilson as Southerner (and also as Democrat).

Fourth, a strong tradition of party regularity that led Southerners to be obediently nationalistic (except for reciprocal trade) during the early New Deal and to discover international affairs at about the same time President Roosevelt did in 1937.

Fifth, W. J. Cash's "tradition of violence" as an explanation of the South's fixation on military affairs and its enthusiastic embracing of the military requirements of World War II and the early Cold War.

Put together, these various elements combined to form (or, at least, to shape) a Southern outlook that committed the region deeply to the Roosevelt-Truman foreign policy between 1938 and 1953. Questions may be raised about the reasons for the South's support of the major lines of American action during these years, but there is no doubt of the support itself. In 1957, the National Committee for an Effective Congress released a

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study of Southern votes on international issues during this time span. Their analysis concluded that—even before 1941—the South "was markedly more internationalist even than the New England and Middle Atlantic States. . . ."[4] "Internationalism" in the Committee's study, however, was synonymous with militarism; the eight "key bills" the Committee relied upon for proof were all either purely military or openly contemplative of war.[5] Of evidence of any regional commitment to multilateralism there is none.

But it would be captious historicism to quarrel today with the reasons for Southern support of necessary policies. All Americans should be grateful that the votes were there whenever they were needed and that, granted real variations in the enthusiasm with which different programs were supported, the Southern bloc could usually be counted on to hold the line against the attacks of Middle Western–Great Plains Republican isolationist remnants.

## VI

Today, however, this solid support of internationalism has evaporated. Old-line internationalists in Congress are fighting for their political lives; new Congressmen come to Washington from the South armed with a vigorous nationalist and unilateralist mandate from their constituents; fence-straddlers (always the most accurate indicators of regional opinion) are swinging into an avowed alliance with hard-shell Middle Westerners. The "new isolationism" is the dominant position expressed in Southern discussion of international questions, and firm Southern commitment to the general line of American policy can no longer be assumed.

## VII

In approaching Southern thinking on international issues, we ought never to assume that it is entirely unheard of for Southerners to talk and act like isolationists. Attitudes startlingly

[4] National Committee for an Effective Congress, *Congressional Report*, vol. 6, No. 2 (May 15, 1957), p. 1.

[5] Fortification of Guam (1939), Neutrality Act Revision (1939), Lend Lease Bill (1941), British Aid Bill (1941), Ship Seizure Bill (1941), Draft Extension Bill (1941), Second Lend Lease Bill (1941), and Repeal of the Neutrality Act (1941). *Ibid.*

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similar to the present ones existed even during the era when "internationalism" was flourishing. What makes the contemporary trend different, however, is that today isolationism is no longer freakish, but is instead an increasingly respectable pattern with unquestionable political appeal.

Southerners will never forget the famous isolationists of the recent past: Vardaman and Bilbo of Mississippi, Huey Long of Louisiana, Tom Heflin of Alabama, Tom Watson of Georgia, and Robert Rice Reynolds of North Carolina. Each of these Senators advocated the rejection of a half-understood outside world and a myopic concentration on "our own problems"; each painted a dark picture of the perils awaiting the nation on the international scene. Each foresaw entrapment, impoverishment and mongrelization as the inevitable outcome of American entry into world affairs. Each professed to be acutely sensitive to the dollar cost of international relations and to be solicitous to spare the "long-suffering American taxpayer" the burden of subsidizing hordes of greedy, envious, slothful and wily foreigners.

For none of these men, however, was foreign affairs a primary concern. Their positions on foreign policy questions were simply by-products of the broader social and political environment from which they sprang. Isolationism was a necessary part of their kit of political tools, but so also were racism, localism ("states' rights"), social reformism of a heavily demagogic stripe, and a pronounced rural bias.

Vardaman, Bilbo, Long, Heflin, Watson, Reynolds—each was both the product and the manipulator of the politics of protest, Southern style. Each drew his initial and longest-lasting support from the lowest economic and social stratum of the rural poor whites. Each in his own way capitalized on the inchoate resentments of the back-country farmer or courthouse-towner in revolt against a changing society that denied him his old place and seemed to provide no new one. Each offered the same set of scapegoats, all identified in some way with the urban Northeast; all deviations from the rural white Southern norm (including, interestingly enough, the *urban* white Southern norm) were at one time or another pointed out as the cause for all that ailed the South. Against them the demagogue proclaimed a crusade and received a mandate to do battle.

The isolationists of the 1920's and 1930's rode the crest of a

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wave of incensed provincialism. The Ku Klux Klan epitomized the up-country South indignantly denying the existence of a changing world and frantically searching for fundamental truths on which to stand. Protestantism, white supremacy, and a narrow nationalism filled the bill.

This is the doctrine each of these men served. Tom Watson was indeed an "agrarian rebel", but ultimately he rebelled—in perfectly logical sequence—not only against industrialization and finance capitalism, but also against the twentieth century and the entire world outside the rural South. Southern isolationism before Pearl Harbor was not nationalistic in any meaningful sense; it was provincialism on a rampage. Southern poor whites, their basic assumptions threatened by "alien" ideologies and their social and economic system tottering under the impact of sweeping change, reacted by turning their backs on reality and escaping into a purer and simpler world of fantasy.

Thus the politics of protest, necessarily isolationist, were in constant conflict with the "internationalism" of the traditional Southern ruling class during the entire interwar period. Their common meeting grounds on foreign policy were only two: low tariffs (a symbol for some, for others a stark reality) and military tradition. Where protest was weak enough to be kept suppressed, internationalist leaders from the "better" strata of Southern society kept their states committed to their own views; where protest broke through, isolationism and demagoguery took over. These swings of sentiment, however, were largely stilled by the New Deal, World War II, and the postwar boom. Southern internationalism (as the rest of the nation thought of it), therefore, maintained control up to 1954 in spite of periodic outbursts of protest.

## VIII

It is clear that the "new isolationism" of the South is cut from the same cloth as was that of Heflin or Reynolds. The "Southern way of life" is again under attack; the same protests are heard in almost the same language. Although the economic and social forces that are transforming the South today—industrialization, urbanization, agricultural diversification—are producing statistical changes that are gratifying to the economist (and to most residents of the larger Southern cities), for millions

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of rural and small-town Southerners the process has been agonizing.

Georgia provides an illustration of how widespread and rapid the change has been; trends here are sharper than in most of the South, but they go in the same direction. In Georgia, rural depopulation has reached a pace that verges on the headlong. Between 1940 and 1950, 98 counties (out of 159) lost population; 95 of them continued to decline between 1950 and 1959. In the meantime, seven or eight large urban centers absorbed the bulk of the entire state's increase in population and industrial production. The small county-seat towns faced an impossibly dwindling market; the local cotton mill (usually the only small-town industry) ran into ruinous competition from both domestic and foreign sources. In the cities, hordes of new-comers, fresh from the farms, were scooped up in Northern-owned industries with the wholesale change in life pattern that such a change entailed. On top of the socio-economic dislocations there came the moral crisis of the racial revolution that has bitten so deep into the Southern psyche.

For most of the once-rural Southern people, the new order is a frightening thing. The old landmarks are disappearing one by one; even more depressing, the seamier side of Southern life has again been dragged out for public examination in literature, journalism and electronic media. The question of race, of course, has made most Southerners almost pathologically sensitive to criticism from the outside. Many of them feel that they have been pushed too far too fast; their message to the world, despite its many forms, can be translated simply as "Leave us alone!"

But the world refuses to leave the South alone any longer; there is a considerable truth imbedded in the hackneyed Southern complaint that "Nobody understands ûs." What is often missed in contemporary discussion of Southern phenomena is the fact that the same social-economic-political pattern that produced Watson and Bilbo has reasserted itself. The poor white, unable either to counter or to adjust to a set of changes he hates and fears, has again tried to blind himself to them by a new search for old certainties. The leadership was available, awaiting its chance to mobilize this yearning into a potent political force, and the Southern demagogue has reappeared to practice an art form most of the nation hoped was verging on extinction.

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Isolationism in the South today is, as it was generally in the past, part of a package of attitudes. Where you find an isolationist, you usually also find a states' righter of a particularly rigid and mechanistic sort, a budget-cutter, an opponent of "socialism"—from which he usually excludes cotton supports and the depletion allowance—and increasingly often a racist who is free with his prophecies of bloodshed. He is usually identified as a Democrat, although he fraternizes easily with the extreme Right wing of the Republicans.

Isolationism is important in this position because it helps to provide the all-important scapegoats. The new mass truculence needs targets. The troubles of the South, the argument goes, all arise from the machinations of malevolent individuals and groups, most of them outside the region. The list of the "enemies of the South" is long, but its leading members include President Eisenhower, Chief Justice Warren, the NAACP, Mr. Nehru, the Communist party, the Attorney General of the United States (whoever he may be at the moment), "weak" Southern politicians like Senator Kefauver or Governor Hodges of North Carolina, and such disparate figures as Eleanor Roosevelt, Thomas E. Dewey, Walter Reuther and Paul Butler.

Without such scapegoats, explaining to the Southern voter what is going on might raise some embarrassing questions about the caliber of his leaders and the direction in which they are taking him. As long as Marvin Griffin, Orval Faubus, Herman Talmadge and James Eastland can fight the enemies of "our way of life", such issues are less likely to come up. Who will worry about scandals in the highway department or the efficacy of the oil lobby when the sanctity of the Southern home and the purity of Southern womanhood are at stake? Of them all, communism is the most useful scapegoat; Southern patriots from Harry Byrd at one extreme to the Ku Klux Klan at the other are agreed that the desegregation decisions were masterminded in the Kremlin and that the abasement of Southern culture ranks high on Moscow's list of priorities.

The semantics of the contemporary isolationism are deceptive. No Southerner (except for the authentic lunatic fringe) goes so far as to preach real physical disengagement by the United States. In fact, the contrary is true; the usual line demands, not fewer international contacts by the United States, but more. The United States, however, is urged to act more and more

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unilaterally as it pursues its expanded rôle; and elaborate co-operative arrangements like the United Nations are either to be converted into auxiliary arms of American policy or to be ignored. Military force is to be the key technique of policy, and "foreign aid" and diplomacy alike are ridiculed as attempts to "buy friends" or as instruments of appeasement.

Southerners are in general unenthusiastic about most of the newer trends in world affairs. Anticolonialism, neutralism, the birth of new states (most of them unhappily made up of non-white peoples), and economic development are all related to the problems with which the South is struggling or are simply watched passively. The defiant reaction to Little Rock, and to the more recent dime-store "sit-ins", that "We don't care what the rest of the world thinks" found many takers in the South; implicit in this attitude is a clear feeling that the rest of the world knew what it could do if it did not like the South's way of handling "its own problems". And many a well-meaning Northerner has come to grief in an attempt to explain that Little Rock was the nation's problem and not the South's alone!

The MSA votes tend to confirm this thesis of isolation-as-protest. The states that went the furthest in their antipathy to foreign aid—Mississippi, South Carolina, Louisiana, North Carolina and Georgia—were those where the race issue had most effectively polarized politics and where rural depopulation and rapid urbanization had caused the most painful transitions. Even North Carolina's long-standing and widely heralded liberal tradition proved unable to resist completely the impact of the new crop of rural demagogues the state has spawned since 1954.

Further corroboration of isolationism's relationship to protest is found in the cases of Arkansas and West Virginia. The poor-white crusade that Orval Faubus created and leads in Arkansas had its predictable effect on that state's anti-MSA votes. West Virginia's chronic economic distress breaks out periodically into political revolt; one can almost chart the violence of voter protest in the state in terms of the isolationist position of its House delegation.

## IX

If the conclusions drawn here are valid and Southern isolationism is indeed a product of mass political protest, then the South will remain isolationist as long as it continues to protest

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—which promises to be a long time indeed. Not until the massive transition through which the region is passing has run its course and been succeeded by a new stability will the demagogues lose their grip on the imaginations of the dominant layer of Southern society. As long as race politics retain their potency in the deep South and the rural courthouse gangs control the Democratic party machinery, we may count on more isolationists in Congress rather than fewer. It required four generations and two world wars for the Middle West to come to some understanding of what foreign policy is about. We may only hope that the South's road to international maturity will be shorter.

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# PEKING—LHASA—NEW DELHI

RECENT outbreaks of violence in Tibet and northern India have once again drawn world attention to these remote, but strategically important, spots on the surface of the globe. Yet actually these incidents cannot be termed particularly novel or entirely unexpected occurrences. They come as an almost inexorable culmination to a long series of political, diplomatic and military conflicts which have during the last ten years frequently embittered relations between Peking, Lhasa and New Delhi, and which were caused, primarily, by the incompatibility of the three capitals' aims and desires in an area where their spheres of influence and interest overlapped. In order to understand the current crisis, therefore, one must study the historical antecedents of the present problem, as well as the more nearly contemporary circumstances in which Red China has emerged as the dominant Power on the Tibetan highland and as a rival of India for supremacy over other vast tracts of territory along their mutual frontier.

The immediate background for today's situation is provided by the dramatic events of a decade ago.[1] In 1949, when it became evident that the days of the Chiang Kai-shek régime were numbered—at least in so far as its rule on the mainland was concerned—the native authorities in Lhasa decided that the moment was ripe for divorcing themselves from the internecine strife between China's two political factions. Chiang's public representative in the Tibetan capital was ceremoniously escorted out of Lhasa, along with his official retinue, and the Regency formally proclaimed Tibet's independence. Various missions were immediately got ready and some actually sent to the outside world, but no really serious efforts were made to establish permanent contacts with other states. Shortly thereafter the triumphant Chinese Communists publicly made the traditional claim of all Chinese governments that Tibet was an integral part of China. The 1949 declaration of Tibet's independence was denounced by Peking as an illegal gesture fomented by

[1] For the events leading to the re-imposition of Chinese *de facto* and *de jure* authority over Tibet in 1951 and Peking's early policies in the region, see Werner Levi, "Tibet under Chinese Communist Rule", *Far Eastern Survey*, January 1954, pp. 1-9.



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foreign imperialist forces, the Red régime insisting instead that both the Chinese and the Tibetan peoples were anxiously awaiting the region's "liberation" from oppressive colonialism and reactionary exploitation. This "liberation", Radio Peking made clear, would be effected very shortly, with the use of the might of the People's Liberation Army, if need be.

In 1950, carrying out its avowed intention, the Central Government dispatched large contingents of troops into the eastern and northeastern portions of the plateau, at the same time keeping up an intensive barrage of propaganda exhorting the Tibetan masses to rise and assist the P.L.A. in its "liberation campaign" and to rejoin the fraternal family of China's nationalities. Lhasa's plans to oppose the Chinese invasion by force of arms proved completely ineffectual; an attempted appeal by the Tibetans to the United Nations was discreetly shelved;[2] and various missions which were to solicit outside assistance in arms and matériel either never left the plateau or were stranded in India. The Dalai Lama and his personal entourage fled to Yatung, on the Tibetan-Indian border. There they were poised to resume their flight further south at a moment's notice, but also torn by uncertainty about their best course in view of the heavy pressure exerted by influential sections of the Tibetan hierarchy (notably the leaders of the Lamaist Church) favoring a peaceful settlement of all differences with the Chinese and an acceptance of Peking's claim to suzerainty over the region.

During these developments the outside world either ignored Tibet's plight or confined itself to sparse and lukewarm indications of sympathy. This equanimity of world opinion in the presence of a clear breach of the peace must chiefly be explained by the facts that Tibet still remained, by and large, a mysterious *terra incognita* and that no foreign government had much knowledge of or material commitment in the area. Moreover, direct interference by third parties was difficult since Chinese suzerainty over the region had long been openly or tacitly acknowledged by most Foreign Offices, this fiction having been conveniently maintained even when Chinese control over the highland was almost nonexistent. Nor, it should be added, did the Tibetans themselves ever make any serious effort to break out of their traditional isolationism and join the family of

[2] "Tibet's Appeal to the United Nations Against Chinese Aggression", *United Nations Bulletin*, vol. 5, No. 9, December 15, 1950, pp. 675-676.

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nations, as they certainly had ample opportunity to do in the past fifty years.

This strange state of affairs was quite in keeping with historical precedent. Few foreign states had ever shown any serious or long-continued interest in Tibet. At the height of tsarist Russia's expansionist drive around the turn of the century, it is true, some official circles in St. Petersburg nourished territorial ambitions in this remote province of China over which the Manchus exercised no real authority. For a time it seemed that the Russian Imperial Court harbored real intentions of disassociating Tibet from China in the same way in which Mongolia was then being drawn away from Peking. However, the 1907 agreement between London and St. Petersburg effectively blocked Russia's aspirations in Tibet, and Russian infiltration, once stopped, was never resumed, either before or after the Bolshevik revolution.

In fact, the only European Power which was ever able to wield any substantial influence and authority in Tibet was Great Britain in her capacity as mistress of India. For a number of years England's interests on the plateau were judiciously extended and protected through the efforts of leading members of her India service who, often on their own initiative, gave support to the reigning Dalai Lama's rule, especially against various Chinese encroachments. Thus they gradually gained considerable personal ascendancy over the local potentates, consolidating their hold by means of concessions and privileges extorted (by force of British arms if necessary) from both the Tibetan and the Chinese authorities. The latter included the right to station military garrisons at certain strategic points along the main commercial arteries from India or Nepal to Lhasa, the permission to install various communication facilities and operate a network of roadhouses, and the privilege of trading with the Tibetans directly without having to proceed first through the intermediary of the Imperial Manchu Court.

The political situation prevailing along the Indian-Tibetan Chinese border in modern times may therefore be described as follows: Russia had ambitions in the area, but these had been largely abandoned under pressure from London; the British were firmly established in India and had extended their influence into Tibet where they obtained for themselves an undisputed most-favored-nation position; nominally, Chinese suze-

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rainty over the plateau continued to be acknowledged by all concerned, but in fact the British government tolerated only a minimum manifestation of Chinese authority. The net result was a balance-of-power situation in Asia's heartland. A precarious equilibrium of force and influence was made possible by the presence of British arms and the Crown's willingness to use them to prevent any encroachment on the *status quo*, and was dependent on the preservation of China's lack of power to enforce her recognized sovereign rights over the highland. Tibet thus constituted a neutral buffer zone. Formally a part of the Chinese Empire, she was in fact completely independent of Peking and ruled by her own local theocratic government. She could depend on the military and political power of the Viceroy of India for protection from any external threat to her existence or domestic authority.[3]

When, following World War II, Great Britain was forced to grant independence to her Indian possessions, the traditional British policy vis-à-vis Tibet was inherited by the new Indian government which, however, lacked both the military strength and the political inclination to practice the overt power politics so indispensable for the successful implementation of this policy. Nevertheless, for a short while, India and Nepal continued to operate the facilities formerly owned by the Crown at important points of the highland. They also continued to show strong interest in political developments in the region partly because of the religious, cultural and ethnic affinities between their own and the Tibetan people, but especially for economic and military reasons.

The Indian government was vitally concerned about the Communist Chinese "liberation" drive against Tibet in 1950. A perturbed Nehru addressed a series of diplomatic notes to Peking tactfully deploring the Red régime's resort to armed force and urgently appealing to Mao to find an amicable way to settle his differences with the Tibetan theocracy. This

[3] A historical and legal survey of Tibet's position in international affairs is found in C. H. Alexandrowicz-Alexander, "The Legal Position of Tibet", *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 48 (1954), No. 2, pp. 265-274; Tieh-Tseng Li, "The Legal Position of Tibet", *ibid.*, vol. 50 (1956), No. 2, pp. 394-404, and *idem, The Historical Status of Tibet* (New York, 1956).

For an analysis of Tibet's record from a Soviet point of view, see V. P. Leontiev, *Inostrannaya ekspansiya v Tibete, 1888-1919gg (Foreign Expansion in Tibet, 1888-1919)* (Moscow, 1956).

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expression of interest, however, met with the curtest rebuff from Red China. Chou En-lai pointedly informed New Delhi that Tibet was, and had always been, an integral part of the Chinese state, that this was an exclusively domestic dispute, and that India was meddling in a matter which was beyond her proper jurisdiction, thereby giving encouragement to certain "reactionary" Tibetan circles in their futile resistance to China's lawful rights.[4] The exchange of official communications proved completely fruitless. The steady advance of the Chinese troops into Tibet soon brought about the capitulation of the Dalai Lama's régime and the conclusion, on May 27, 1951, of the fateful so-called Treaty on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.[5]

Much of the present controversy and bloodshed in Tibet and, indirectly, in northern India can be traced to the document signed and sealed in Peking in 1951. Red China's present position on the plateau and the current Sino-Indian differences with regard to the highland to a great extent stem from Peking's manner of interpreting and implementing the provisions of the accord. By the terms of the treaty the Dalai Lama's government acknowledged that Tibet was part of China, consented to entrust foreign relations and defense to the Chinese authorities, agreed to the establishment of a Military Area Headquarters of the P.L.A. and a military-administrative committee on the plateau, acquiesced in principle to a proposed program of future socio-economic reforms in the region, and promised loyally to aid the Chinese in freeing Tibet from all imperialist influences. In return, the Central Government undertook to preserve the existing administrative system in Tibet, granted the area "regional autonomy" within the Chinese state, and bound itself not to modify in any way the titles, rights, privileges and powers of the traditional Tibetan officialdom, on the sole condition that the Panchen Lama, then residing in exile in China, be reinstated in his lawful birthright.

The Sino-Tibetan agreement in fact withdrew the Tibetan question from the international arena. Formally, of course, the newly defined relationship between Peking and Lhasa closely

[4] Text of Sino-Indian exchange of notes, in *People's China*, December 1, 1950, Supplement, p. 9.

[5] Text of the 1951 treaty, in *People's China*, June 16, 1951, Supplement, pp. 3-5; *Pravda*, May 29, 1951.

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resembled the traditional pattern of Sino-Tibetan ties, even to the extent of not openly encroaching on the historical rights of third parties such as India and Nepal in the area. To judge from the written language of the document, China had merely succeeded in reaffirming her age-old juridical claim to suzerainty over the area, while Tibet would continue to enjoy internal autonomy as she had done in times past. Moreover, the solution had apparently been reached with a minimum use of force, although not without repeated threat of resort to such means. In view of all these factors and seemingly satisfied that China would abide by the terms of the 1951 treaty, Nehru, who had always recognized Chinese claims to sovereignty over Tibet, gave the accord wholehearted approval. Other states found in the document a convenient device for divesting themselves of all responsibility in the matter without flagrantly compromising their moral principles.

In addition to these considerations the relatively easy reassertion of Peking's sovereignty over Tibet was aided by a number of incidental developments in international diplomacy: the United Nations preoccupation with the Korean war; the geographical remoteness and physical inaccessibility of Tibet; and, also, perhaps a general impression that preservation of Tibetan independence at the cost of armed intervention would not materially contribute to the strengthening of Western defenses in Asia. Furthermore, most governments seem to have expected Nehru to take the lead in dealing with Peking, since India was the party most affected by Red China's show of force in Tibet, only to find him first adopting a hands-off policy and then hastening to recognize Tibet's newly defined status.

But the Chinese success in Tibet was also due in part to Peking's timely adoption of, and, for three or four years, genuine adherence to, a policy of moderation and of respect for native customs and socioeconomic and political patterns.[6] In the period immediately after the "liberation" and for some time subsequently the presence of the Chinese on the plateau made itself effectively felt without causing undue friction between the

[6] George Ginsburgs and M. Mathos, "Tibet's Administration in the Transition Period, 1951-1954", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 32 (1959), No. 2, pp. 162-177.

A Communist and fellow-traveler estimate of this initial period is in B. P. Gurevich, *Osvobozhdenie Tibeta (The Liberation of Tibet)* (Moscow, 1958), and Alan Winnington, *Tibet: Record of a Journey* (New York, 1957).

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Han elements and the local vested interests. In part this phenomenon can be explained by the apparent desire of the Chinese representatives to concentrate on assuring their physical survival in and material means of control over the territory, a preoccupation which did not require any serious intrusion in Tibetan domestic affairs. Large contingents of Chinese troops were gradually moved in. Highways were built at great expenditure of life and labor to provide relatively easy communication on the plateau and with other areas of the mainland and to permit rapid movement of troops and supplies from bases in inner China into Tibet. Finally, decisive control over most aspects of Tibet's economy, including her trade, was achieved within two or three years, with little opposition either from the local officialdom or from the population at large.[7]

Even in this initial period, however, the representatives of Peking also attempted to extend their influence and authority into other fields of activity than those directly relating to Chinese military control. These first untroubled years of Sino-Tibetan coexistence were used by the Chinese to lay the groundwork for the moment when their government would move toward a closer social and economic integration of Tibet and China. There were early indications of these intentions. Beginning in 1953, and at a rapidly increasing pace, many innovations were introduced, unobtrusively at first, but more and more openly as time went by, designed primarily to win widespread acceptance for large-scale reforms to aid the underprivileged strata of Tibetan society and thus to facilitate the later transformation of the Tibetan way of life in the image of the rest of China. In addition, Tibetans loyal to the Communist régime and hostile to the Dalai Lama's rule were infiltrated into many departments of Tibetan administration, secular as well as eccle-

[7] For a pro-Tibetan and anti-Chinese description of Peking's policies in the period before March 1959, see International Commission of Jurists, *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law*. *Per contra*, and *cf.* V. Kassis, *Vosemdesyat dnei v Tibete (Eighty Days in Tibet)* (Moscow, 1956), pp. 87 *et seq.*; V. Ovchinnikov, "Reporting from the 'Roof of the World'", *Zvezda*, 1956, No. 8, pp. 139 *et seq.*; K. Beba, "Tibet Revisited", *China Reconstructs*, vol. 6, June 1957, pp. 9-12.

An essentially pro-Communist, yet discriminatingly critical, survey of Chinese efforts in Tibet by a Hungarian journalist may be found in I. Patkó, *Tibet* (Budapest, 1957); excerpts in English in *East Europe*, vol. 8 (1959), No. 8, pp. 12-19.

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siastical. Public services were introduced, especially free medical care, with the obvious intention of currying favor with the Tibetan masses. First steps were taken, too, to break the Lamaist Church's heretofore unchallenged monopoly of education by instituting free secular schooling that would eventually satisfy the needs of the entire population.[8]

Despite the impact of these innovations on the traditional Tibetan mode of living, and the underlying incompatibility of the traditional, feudal, spiritual Tibetan outlook on the world, completely dominated by religious ethics, and the materialistic, revolutionary and atheistic *Weltanschauung* of the Chinese Communists, Han authorities secured some popular acceptance of their ideas without violently disrupting the pattern of social relations in the area.[9] As a consequence, effective native opposition to the presence of the Chinese did not crystallize in the first years. Now and then, it is true, there were flare-ups of violence and rebellion by nomadic tribes resentful of alien regulations, officials and tax collectors, as well as among sections of the Church and high nobility who were aware of the danger to their privileges if the Chinese encroachments were allowed to continue unprotested. These clashes, however, did not attain critical proportions before 1956 and, by and large, through a judicious blend of armed firmness and administrative tact Peking did manage to consolidate its authority over the plateau during this phase without arousing widespread popular resentment. It even

[8] Ginsburgs and Mathos, *loc. cit.*, and *idem*, "Tibet's Administration during the Interregnum, 1954-1959", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 32 (1959), No. 3, pp. 249-267, and the documentation therein. M. L. Niemi, "Recent Trends in Chinese Communist Control of Tibet", *Far Eastern Survey*, July 1958, pp. 104-107.

[9] Thus, the *New York Times*, January 13, 1957, commented that "there was no headlong rush towards imposing a Communist society. But year by year more and more Chinese, more and more Chinese laws, have become part of Tibet."

For a Soviet analysis of the administrative reforms in Tibet since the Chinese occupation and the changes in Tibetan social customs since 1951, see, in particular, G. M. Valiakhmetov, "The Internal Structure of Tibet", *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo (Soviet State and Law)*, 1956, No. 7, pp. 114-115, and *idem*, *Organy vlasti i upravleniya Tibeta (Organs of Government and Administration in Tibet)* (Moscow, 1958), pp. 40-41. The Chinese viewpoint may be found in Phuntsogwanggyei, "Tibet Forges Ahead", *People's China*, vol. 13, July 1, 1954, pp. 15-17; Chang Kuo-hua, "Second Anniversary of Tibet's Liberation", *Narodnyi Kitai (People's China)*, 1953, No. 10, pp. 35 *et seq.*

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seemed to gain the tacit support of the bulk of the laboring classes for some parts of its program.

To this policy of official moderation, to Peking's apparent willingness to respect Tibetan institutions and customs, and to China's public acceptance of the principle of peaceful coexistence with the neutralist nations of South and Southeast Asia, the credit must be given for the total elimination of all foreign influences from the Tibetan plateau without resort to any overt political pressure or military coercion. Believing that Red China would abide by the 1951 agreement and would preserve the region as an autonomous buffer zone between China and India, Nehru acceded to China's repeated requests for the termination of all the privileges which the Indian government had inherited from its colonial era and which it continued to enjoy after achieving independence. With the conclusion of the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954,[10] the last important foreign force in Tibet was removed. Indian garrisons in the trading posts were evacuated; trade missions were no longer maintained as of right, but only on the basis of strict reciprocity; a trade agreement for Tibet was signed with the Chinese in Peking, no longer with the Tibetans in Lhasa; and all installations heretofore owned and occupied by the Indian government were sold and transferred to the Chinese authorities. In 1956 Nepal followed India's example and surrendered what few special privileges she had enjoyed in the areas of Tibet adjoining their common frontier.[11] Thus, for the first time since the British appeared at the foot of the Himalayas, Tibet was wholly and undisputably relegated to China's sovereign dominion. For the first time in modern history, moreover, the Central Government exerted effective control over the area instead of merely being satisfied with an acknowledgment of its juridical claims by the *de facto* independent local government of Tibet.

Increased Chinese pressure on Tibet began to make itself felt in 1955, gaining momentum in 1956 and manifesting itself with varying degrees of intensity throughout the next three years. Having established firm physical control over the territory, Peking apparently decided in 1956 that there was no need to

[10] The text of the agreement is in *Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily)*, April 13, 1954; Russian translation in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn (International Affairs)*, 1954, No. 1.

[11] Text in Russian in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn*, 1956, No. 11, pp. 154-155.

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postpone any longer the execution of its real plans, namely the total integration of Tibet into the rest of the Chinese community. This new drive to bring about a "socialist transformation" of Tibetan society took the form of increased pressure by Peking to secure certain changes. Among these were the inauguration of large-scale programs of education and indoctrination under the guidance of imported Han teachers and officials; the encouragement of Tibetan youth to enroll in various institutes for national minorities opened in China proper; increase in the power of Chinese banks and trading corporations over the local economy; the growing dependence of the native producers, merchants and consumers on Chinese imports and Chinese outlets; and discriminatory fiscal policies designed to increase the popularity of the Central Government among the laboring classes (which these measures favored) while slowly undermining the economic position of the monasteries and the nobility.[12]

During the same period the officially encouraged influx of Han settlers from China's overcrowded lowlands to the sparsely populated highlands of Tibet assumed threatening proportions. The Chinese authorities, also, now much more self-confident, began to interfere directly in administration, introducing Chinese laws, bureaucrats and practices into every branch of the local government. As a final step, under unrelenting pressure from Peking the Dalai Lama reluctantly gave his approval to the creation of a so-called Preparatory Committee for the Creation of a Tibetan Autonomous Region, which began functioning in Lhasa in 1956.[13]

The establishment of the Preparatory Committee marked the high point of Peking's campaign of indirect subversion to supplant the autonomous local administrative system by an apparatus of its own creation, completely subordinate to the Central Government's wishes and negating all actual exercise of regional autonomy while formally preserving the pretense of Tibetan

[12] *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law*, pp. 17-67; R. F., "Tibet under Communist Occupation", *The World Today*, vol. 13, July 1956, pp. 292 *et seq.*

[13] "Brief Regulations on the Creation of a Preparatory Committee for the Formation of a Tibetan Autonomous Region", adopted at the 47th meeting of the Standing Committee of the National Congress of People's Representatives, September 26, 1956, *Kuang-Ming Jih-pao*, September 27, 1956; Gurevich, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-209.

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"local government". Hedged in with Chinese civil and military advisers, as well as Chinese-trained Tibetans, the authority of the Dalai Lama and his Cabinet and the influence of the local hierarchy, both secular and ecclesiastical, over matters Tibetan became more and more shadowy after 1956. Henceforth, either openly or *sub rosa*, the Chinese were gradually to gather into their own hands control of all the significant posts and functions on the plateau. The continued existence of the traditional organs of theocratic rule was tolerated by Peking only as a useful fiction serving to mask the real centers of power.[14]

The heightening of Chinese pressure on Tibet resulted in increased resistance by the local hierarchy and some sections of Tibetan society to the growing menace of complete Han domination. Periodic flare-ups of violence and sporadic armed uprisings were reported throughout 1956, 1957 and 1958, generally necessitating suppression by Chinese military might. Beginning in 1957 a rise was also observed in China's pressure on her neighbors to the southeast, on Burma and all along the Tibetan frontier, often in the form of armed incursions by Chinese border troops into adjoining territories and unobtrusive encroachments on and occupation of scattered districts in Burma, north India and the smaller border states. To a considerable extent these periodic fits of aggressiveness seem to be linked to the continuing deterioration of China's domestic situation including the growing difficulties experienced by Peking in its all-out effort to absorb China's recalcitrant minorities.

In part, then, Peking's occasional show of military strength along its southern periphery was clearly designed to keep any help from reaching dissident elements within its territory from alleged anti-Communists on the outside. In part, too, it was an effective way to demonstrate to her neighbors the power of Red China's displeasure with any actual or potential deviation from an attitude friendly or acceptable to Peking. Moreover, such actions served the useful purpose of testing the military preparedness and will to resist of the states in question, and provided a definite possibility of improving China's strategic position in these remote regions and even of acquiring additional territory at negligible risk. In addition, in some instances

[14] See Ginsburgs and Mathos, *loc. cit.*, *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 32 (1959), No. 3, p. 249-267; also, *Tensions in Communist China: An Analysis of Internal Pressures Generated since 1949*, Senate Document No. 66, 1960; pp. 48-59.

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Chinese seizure of strategically situated passes in the mountainous approaches of India's northern provinces was apparently intended to close off avenues of escape from Tibet and inner China and possible routes of infiltration into them.

A final, and major, factor helping to explain China's resort to probing tactics along her southern perimeter is the nature of Southeast Asian geopolitics. The newly independent nations of this area are constantly combating widespread secessionist movements in their outlying provinces that are peopled by ethnic and cultural minorities and characterized by an ingrained opposition to centralized authority on grounds of principle. A successful manifestation of Red China's presence in these areas, without effective counteraction from their respective capitals, would encourage the local dissident elements in their centrifugal tendencies and further undermine their bonds of allegiance to distant and sometimes culturally alien governments. Repeated demonstrations of power by Peking, particularly in so dramatic a form as military occupation, would be bound eventually to discourage any vocal opposition to its ambitions in these areas and foster a definite orientation of local opinion and loyalty toward this dominant influence, at the expense of New Delhi, Rangoon, Katmandu and other seats of official, but ineffective, authority. These consequences would apply equally well to the situation in Burma's Wa districts and the troubled Shan States, as it would to Sikkim and Bhutan and the Ladakh region and even Nepal herself, all of which look for help and protection to their Central Governments or protecting power and often find it not forthcoming.

In any case, regardless of what other policy calculations may have inspired Peking's increasingly aggressive tactics in 1957, it is certain that the growing Tibetan opposition to all things Chinese during that year, combined with vocal anti-Communist agitation by Tibetan elements residing in the border areas of Nepal and India and veiled, but obvious, official concern in those two states over the more and more frequent Chinese resort to armed force in order to maintain peace and order in the region, played a major part in goading Peking into these fitful shows of military might. The use of these methods did not, however, materially improve the Chinese position in the area and toward the end of 1957 Peking was even forced to withdraw the bulk of its military and civilian occupation forces from

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Tibet in the face of mounting local rebellion against its rule.[15] Yet, barely six months after suffering this serious reversal the Red régime once more returned to the attack and its determined offensive against all obstacles to its absolute control seems to have been largely responsible for provoking the March 1959 uprising in Lhasa and Kham and all the ensuing bloodshed. In analyzing the pattern of diplomatic intercourse now prevailing in this disputed area, then, it becomes necessary to distinguish between three different sets of political relations, which, though essentially interdependent and mutually complementary, nevertheless each possess a rationale and *raison d'être* quite their own: (1) the Sino-Tibetan prospects; (2) the Peking-New Delhi relationship; and (3) Chinese and Indian positions in and with relation to their common Himalayan periphery.

So far as Tibet is concerned, it seems quite clear that Peking is resolved to make the region part and parcel of the Chinese nation, perhaps endowed with some form of "paper" autonomy, but in reality directed, exploited and ruled from Peking just like any of the other national-minorities regions and areas of the Chinese People's Republic. In the pursuit of this goal the Central Government is apparently determined to brook no outside interference in its relations with Lhasa. Nor would it seem that Peking is willing to tolerate any longer the Tibetan delaying techniques which, for eight years, prevented China's Communist régime from reaching its main political objectives of carrying out "socialist reforms" in the area.[16] Thus, even granted that the desperate 1959 uprising of Tibet's conservative, anti-Han elements was not deliberately provoked by the Chinese authorities in order to furnish them with an excuse to liquidate the tradition-oriented local government of Tibet and its die-hard supporters—a not implausible explanation of the revolt's origins—it does, nevertheless, seem to have provided them with a welcome pretext ruthlessly to wipe out, once and for all, the few remaining obstacles to Peking's exercise of absolute authority on the plateau.

[15] Hsinhua News Agency, "Daily News Release", December 11, 1956, p. 91; *New York Times,* October 12, 1957, p. 2; *Survey of China Mainland Press,* No. 1527, May 10, 1957, p. 34, and No. 1634, October 18, 1957, p. 35.

[16] For first reports of Chinese progress in introducing large-scale social and economic reforms in the wake of the abortive March 1959 uprising, see *New York Times,* November 14, 1959, p. 1, and February 29, 1960, p. 8; also *Survey of China Mainland Press,* No. 2120, October 21, 1959, p. 5.

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For the present, Tibet must be treated as within China's exclusive jurisdiction and control. Even though vestiges of her age-old theocratic form of government continue to be tolerated by the Chinese authorities, this is at best a temporary concession. The final outcome will in all probability follow the precedent of Outer Mongolia where prior to 1924 conditions prevailed quite like those in Tibet before the Communist occupation. Just as the Mongolian Living Buddha's theocratic rule was allowed to exist, in emasculated form, until the Hutukhtu's death but no new incarnation permitted thereafter, so, most probably, will the exalted position of the present leaders of the Tibetan hierarchy be maintained, after a fashion, only to disappear by default after their earthly demise. Barring unexpected developments, then, Tibet within the foreseeable future seems to be scheduled for total assimilation (economically, politically, socially and culturally) into the main body of the Chinese state and nation.

While Peking's intentions in Tibet are unmistakable, considerable ambiguity and vagueness suffuse its official attitude toward neutralist India. On the whole, however, it seems safe to conclude that Peking does not, at least at present, plan any large-scale territorial aggrandizement at India's expense. Rather, Chinese tentative probing of India's northern defense perimeter apparently serves to gauge the strength of Nehru's determination to resist any potential encroachment, to discover the weak points in New Delhi's security system, to throw the Indian government off balance and perhaps render it more amenable to Chinese demands or blandishments, or to undermine its internal authority and thus facilitate the Indian Communist party's bid for power. Each of these considerations or a combination thereof must in turn dictate Peking's decisions to increase or abate the intensity of its pressure on India, for, even at their amicable best, relations between the two countries are never completely devoid of an element of tension and suspicion, for the most part originating with the Communists.

While India proper is not, therefore, in any serious danger of invasion by Chinese forces or even under serious threat of Communist subversion supported and directed from across her northern border, the same cannot be said of the small border states lying athwart the Indian-Tibetan frontier. In effect, the pattern of political relations in this twilight zone has since 1950 under-

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gone a fundamental transformation. The withdrawal of British military might from the area and its replacement by the much weaker forces of the Republic of India, coupled with the rise of China as a military and economic Power of the first rank, have resulted in a shift of the sphere of struggle and power-balance from Tibet southward.

The Tibetan plateau can no longer be viewed as a neutral glacis, a sort of political no-man's land insulating the British outposts in India from China's millions, a region where the ambitious pretensions of the Manchu Emperors, and their Republican successors, were effectively stymied by natural obstacles and British diplomatic maneuvers and thus kept at a safe distance from the Crown Jewel of the British Empire. On the contrary, Tibet now represents an advance base of Chinese penetration into Southeast Asia and a forepost of Chinese military power in that continent's strategic heartland. The border states which once served as convenient *places d'armes* for British expeditions to Lhasa have in turn become the arena in which the portentous struggle between Peking and New Delhi for influence and control, and for the possession of the vital Himalayan passes, is now being decided. Long safe behind the British front lines (then drawn deep in Tibet), Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Kashmir have now been projected into the very center of the battle for political domination, while Tibet has receded into the background, a rear-guard zone no longer an active prize in the contest for local supremacy between India and China.

The struggle for primacy between Asia's two great Powers in this crucial area of the globe is still in process, with no clear outcome yet in sight.[17] As of now, however, it would seem that Communist China holds a significant edge in the clash and that, unless India soon undertakes a complete reappraisal of her present attitude toward the problem and institutes a drastically revised policy, China will progressively strengthen her current efforts at expansion and further increase her already important gains in the disputed sectors. Thus, while it is almost certain that Peking does not at present envisage any large-scale occupation of territory unquestionably belonging to India, it is equally clear that no such reservations apply to a number of areas where

[17] H. A. Steiner, "India Looks to Her Northern Frontiers", *Far Eastern Survey*, November 1959, pp. 167-173.

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Chinese exploratory thrusts have, as of late, been particularly active. India's title to Kashmir, and with it Ladakh, is, for instance, far from unclouded; historically, as mistress of Tibet, China also has some definite, albeit quite obscure, rights in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim on grounds of immemorial tradition, and ethnic, cultural and religious affinity between the populations of these lands and China's Tibetan minority.[18] To detach these territories from India and integrate them into the Chinese orbit, by means short of war if possible, seems to be the chief aim of Peking's current manipulations in this region, an aim long nurtured by Mao's régime, but postponed for lack of the effective means for its realization.

The measures that China has taken since 1951 to strengthen her initially precarious foothold in Tibet have now provided the means for further penetration to the south and southeast. Both areas of significant Chinese advance into Indian territory, in Ladakh and south of Yatung, are terminal points of major highways constructed during the last eight years by the People's Liberation Army's garrisons on the highland. Tibet herself, just a few years back entirely devoid of any means of communication more complex than a footpath or caravan route, has since 1951 been traversed by a series of all-weather motor highways, crisscrossing the country from north to south and east to west, with intermediary trunk lines connecting all centers of any importance.[19] As a consequence, certain points within the northern crescent of India's border provinces or territories nominally under New Delhi's protection are at present more accessible to forces stationed within Tibet than to India's own troops, especially in the case of mechanized units. In these underdeveloped lands the flag often tends to follow the road and Peking's large-scale highway-building program, sometimes, as in Ladakh, laid out in alien terrain, could well persuade these peripheral areas to gravitate into China's sphere of control, as it is apparently intended to do.

When to military preponderance and communications suprem-

[18] For a suggestive survey of the conflict of legal claims in this area, see A. P. Rubin, "The Sino-Indian Border Disputes", *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, vol. 9 (1960), No. 1, pp. 96-125.

[19] Three main highways now link Tibet with Sikang, Sinkiang and Szechwan. Within Tibet proper 6,000 km. of motor roads and highways are said to have been built by the Chinese authorities since 1951.

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acy is added yet a third factor, namely prospective population superiority in the region, the threat of Chinese domination over the northern approaches to the Indian plains assumes even greater reality. What are, in effect, officially sponsored migrations of Chinese settlers into Tibet have been proceeding at a considerable, and ever increasing, rate during the past five years. Mao publicly stated, as far back as 1952, his desire to see ten million souls permanently residing on the highland within the foreseeable future.[20] Should this plan be fulfilled, a population ten times greater than the one which has traditionally occupied the plateau will be facing the relatively empty, and inviting, spaces across the Tibetan-Indian frontier. And populations, like cold air, tend to move from high pressure to lower pressure areas.

In short, unless drastic steps are undertaken by New Delhi without delay, the outlook for a successful containment of Red China at the Indian-Tibetan border seems very dim—as dim as the hopes once so fondly cherished by most Foreign Offices that Tibet's impossible landscape, with some slight assistance from the Tibetan army, would defeat any Chinese invasion. Should such countermeasures not be taken in time or in sufficient number, the repercussions could prove fatal for the free world's survival on the Asian continent. To paraphrase a well-known and undeservedly abused proposition of geopolitics, "He who holds Tibet dominates the Himalayan piedmont; he who dominates the Himalayan piedmont threatens the Indian subcontinent; and he who threatens the Indian subcontinent may well have all of Southeast Asia within his reach, and, with it, all of Asia."

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[20] Between 1954 and 1956 there were reports that 500,000 Chinese emigrants had been resettled on the plateau under the auspices of the Central Government, *New York Times*, November 28, 1956, p. 7, and February 6, 1957, p. 10. The resettlement scheme, which slowed down considerably during 1956-1959, seems to have gained new impetus in the wake of recent armed disturbances in China's border areas; e.g., "Chinese Migrate to Border Areas", *New York Times*, April 5, 1959, p. 9, estimates a proposed influx of an additional 5 million Chinese into the border regions by 1962.

The eventual increase of Tibet's population to 10 million is planned through a systematic program of resettlement of Han elements from China proper onto the plateau. See A. G. Yakovlev, *Reshenie natsionalnogo voprosa v Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublike (Solution of the National Question in the Chinese People's Republic)* (Moscow, 1959), p. 89.

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# THE USES OF MARX FOR HISTORY*

## I

DISCUSSIONS of Marx have become invitations to banality. The Machiavellis, the Vicos, the De Toquevilles rise and fall but Marx goes on forever. So ubiquitous has he been in our intellectual experience and so all-encompassing have been the commentaries that it seems at times advisable simply to accept the inevitable and work him into the collection of old maxims which so frequently spare us the trouble of thinking. Thus: Marxism is a fine position to visit but I should hate to stay there. Or: Marx hatched the egg that Hegel laid while standing on his head.

For those whose tastes run rather to the utilitarian, perhaps the time has come to draw up a list of serviceable prescriptions wherein Marx figures. For example: Our views will be generally acceptable if we apply Marx to the analysis of any country but our own; the more hostile the country, the more acceptable the views. And again: We shall find Marx very convenient in explaining any social system about which we know very little; the less we know, the more unqualified and therefore the more brilliant the explanation. This use may be labeled "Marx as a teaching aid."

But we are not interested here in enriching our store either of proverbs or of injunctions. Nor are we interested in Marx merely as an object of study—whether as part of the "Know Your Enemy" series or as a revealing representative of nineteenth-century social and intellectual history. The relevance of the first is obvious, but for this purpose we should patiently follow the criteria of Marx chosen by the "enemy" rather than select our own. The relevance of the second is equally patent, although as historians we should probably prefer someone more obscure who could be rehabilitated. In any case it may be accounted, on this occasion, a parochial concern. What we are really interested in is the question of Marx's longevity, of Marx as a subject, if subject be taken to mean citizenship in that exclusive republic of letters whose collective mind, formed

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slowly over the centuries through the sifting out of the transitory, the contingent and the inadequate, bequeaths the quintessential treasure of western culture to us, its novitiate.

When regarded in these fundamental terms, the answer to the question of Marx's permanent value may well be considered to be all or nothing at all. For if we consider many of Marx's particular contributions, we find them double-teamed, and fretted into that worn-out category of the "transitional". We have been assured that they had their origins before Marx, and we know that they have been formulated more truly—or let us say, for the skeptics, more to our taste—since Marx. For the dialectic, Marx is surrounded by Hegel and the existentialists; for the class struggle and the science of society, by Saint-Simon and Max Weber; for social history, by Lorenz von Stein and Marc Bloch, to name but one luminary of the modern approach. But if we then proceed to assert that it is not what he said but the way that he said it—that is, the combination of these particular insights into a more or less compatible system—then we have advanced only from the trivial to the trite. More important, to emphasize the substantive totality of Marx's system, whether in the ambitious form of dialectical materialism or in the more modest dress of the economic interpretation of history, is to emphasize precisely that aspect of Marx which, whatever its popular appeal, has been most wholeheartedly rejected by the academic community. Nor can it be maintained that Marx's total scheme amounts only to a dispensable scaffolding, an early crutch with no valid function in his mature thought. For even a cursory reading of Marx reveals that his characteristic interpretations applied generally to complete historical processes and not to specific events. His analyses of particulars were frequently perceptive but not especially distinctive. Consequently his system stands and falls with his over-all framework. And yet, while Marx's particular insights have generally called forth a "Yes but" response from scholarly posterity, the compound as a whole is typically answered with an "Oh no." In this posture he is aligned with Hegel and Toynbee as the protagonists of absolute historical laws in whose very possibility we no longer believe. Perhaps historians can still make their reputations by proclaiming themselves against determinism and the primacy of economic man—in short, against sin—but I doubt it.

Substantively, then, Marx provides little sustenance for histo-

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rians today. We proceed on the assumptions of historical discontinuity, plurality of causation, and merely formal absolutes when we admit any at all. Marx's undoubted contributions to the social identification of the undifferentiated "people", or "masses", to the disciplined, or scientific, study of society, to the awareness of the ideological component in ideals and of the relations of material interests to them, to the social analysis of political power, and to the periodization of social history have all been absorbed and refined to such a degree that their classic formulation in Marx functions less as a model than as a straw horse. When even the disciples have had, admittedly or covertly, to revise Marx's analysis as men and times have changed, how much more exception has been taken by those whose assumptions as well as circumstances differ widely from Marx's own.

## II

If we turn now from the substance to the form of Marx's thinking we come to the heart of our problem of his current usefulness, for here filial condescension is out of place and we must look to Marx as a master. In three different ways Marx provides approaches that must still be studied for problems that are still vital. For two of these approaches Marx must share our attention with his fellow members of a select company of intellectual pioneers. In the third, he stands alone.

First, Marx is one of those pivotal thinkers in whom—and only in whom—the fundamental antinomies of human life are not only expressed but, in some mysterious way, resolved. The criteria of intellectual greatness in our culture are varied. For some judges, either more impressionable or more partisan than most, they revolve around the function of innovation. For other observers, who can dissolve any putative novelty into its traditional components until there is nothing new any time anywhere under the sun, intellectual performance is measured by the comprehensiveness with which the assumptions, methods and ideas already current in an age are articulated and integrated. But if we take a less historical view of the problem and make our distinction between the primary thinkers from whom we can learn directly and the secondary figures who simply enter somehow into the development which has made us what we are, then we can probably agree on the truism that the measure of greatness is the illumination of what is fundamental

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to humanity in all ages. The problem, of course, is, whose fundamental?—since one man's necessity is another's contingency. But the problem does get resolved in practice, for there is a surprising consensus on the authoritative figures of our culture, and if we review their ranks the rationale of greatness becomes clear. Almost without exception the immortals are those who, regardless of their partisan solutions and followings, have something to say to everybody because they encompass both sides of eternally vital issues. Moreover, they encompass these oppositions in ways that are not only inimitable but almost incomprehensible. Idea and appearance in Plato, the two cities of Augustine, faith and reason in Ockham, necessity and virtu in Machiavelli, the spirit and the world in Luther, predestination and freedom in Calvin, mind and body in Descartes, reason and reality in Hobbes, transcendence and immanence in Spinoza, reason and nature in Rousseau, imperative and freedom in Kant —these fundamental contrasts, which seem disjunctive to lesser minds and which have even required a rather obvious developmental mediation by an Aristotle, an Aquinas and a Hegel, were not opposites for the masters. Indeed, so persuaded are they of the essential compatibility of these principles that they take it for granted and seem hardly aware of the problems that have beset their progeny. The delicate balance which is so natural in them has struck their successors as an intolerable strain, and so we have had the pattern of the original equilibrium of principles giving way to resolutions on the one side and on the other. Now, despite the Hegelian developmental format of his thought, Marx's place is with the dealers in dualities. "Evolution and revolution" is but the most familiar expression of the underlying balance between necessity and freedom which Marx with such assurance upheld. The vision of human destiny which men of this stamp shared is, I think, still beyond us. When we do catch a glimpse of it we grasp it usually in a particular formulation and then only fleetingly. The distance is too great, and the insight soon drops away or is hollowed into mere verbalism. We must read Marx along with the others—perhaps, since his idiom is familiar to us, even more than the others—to raise ourselves to the comprehension of this most elevated strand of our cultural heritage wherein the diversity of man's fate is recognized and yet composed to unity. For Marx illuminates the crucial insight on this level: that particulars and totalities

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are subject to very different processes; that we are equally committed as individuals to the freedom and variety of the one and as members of collectivities to the order and determination of the other; and that from this interplay of private spontaneity and public channel comes the final single direction of tomorrow's history.

The second application of Marx affects the general rather than the philosophical historian, for it concerns interpretation within, rather than across, particular periods. There has been much talk—if somewhat less use—of integrated history. With the expansion of the historical process to include the full range of human activities, from the economic and technological to the cultural and religious, the problem of how these varied strains are to be put together has come to the fore. In general, five devices have been adopted to this end. First, the specialized approach: one field of history is chosen and the rest lumped together as "background", to be brought out again in case of emergency when all intra-field explanations have failed. Second, the additive approach: this consists of several chapters on politics and one chapter each on everything else, together with the pious hope that it will all add up to something. Third, the grain-of-sand approach: an issue or theme that cuts across several fields of interest is examined for the play of various kinds of influences upon it, with the pious hope that historical man in this case was more unified than he usually is and was concerned in all his activities with this same issue. Fourth, the atmospheric approach: this is an aesthetic procedure in which variegated movements, events and anecdotes are grouped into a kind of historical portrait which yields a dominant impression. Fifth, the stylistic approach: here a label is selected, usually from the arts—like Renaissance, baroque, classical, romantic—and the qualities associated with it are applied across the board to all kinds of endeavors unto Renaissance tyranny in the name of the Roman republic and romantic economics in the name of infinite profit-seeking. These devices are certainly an improvement as modes of integration over the traditional organic analogy of rise, maturity and decline—which, incidentally, they have not entirely replaced—but their very variety shows that they are not entirely satisfactory.

In any discussion of this urgent problem of coherence Marx is essential; for, whatever our reservations on his substantive

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notions of base and superstructure, his method of integrating man's historical activities in any one period is the most intellectually satisfying means yet devised. What is unsatisfactory, of course, is Marx's commitment to economic primacy and to political and ideological dependence as absolute principles. Nor does it help much to tinker with this formulation and to claim with the early Marx and the late Engels that the relationships admit of reciprocity. What we must do is something more radical. We must "relativize" Marx's formulation and insist that, as he put it, it holds for some situations and not for others. But even when we deflower Marx's doctrine in this way, we are still left with a model structure of integration. Its essential prescriptions are two: that in every period the kind of activity with which men are most concerned—which they consider the most important—gives tone and color to the rest; and that this kind of activity must be one that concerns not only a capriciously selected few artists, writers or statesmen but the great body of men who are active.

If it be objected that our formulation has departed too far from the original Marx, it should be remembered that in the first large-scale articulation of his system what Marx opposed to the speculative history of consciousness was basically not economic history as such but the history of "real living individuals" and "*their* consciousness".[1] Consequently, history itself became for Marx a "real, positive science", and the coherence within a period is given by "abstractions" or "assumptions", which "have no value in themselves" but which "stem from the study of the real life process and the action of individuals of each epoch" and "serve only to facilitate the ordering of the historical material and to indicate the hierarchy of its particular levels."[2] Marx explicitly assigned to his first classic exposition of the economic interpretation, which followed hard upon this introduction, a place simply as "some of these abstractions which we use vis-à-vis ideology. . . . illustrated by historical examples."[3] Certainly this wider framework was rarely operative in Marx's subsequent writing, and in the *Capital* he was expressly to deny that classical antiquity and the Middle Ages were less dominated

[1] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie*, in V. Adoratsky, ed., *Marx/Engels Gesamtausgabe* (Berlin, 1932), I/5, p. 15.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

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by their economic bases than were modern times.[4] Yet the breadth of Marx's ultimate conception of integration did have at least two important results for his work.

It permitted him to acknowledge, not only in historical practice, but in historical principle, that "even within a nation the individuals have entirely different developments, apart from their property relationships," since on the one hand traditional interests may exercise a political and theoretical influence disproportionate to their already "destroyed form of exchange", and on the other hand "particular points [*einzelne Punkte*]" of a society allow certain theorists to form "a more general synthesis" and thus "to appear at times further advanced than the contemporary empirical relations."[5] It was this kind of vague consciousness of a wider context for the economic interpretation that explains the surprising latitude in some of Marx's actual history-writing and helped Marx to account for himself.

The other important consequence of the broader context in which the economic interpretation was imbedded was that it permitted Marx to announce the principle of the particularity of each era and thereby to delimit the dependence of the superstructure upon the economic base for historical interpretation. Marx could castigate Proudhon for having "substituted the means and men of our century for the men and means of previous centuries and misunderstood the historical movement by which successive generations transformed the results acquired from the generations which preceded them."[6] Now obviously Marx himself saw a pattern common to all ages, but since for him this was an admitted abstraction derived by synthetic judgment from experience rather than a necessary law imposed upon experience, it did not abridge the autonomy of each era of humanity. He even asserted, in his usual sweeping fashion, that with "immutable laws, eternal principles, ideal categories . . . there no longer is any history."[7] This insistence had the effect not only of maintaining historicity *between* eras but also of loosening the rigidity of integration *within* eras.

Since economic primacy was no absolute principle, the super-

[4] Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (New York, 1906), p. 94, note.

[5] Marx and Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie, loc. cit.*, I/5, p. 62.

[6] Marx, *Misère de la philosophie*, in *ibid.*, I/6, p. 187.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 184.

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structure could not be implied in it, inferred from it, or be considered any kind of logical function of it. For Marx the common substance of history was the activity of men—"men as simultaneously the authors and actors of their own history"[8]—and this activity extended equally to all levels: modes of production, social relations, ideas and categories.[9] Consequently in society "all relationships co-exist simultaneously and are mutually supporting".[10] "Definite individuals" are "the producers" of all these relationships, and the hierarchy of relationships is established simply by the fact that the conditions of physical existence define for every age the general orientation of the individuals whose activity produces the society, the state, and the ideas of that age.[11] If we subtract the substantive assumption prescribing only economic considerations as the conditions which delimit the area of significant activity, then we are left with the fruitful insight that the chief of men's concerns or values in any period form a kind of mold within which their other interests are organized.

But the uses of Marx as a model for the admission of antinomies and for integration within historical periods both lead inexorably to the problem that is at once Marx's most distinctive contribution and his greatest difficulty. For Marx is by professed method and by a body of actual insights as concrete and empirical as we are, and yet he somehow also gets out of this method and puts into his insights a total process, a total meaning, such as we should wish to have. It is true that some of Marx's approximate contemporaries, like Comte, Spencer, Buckle and Ranke, evince similar patterns, but they do not touch us so nearly. Either the seams in the pattern are too evident, as in Comte and Ranke, or the scheme is so attuned to the material, whether by the amorality of the scheme or the limitation of the material, that we do not particularly care whether it is true or not. In either case we may endorse or criticize; in neither case can we participate. What intrigues us about Marx is his capacity to find an essentially ethical rationale running within and across the centuries at the very same time that he perceives the diversity and complexity of historical existence. Certainly we may simply shrug our shoulders and call him inconsistent. The trouble is that he is too inconsistent; the contrast is too blatant for us to

[8] *Ibid.* [9] *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 180.
[11] Marx and Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie*, in *ibid.*, I/5, pp. 15-16.

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be able to explain the inconsistency with the patent observations that a moral coloration seeped into the admitted "assumptions" or "abstractions" which constituted the sinews of his system. If this were all, the process would be familiar enough and we should be in a position to teach rather than to learn.

But Marx's thinking is striking in two ways. In the first place, where we cautiously and self-consciously separate our assumptions from the reality that we treat and look to the *validity* of our methods, Marx deliberately threw this caution to the winds, buried his assumptions without residue in the substance of history, and found in the manifold of reality the rational truth that he had placed there. He called his assumptions "actual assumptions" *(wirkliche Voraussetzungen)*,[12] and felt that the pattern was as objectively existent as the particular facts of which it was entirely composed. All it required was inclusion of a set of facts —that is, the economic—which historians had not yet "bothered to observe or treated only as inessential, isolated from the historical process."[13] When he dwelt upon the "illusions" of the past, as he so often did, his concern was, not to show their invalidity, but to assess them for the degree of reality which they expressed and to demonstrate the distortion in approaching reality as anything less than a total process. Secondly, Marx's system holds our attention because of the apparent absurdity of the form which he chose for its cohesion. At the very period when Marx lashed the Hegelians for applying the categories of mind to "material" reality, he apparently adopted a developmental dialectic which made sense as a category of mind and applied it to "material" reality, where, by his own lights, it does not make sense. Marx had too acute an intelligence to have made such an application baldly without realizing the incongruity of it. Actually, there was an intermediate step between his dialectical scheme and the raw material upon which it was imposed—a step which made the imposition seem congruous. Here we may perhaps glean something about the principles of synthetic judgment which we so sorely need.

## III

What this process of mediation was, in Marx, can be specified, for it was not only a logical but a chronological development.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

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It forms a crucial chapter in his intellectual biography, and we can watch it grow. Indeed, we can approach it only genetically, for Marx's situation was not that of a philosopher who held simultaneously to first principles and brute reality and sought a logical connection between them. Rather it was the situation of an intellectual who developed out of his first principles the mediating mold which was to cradle the brute reality from its first apprehension. It was not, then, as might appear from the finished system, the scheme that was applied to the reality, but rather the reality that was fitted to the scheme. Not only did this process signify a kind of prefabrication of Marx's reality which automatically ensured its consonance with the pattern—an obvious and not uncommon procedure—but, what was far more important and distinctive, it signified the development of principles which positively opened the way for Marx to reality. Can it be surprising, therefore, that he saw these principles as part of the reality itself? Let us see how this development worked.

The writings of Marx's pre-communist period, which stretched approximately from 1841 to 1844, are filled with a double effort: to retain the rationality, the meaningfulness, of Hegelian idealism and to reach for its concrete realization through action. Marx himself rang the keynote of his endeavors when he confessed in 1842: "The existence which I love seems truly to me a necessary existence, which I need, without which my being cannot have a full, satisfied, and complete life."[14] In response to this impulse toward realization, his first step, which he took between 1841 and 1843, was to *in*vert Hegel—a half-way stage toward his ultimate *sub*version of the master. Marx complained that Hegel had reversed the proper relationship of subject and predicate, and he insisted upon changing them back into their proper order.[15] Leaving aside the philosophical implications of this formulation, we may say that in substance it amounted to a shift from the Hegelian notion of the determination of reason in phenomena to the notion of the rationalization of existence by phenomena. Thus "Hegel starts from the predicates of general determination instead of starting from real being. . . . Hegel does not [as he should] consider the universal as the idea of the

[14] Marx, "Debatten über Pressfreiheit und Publikation der Landständischen Verhandlungen", in Adoratsky, ed., *op. cit.*, I/1a, p. 184.

[15] Marx, *Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrecht*, in *ibid.*, pp. 410, 426-427.

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real-finite, that is, of the existent. . . ."[16] "[For Hegel] . . . the philosophical element is not [as it should be] the logic of the thing, but rather it is the thing of logic."[17] Here, incidentally, is the root of Marx's life-long addiction to the rhetorical converse: it was his way of placing what he considered to be false diversions from existence back within the sphere of existence. Marx's rationalizations of existence at this stage made sense in terms of the particular kind of existence to which he was now addressing himself: to rational men in their relationship to the state, an institution which was traditionally deemed an arena of rational construction. A few random quotations will serve to illustrate. "The will of a people can no more than the will of an individual go beyond the laws of reason."[18] "Sovereignty is nothing else but the objectified spirit of the subjects of the State."[19] "The affairs and activities of the State are bound to individuals (the state is active only through the mediation of individuals)."[20] "In the State it is conscious reason which should rule."[21] Rejecting Hegel's "dualism", as he saw it, which opposed the conscious formal constitution of the state to its unconscious, necessitous actuality, Marx identified the resolution of freedom with the immanent rationality of existence when he asked: "why not recognize the law of the thing, of reason, as the law of the State?"[22] Thus Marx, in this early period—that is, between 1841 and 1843—was essentially a political democrat, calling for the assumption of the rational control of the state by the people through an act of revolution.[23]

But the political world of his age was neither rational nor democratic; hence, his synthesis of reason and existence was marred by a glaring fault. When Marx confronted this issue, he was forced to reveal that he, too, was still operating on two different levels of reality.

> In modern States, as in Hegel's philosophy of law, conscious reality, the true reality of the general welfare, is only formal. . . . Hegel is not to be blamed because he describes the being of the modern State as it exists, but because he gives for the being of the modern State that which exists. That the rational is real, that is precisely in

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 427.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 418.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 468.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 427.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 423.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 466.
[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 467-468.

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> contradiction with the irrational reality which is everywhere the contrary of what it expresses and expresses the contrary of what it is.[24]

It was in this context, as early as 1842, that Marx adopted the Hegelian notion of "alienation" as the device for relating rational and phenomenal components in a single order of existence.[25] Alienation at this point was for Marx essentially political: it consisted in the separation of civil society away from the state into a purely private status, and in consequence the separation of the individual away from his true social being into "a purely external material being".[26] The remedy is similarly political—participation of all individuals in the constituent legislative power as their "natural right", for "only in his political posture is the member of civil society . . . worthy of the title of *man*."[27] At this stage, then, the integrity of Marx's realism demanded an act of collective political reason. Neither history nor economics entered into the problem.

The analytical point of view which this framework sponsored for Marx emerged in his journalistic activity on the *Rheinische Zeitung* during 1842. Essentially his analysis consisted in the critical measurement of current events by the standards of categorical universal political ideals. What was distinctive about this analysis was that for Marx the ideals were at least as real as the events and that consequently his measurement tended to take the form of assessing events as subordinate parts or divisions of the unities represented by the ideal within the real. Thus his criticism was double-pronged. On the one hand he set his own categorical principles as realities against "mystico-religious" theories of "imagination".[28] Not only did he now oppose "communist theories in their present form" because they had no "theoretical reality", much less any possibility of "practical realization",[29] but he even deemed the conservative nobility to live, when measured by his standards, "beyond the real world". But even they must, to fight for their social existence, "allow universal reason and general liberty to enter into their bad

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 476.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 496.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 497-499.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 498, 508-510, 525.

[28] Marx, "Debatten über die Pressfreiheit", in *ibid.*, pp. 199, 220.

[29] Marx, "Der Kommunismus und die Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung", in *ibid.*, p. 263.

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sentiments and their chimeras".[30] "Liberty so constitutes the essence of man that even its adversaries realize it while fighting the reality of it."[31] On the other hand, he analyzed moderate positions as not merely partial but even essentially opposed to the general reality. "It is in the opposition to a general liberty that the spirit of the definite sphere, the individual interest of the particular class, the naturally unilateral aspect of character manifest themselves with . . . most brutality."[32]

> It is not a question of knowing if the liberty of the press ought to exist, since it always exists. It is a question of knowing if the liberty of the press is the privilege of some individuals or the privilege of the human spirit. It is a question of knowing if the "liberty of the spirit" has more right than "liberties against the spirit".[33]

Nor did specific forms of the principle fare any better than its limited application. "We do not like the kind of liberty which appears only in the plural. England shows us . . . how dangerous the limited horizon of 'liberties' is for 'liberty'."[34]

We can see here the origins of Marx's ideas of "class". It had meaning only over against a whole rational principle, of which it was both a part and an opposite. Class thus started as the alienated phenomenon of real reason. Marx even formulated a philosophical class conflict: "There is the intolerance of one species of liberty which will support the others only if they renounce their special nature and declare themselves its vassals."[35]

The first tentative extension of these categories to social issues came late in 1842 in Marx's articles on the wood-theft law. For here the general scaffolding was still much in evidence, with law and the state replacing liberty as the concrete universals under discussion, but their antithesis now was the partial private interest of "property owners", into which he lumped all the "privileged estates" without discrimination vis-à-vis the "class *(Klasse)* of the poor"—the "unpropertied".[36] Marx's concern, however, lay not with this class opposition as such. It lay rather with the illegality and irrationality of the property owners' efforts to use law and the state as instruments of private interests; the unpropertied class, consequently, was not an active agent but functioned simply as an object upon which the state

[30] Marx, "Debatten über die Pressfreiheit", in *ibid.*, pp. 198-199.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 202. [32] *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185. [33] *Ibid.*, p. 202.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 226. [35] *Ibid.*, p. 221.
[36] Marx, "Debatten über das Holzdiebstahlsgesetz", in *ibid.*, pp. 273-275.

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could vent its humane activity. Marx still gave neither an economic nor a historical basis to these classes; they were simply the palpable expression of the existential challenge to the integrity of human reason. His only approach toward history was his designation of feudalism—and of the customary rights which the privileged estates continued to claim from it—as the product of the "animal" age of man, but this was actually a philosophical rather than a historical reference since Marx's purpose here was to emphasize the freedom and the humanity of the conscious statutory law of the state by its contrast to the bondage and blindness of social custom.[37] "The statute [*Gesetz*] . . . is the universal and authentic judge over the lawful nature of things . . . [and] must conform to the lawful nature of things."[38]

The function of the state, "conformable to its reason, its universality, and its dignity," was to administer the "immortal" law.[39] The classes of the rich and of the poor were equally, although differently, alienated from these rational totalities, the rich because of their commitment to exclusive private property and interests—summed up as "accidental arbitrariness"—and the poor because of their divorce from the organic body of society, their delivery to "need" and "chance".[40] The fervor of Marx's passion for unity as a basic reality and of his deprecation of class as an alienation from it comes out graphically in his elaborate analogy between the class of the poor, cut off from the integral life of society, and dead wood, which has lost all connection with the rich life of living things.[41]

There is no more characteristic feature of Marx's philosophical framework than this categorical reprobation of economic interest as a distortion vis-à-vis the whole moral man.

> The small, dry, spiritless, and self-seeking soul of interest sees only one point, the point at which it is violated, like the primitive man, who . . . makes the one point at which a passer-by touches him into the only point at which the essence of this passer-by touches the world. . . . But the State must see in the wood thief more than a stealer of wood. . . . Does not each of its citizens cohere to it through thousands of life-nerves, and should it sever all these nerves because that citizen has himself severed one? So the State will also see in the wood thief a man, a vital member in which its heart's

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 272.
[38] *Ibid.*, p. 269.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 282, 298.
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 275-276.
[41] *Ibid.*

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> blood flows, a soldier who defends the fatherland, a witness whose voice counts in court, a member of the community who should exercise public functions, the head of a family whose existence is sanctified, and above all a citizen of the State.[42]

Despite the apparent transvaluation of values which stamped his subsequent development Marx never departed from the fundamental conviction of his philosophical phase that acts of class interest could be neither justified nor understood save by reference to the total structure of reason in man and that the status of rationality in human affairs found its primary expression in the political act, where practice and consciousness joined. Hence in November 1842 it was still the state which had to restore integrity to men, through rationalizing the rights of the poor and generalizing the private interests of the rich. "Particular interests" did not represent matter itself but an "abstraction" from matter, and against "this depraved materialism, this sin against the holy spirit of peoples and humanity", Marx set the "political solution of material problems"—"their connection with the whole wisdom and morality of the State."[43]

It was all very well for Marx to translate Hegel's Reason into the reason of living men, but to burden rational activity with a metaphysical as well as a moral function is to place a great strain upon patience, and Marx was not a patient man. In his correspondence during 1843 Marx is still the political rationalist, calling for the "democratic state" as "the order of free humanity instead of the order of dead things."[44] "To become men means to be spiritual beings; to become free men means to be republicans."[45] But he was now obsessed with the search for "revolution" as the only means of bringing about the desired order. The urgency of revolution stemmed from a moral and political imperative but brought on an intellectual crisis which led Marx to a more practical development of his principles. "We want . . . to act on our contemporaries. . . . How to go about it? That is the question."[46] He acknowledged the disinclination of the Prussian government and the middle-class liberals to initiate political reforms on the one hand and the "anarchy" of intellectual reformers on the desired state of reason on the other.[47]

[42] *Ibid.*, I/1a, pp. 277-278.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 304.
[44] Marx to Ruge, May 1843, in *ibid.*, pp. 561, 564.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 561.
[46] Marx to Ruge, September 1843, in *ibid.*, p. 574.
[47] Marx to Ruge, May 1843, in *ibid.*, pp. 561-566, 573.

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With this acknowledgment Marx's former acceptance of two juxtaposed existences and his confidence in the triumph of the true rational reality were undermined from both ends. Irrational existence must now be taken seriously; both its relationship to reason and the kind of rational reality which this relationship disclosed must be investigated and defined; in the service of the revolution which existing men would make to establish the rational society, the starting point could no longer be reason and the subsequence the arbitrary declination from reason, but the beginning must be the actual conditioning of men's reason by existence and the actual operation of men's reason in the conditions of existence considered as a single process. Hence, Marx abjured all discussion of rational reality as such and announced his intention of "finding the new world only through criticism of the old world."[48] But what must be emphasized here is Marx's confidence in the essential integrity of the intellectual process: the shape of reason could be discerned only by the inquiry into the conditions of its existence and the conditions of existence could be explicated only by reference to the operations of human reason.

> Reason has always existed, but not always in the form of reason. Criticism can start then from any form of theoretical or practical knowledge, and from existing reality's own forms develop the true reality as its goal and final objective. . . . The reform of consciousness consists solely in . . . explaining its own actions [to the world]. . . . It will appear . . . that humanity is not beginning a new task but finishes its old work by taking consciousness of it.[49]

At this point, we can see Marx's system driving him to break out of the circle of philosophy toward history and out of politics toward economics. It is crucial for the understanding of Marx to realize that history and economics entered his system together. In his attempt to merge existence and reason into a single level of reality the interplay of the dialectic was flattened out into a concrete development through time. If reason could be known only through all the conditions of its existence, and if men then used their rational faculty, thus fortified, to create more appropriate conditions, then obviously a historical dimension enters in. By the same token, if reason is now homogenized in the sense of being a conditioned force operating through all spheres

[48] Marx to Ruge, September 1843, in *ibid.*, p. 573.
[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 574-575.

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of human activity, and if the further rationalization of the political sphere is blocked by the passivity of all politically active classes—Marx lumped conservatives and liberals alike under the label "philistine"[50]—then the motive force of progress must be sought outside of politics in a more fluid sphere and among men less susceptible to the prevailing form of conditioned reason. Marx still felt that "the modern forms" of the state "comprise the requirements of reason", but he now saw the contradiction within the modern state between "its theoretical definition and its real hypothesis" as a contradiction within politics rather than as an alienation from politics. Consequently, the resolution of the contradiction had to come from outside, from "the social struggles, the social truth", which the state no longer resolved but "expressed".[51] It had to come from the social group that was alienated from the existing forms of society by the prevailing system of "acquisition and exchange" and enlightened toward political rationality by the intellectuals.[52] Marx was not yet either a philosopher of history or an economist, but his tentative gropings in these directions already indicate the main lesson of his development: that a system of principles, when treated for their reality rather than their validity, far from inhibiting actually stimulates the infinite expansion of empirical investigation. When they are genuinely universal and when faith in their validity is strong enough to require no further buttressing, the inevitably mixed testimony of their realization presses inexorably toward universal research in the effort to reach a final assessment.

The seeds which Marx planted in this published correspondence of 1843 were harvested during the following year. During this last phase of his pre-communist development, which led up to the first classic formulation of the familiar system in the *German Ideology* of 1845, Marx introduced the economic basis of his doctrine and joined it to his older framework through a philosophy of history. The chief products of this phase were the published introduction of the projected *Contribution to the Criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Law,* assorted unpublished papers brought together and printed in 1932 under the appropriate title of *The Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts,* and the

[50] Marx to Ruge, May 1843, in *ibid.,* p. 565.
[51] Marx to Ruge, September 1843, in *ibid.,* p. 574.
[52] Marx to Ruge, May 1843, in *ibid.,* pp. 565-566.

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better-known *Holy Family*. The importance of these works for our purposes lies in their revelation of the rôle of history in Marx at a time when he still was holding explicitly to philosophical and political principles, before they were transmuted into assumptions of primary historical and economic categories. They show that Marx resorted to history for three reasons: first, to explain in terms of anachronism or anticipation some of the discrepancies between ideas and conditions; secondly, to set the changing forms of men's practical reason against the claims to absolute validity by contemporary theorists; thirdly, and most importantly, to add the necessary dimension to human economic activities which could justify Marx in identifying those activities with the fundamental life-process of humanity.

Under the first head, we have Marx's argument in his essay on Hegel, that "the mission" of history is "to establish the truth of the present life", that this truth consists in the demonstration of the theoretical and practical "alienation of man from himself", that in the case of Germany this alienation consists in the representation of modern times by "ideal history"—that is, by theory—and the adherence of its "real history" to the *ancien régime*, and that the action which establishes integrity in Germany must consequently be the historical action of modernizing existence by "realizing philosophy".[53]

Under the second head, Marx's use of a historical orientation to emphasize his argument against the absolute claims of theory went far beyond the expected reference to history as a "movement" operated by the actions of real men.[54] He denied that history could even yet be the real history of man; it could only be "the history of the origins of man"—that is, the prehistory of man.[55] Obviously, then, history could not yet embody integral forms of reason.

Marx's third argument follows from this. The motive force of this prehistory was the process by which man was producing the material conditions for his life as man, and the connection between this material production and the ultimate rational self-development of human culture could only be a historical one—

[53] Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie: Einleitung", in *ibid.*, pp. 608-613.

[54] Marx, *Ökonomisch-Philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844*, in *ibid.*, I/3, p. 153.

[55] *Ibid.*

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that is, the movement from prehistory to history. For Marx, industry was the prime vehicle of interaction between nature and man, and it was the historical dimension that even within the realm of prehistory generalized the meaning of economic activity. "Industry is the actual historical relationship of nature . . . to men. . . . The nature which is developing in human history . . . is the real nature of man; therefore, the nature that is developing in industry, even if in alienated form, is the true anthropological nature."[56] Marx complained that "the history of industry" had hitherto not been "comprehended in its connection with the essence of man",[57] and he adapted his own historical philosophy to the purpose.

How did he work this? Apparently by a play on the broader and narrower sense of "produce".

> This material, directly perceptible private property is the material sensory expression of alienated human life. Its movement—production and consumption—is the sensory revelation of the movement of all previous production—that is, the actualization and actuality of man. Religion, family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc. are only particular forms of production and fall under its general law. . . . Religious alienation as such appears only in the realm of inner human consciousness, but economic alienation is that of real life—the transcendence of it therefore includes both sides.[58]

The rôle of history, then, is to mediate between both these meanings of production. It becomes for Marx the common denominator for tracing the relationships among the various kinds of human production.

Marx's development toward communism had the effect of divesting philosophy and politics of their former integrity without, however, enthroning economics in their place. All these activities were partial, and Marx's emphasis was always on wholeness, totality, as the only basis for rational freedom. It was to be expected that philosophy as the expression of consciousness only and politics as the organization of "a ruling group in the society" around "an abstract whole"[59] would be insufficient, but more surprising is the fact that for Marx economics was, too. Marx came to economics via the proletariat, and not the other way around. In his search for an agency of rationalization he advanced from "suffering humanity" to "the

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 122. [57] *Ibid.*, p. 121. [58] *Ibid.*, pp. 114-115.

[59] Marx, in *Vorwärts,* 10 August 1844, in *ibid.*, I/3, p. 22.

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proletariat" by the end of 1843 because he decided that this was the one group that had "the standpoint of the whole", that was alienated from "the human essence" as such, that "has a universal character through its universal sufferings", that "is, in a word, the complete fall of man and that can reconquer itself only by the complete reconquest of man."[60] Hence Marx did not arrive at his economic primacy by expanding the dominion of economic primacy over human nature but rather by emphasizing the totality of human nature against both philosophical man and political man and then by specifying economics as the least organized, the least determined, and the most generalized field of human activity, and consequently as the one from which impulses for the increase of rationality most freely came. But however primary in sponsoring the primitive forces and establishing the general possibilities of change, the attitude born of economic relations had to be formed and directed by "philosophy, which finds in the proletariat its material arms", toward "political revolution with a social soul."[61] Moreover, man's condition of alienation furnished assurance that none of these activities was deducible from the other. Only history could describe the pattern of their relationships and consequently the changing components of "human nature" for which economics furnished the mold. Surely the professional imperialists among the historians can make good use of Marx here.

What, then, was the character of his history which had such a cardinal rôle in the formation of the Marxist system? Essentially, it was the story of "the common reason of men active and acting in different centuries,"[62] striving, because it is the nature of rational beings so to strive, to recover its identity from the myriad forms into which it had been split. This process of immanent rationalization informs history with a pattern. The process as a whole moves toward world history as man attempts to recover his universality, and the movement is spurred by man's struggle for the means of existence, as the most general sphere of life which catches up into the process of world

[60] Marx to Ruge, May 1843, in *ibid.*, I/1a, p. 565; "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie", in *ibid.*, pp. 619-620; *Vorwärts,* 10 August 1844, in *ibid.*, I/3, pp. 21-22.

[61] Marx, "Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie", in *ibid.*, I/1a, p. 620; *Vorwärts,* in *ibid.*, I/3, pp. 22-23.

[62] Marx, *Misère de la philosophie,* in *ibid.*, I/6, p. 185.

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history the great bulk of people who are unaffected by anything else. But the pattern is not all. It is but the skeleton of history. Since man has alienated himself on all levels he must recover himself on all levels. Hence every act, every event, every institution, every idea is important in itself, for each contains a part of man and has its place in the whole.

## IV

Such was the conception of history that went into the building of Marx's system, and, despite the calcification which it endured in his later years, such are still the assumptions that make it intellectually respectable. It remains to ask: how did this philosophy of history work for him and how can it work for us?

How true was Marx's own writing of contemporary history? Obviously, given Marx's record of political failure and intellectual influence, the answer must be the historian's favorite: medium. With the help of our analysis, however, we may perhaps illuminate this a bit. In the period before the revolution of 1848 Marx's pattern was right but his empirical insight was not. The philosophical conception which called for a revolution of reason for the self-government of humanity was a true intuition into the nature of his age, but his scientific inferences on the status of industrial capitalism and its social agents were true neither on the level of consciousness, where he could account for failure, nor on the level of economic reality, where he could not. During the revolutionary period his system reached the height of its fruitfulness for history. The motif of the class struggle, however temporary, did actually arise to mingle with the political revolution of freedom, and the conformity of this situation with the constituents of Marx's philosophy of history produced the best history he ever wrote. After the revolution Marx's vision of contemporary history was again distorted, but this time in the other dimension. The world of man became—and has continued to become—more self-interested, more diffuse, more empirical; if the Marxist social science could be taken up as appropriate, the Marxist philosophy of the integral revolution certainly could not.

If applicability were all, we could simply conclude with a pious reflection on the flexibility of syntheses, which usually continue to be right somewhere even if they are wrong somewhere else. But applicability is not all. The remarkable fact

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is that Marx's value lies more in the parts of his thinking that were wrong than in those that were right. The contribution of the early Marx to history lay precisely in his perception of an empirical economic and social movement that hardly yet existed. The contribution of the later Marx consisted in his retention, amid a diffused reality, of a rational scheme that did not materialize. These distortions were contributions in two different ways. First, their function was to place historical knowledge in the service of political and moral action, and history used to this end has ever been—and perhaps must ever be—in some measure distorted. For how are historical conditions to be resolved in one of several possible directions unless history is interpreted from the point of view of the desired end? And it must be remembered that Marx always justified himself in the name of reality, that he wrote contemporary history in terms of future reality. Secondly, the Marxian distortions also perform an intellectual function. By expanding the scope of meaningful reality and then clamping his system down tightly over the whole vast area, Marx created a model of the hypothetical unity which enables the historian to make clear sense of those things wherein the historical agents of the past found only confused sense or nonsense. We have come to recognize, with Marx, that a distortion of the past in the direction of unity is a necessary correction for the distortion by the past in the direction of partiality.

Our situation, then, is this: We cannot use the substance of Marx but we can use the form in which he couched it. What does this mean concretely? It means that we must emulate Marx's combination of historical breadth and rational pattern, but only under certain conditions. We must use an approach like Marx's not only because our passion for literal empirical truth threatens to drive the history of man from our grasp but because we must make conscious and deliberate the vagaries of assumptions which in any case determine our judgment even of the empirical fact. But if we are not to pursue the enticing form of reason into that mirrored chamber where, like Marx, we should find only reflections of ourselves wherever we turned, we must observe three conditions in the organization of history.

First, we must employ our categories as questions and not as canons. So variegated is the material of history that our questions must be categorical if we are to penetrate it at all. Thus even the particular substantive categories of Marx, like economic

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primacy, class struggle, ideology, and so forth, invalid as they usually are in themselves, become valid when they are applied, along with others, as *queries* to the material for the purpose of translating it into some kind of rational process. The question to be asked is always, how does it fit?—and we must ask this in terms of all the categories which, both singly and in combination, bear meaning for us.

The second condition which qualifies our search for historical rationality prescribes that our pattern be recognized as bearing only upon the historical material at hand and never upon situations which have not been fitted for size. Thus our patterns will not disappear into laws, and history will not disappear into social science. The distinction is visible in the development of the cautious Marx of 1845, who distinguished between "estate" and "class", calling the latter "a product of the bourgeoisie",[63] into the doctrinaire of 1848 who flatly announced that "the history of all previous society is the history of class struggles."[64]

The final condition requires the choice of categories which lie beyond or across, but never coincide with, the explicit issues in our historical material. This is not only a matter of preventing commitment from degenerating into partisanship. It is also a matter of illuminating the external relations of historical facts and of finding a common measure for them, in all their diversity and conflict. Marx's fruitful application of philosophical categories to economic processes is a case in point. When he began to think of them as economic categories his development as a historian ceased.

But here a final question arises: if we circumscribe universals with such limitations and if we reject all historical metaphysics like Marx's, what kind of rational pattern is left to apply? Are we doing more than simply renewing the vague appeal for general meanings which historians have raised periodically from Renaissance pragmatism to the "new history" of the last generation? Certain specifications can be made. Marx has little, if anything, to teach us directly about universals in the form that dominates contemporary philosophy of history—the categories of historical knowledge. He assumes an identity between historical agent and historian which begs the whole question. Marx does

[63] Marx and Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie, loc. cit.*, I/5, p. 66.

[64] Marx and Engels, *Manifest der Kommunistischen Partei*, in *ibid.*, I/6, p. 525.

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have something to teach us, as has been indicated above,[65] about the comparatively narrow problem which concerns the coherence of man's activities within a particular age or context. But the crucial question is far more fundamental: can we use, in any shape, a rational pattern that runs between as well as within the different ages and contexts of history and thereby provides a constant measure for human evolution? It is well known that historians of our century have dismissed philosophy of history in the sense of such cosmic schemes—whether of the drama of salvation, the progress toward the heavenly cities of freedom or social justice, or the dour cycle of human destiny. When we talk of universals and of laws, we mean—or more precisely, we say we mean—the universals and the laws of knowing and of method rather than of development. Yet it seems to me that the distinction between an acceptable philosophy of history that is epistemology and an unacceptable philosophy of history that is metaphysics is a false one. A rational pattern extending across the ages is as intellectually necessary for the philosopher of history as is the rational community that makes historical knowledge possible for him. For, between the historical man who is to be known and the historian who is to know, there lies an actual historical process, and the knowing depends upon an assessment of what has developed, in the field of the historical action concerned, between the two terminals of knowledge. Obviously, we do not need, for such patterns, the belief in a single grandiose law of substantive history that assures our future as well as our past, and this facet of Marx we cannot use. We restrict ourselves to a plurality of patterns, appropriate to the discrete problems of our investigation, but within these limits—and, indeed, even more urgently because of these limits—we can use the awareness of that universal dimension of historical action which has united men in shared traditions and common enterprises and which furnishes the connecting links both within and between all the particular historical processes leading across the ages from an event to its historian.

We are, then, more modest than Marx, but we are more ambitious too. For we look into history, as it has been lived, for the integrity of humanity, which, in his view of history, has yet to be created.

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[65] *Supra*, pp. 358-362.

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# A PARADOX OF PROGRESSIVISM

## MASSACHUSETTS ON THE EVE OF INSURGENCY

WHAT characterizes an era and often gives it its popular historical name is the effort which the contemporary society makes to solve the dominant problem of the era. Not all elements of the society, of course, may participate in the effort. In the years after the turn of the twentieth century, American society took long strides toward strengthening republican institutions, creating safeguards against waste and corruption, establishing greater control over corporations and public utilities, and promoting the general welfare through social legislation. Contemporaries and historians named the movement to achieve these objectives "Progressive". Because Massachusetts did not participate significantly in the Progressive Movement, contemporaries tended to view the state as stolid and backward, and historians have looked elsewhere for Progressive achievements.

In an early account of the period, for example, Harold U. Faulkner chose Wisconsin as "the most conspicuous example" of the states which established controls over public utilities and promoted the general welfare through social legislation. Matthew Josephson agreed that "For other states, Wisconsin became a sort of experimental social laboratory where new legislation was carefully tested and perfected", adding that "The 'Wisconsin Idea' . . . was a product of the intensely democratic Middle West farmers."[1] In *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt,* the most recent scholarly survey of the era, George E. Mowry also attributed the pioneering rôle to Wisconsin. Under the leadership of Robert M. La Follette, he asserted, "Wisconsin had gone further than any other state along the path toward a social democracy." For Massachusetts, on the other hand, Professor Mowry, like other historians, reserved only casual citation.

[1] Harold U. Faulkner, *The Quest for Social Justice, 1898-1914* (New York, 1931), p. 124; Matthew Josephson, *The President Makers* (New York, 1940), pp. 217-218. See also Robert S. Maxwell, *La Follette and the Rise of the Progressives in Wisconsin* (Madison, 1956), esp. p. 195.



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"*Even* in traditionalist New England," he observed "faint" marks of enlightenment late in the era.[2]

Yet before 1900, with a few exceptions,[3] Massachusetts had enjoyed in practice if not in form all the democratic innovations which Progressives emphasized after 1900. It had, in addition, the most effective corporation laws in the nation; and it led the country in labor legislation. It owed most of these achievements, however, not to any reform *movement,* but rather to the character of its tradition, rooted in the Puritan-colonial experience. For that reason it would be confusing to call Massachusetts a "Progressive" state, as the word is conventionally used. Nevertheless, in most matters identified with Progressivism after 1900, Massachusetts had earlier taken an advanced position.

## I

As a model of republican government, Massachusetts had long attracted the attention of civic reformers and students of politics. Even in the "Gilded Age", that incisive critic of American institutions, Lord Bryce, could write:

> The best [state legislatures] seem to be those of the New England states, particularly Massachusetts, where the venerable traditions surrounding an ancient commonwealth do something to sustain the dignity of the body and induce good men to enter it. The legislature, called the General Court, is, according to the best authorities, substantially pure and does its work well.[4]

A generation later, when Wisconsin was capturing the attention of the nation's reformers with its program of political democracy, social justice and regulation, Professor Paul S. Reinsch of the University of Wisconsin observed that "the General Court of Massachusetts is in all respects nearest the people, and most responsive of any American legislature to intelligent public opinion."[5]

[2] George E. Mowry, *The Era of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York, 1958), pp. 294, 79 (my emphasis).

[3] Among the outstanding Progressive objectives which Massachusetts still lacked were direct election of United States Senators, woman suffrage, and the direct primary. It initiated a primary system in 1903.

[4] James Bryce, *American Commonwealth* (London and New York, 1883), I, 515.

[5] Paul S. Reinsch, *American Legislatures and Legislative Methods* (New York, 1907), p. 175; *cf.* H. S. Dodds, "Procedure in State Legislatures", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Supplement I (1917), p. 50; Walter F. Dodd, *State Government* (New York, 1928), p. 188.

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While reformers in other states during the Populist and Progressive eras fought for closer electoral checks on representatives, state officials in Massachusetts had had to face the electorate annually since colonial times. To safeguard that electorate, Massachusetts became in 1888 the first state to require the Australian ballot. Reformers elsewhere had to fight for the initiative and referendum to secure greater legislative response to the popular will. But in the Bay State the legislature could always attach a referendum provision to any bill applying to local affairs, and failure to do so with highly controversial bills could lead to a veto. All legislative measures were introduced as "petitions", and it was not unusual for a private citizen to draft such a petition, or for the ultimate bill to bear the name of that citizen.[6] Even beyond the right of personal petition in the General Court, the traditional town meeting provided a highly effective form of initiative; although the law did not compel legislators to introduce or vote for measures petitioned at such meetings, they ran the risk of defeat at the annual election if they did not.

In the legislature, bills were subject to open and formal hearings which members of the public not only could attend but in which they also could actively participate.[7] Although in most states public hearings did not usually influence legislation (perhaps because in most states, unlike Massachusetts, the legislature was located away from the business and population centers), Paul Reinsch noted in 1907 that, in Massachusetts alone, committee hearings were "a very important part of legislative action."[8] Reformers elsewhere had to contend with small minorities, often entrenched in key committee positions, who bottled up reform measures. But the standing rules of the General Court required committees to report all measures referred to them, and they usually did report well in advance of the close of the legislative session. The constitutions of many

[6] Thomas J. Wood, "Distinctive Legislative Practices of the Massachusetts General Court", unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1947. See also John W. Plaisted, *Legislative Procedure in the General Court of Massachusetts* (Boston, 1948), pp. 13-15, and Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

[7] Such men as Louis D. Brandeis and Joseph B. Eastman began their long public careers early in the Progressive Era by appearing as representatives of the public at such hearings.

[8] Reinsch, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

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states restricted the legislatures to a certain number of months during the year, for economy reasons, and because conservative interests feared "too much" legislation. The Massachusetts legislature, however, was authorized to remain in session throughout the year.

In sum, Massachusetts possessed almost all the institutional "guarantees" for legislative responsibility in advance of the movements launched to achieve them.

## II

Massachusetts enjoyed more significant benefits than the political practices which Progressives, circa 1900, began to demand elsewhere in the country. In an important sense, one may view Progressivism as a response to the collectivization of American life, and in particular to the disproportionate and insidious influence which public utilities and business corporations exerted upon public policy. In this respect, perhaps the most striking of Massachusetts' achievements was its effective regulation of corporations, particularly of railroads and other public services.

Though other states had anticipated Massachusetts in establishing temporary and *ad hoc* commissions, the Massachusetts Railroad Commission of 1869 was the first established for the continuing and general purpose of reconciling conflicts of interest between the railroads and the public.[9] Under the able and conscientious leadership of Charles Francis Adams, Jr., and fortified by annual salaries of $4,000 (which awed commissioners elsewhere), the three-man commission won the respect and envy of similar bodies. The duties of the board included investigation of the physical and financial status of all the railroads operating within the state, with the right to inquire into the records of the companies. On the basis of its investigations, the Commission could make recommendations concerning repairs, safety, junctions, stock issues, and all other matters which might concern the public, including freight and passenger rate levels. These recommendations were to be made to the company, as

[9] Each of the other New England states had previously provided for commissions to handle particular problems; e.g., New Hampshire created a commission to enable private railroad companies to assume the form of a public corporation so that they might preëmpt land for railroad construction by right of eminent domain. See Edward C. Kirkland, *Men, Cities, and Transportation* (Cambridge, 1948), II, 231-237.

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well as to the public in annual reports. As Adams later observed, "The board of commissioners was set up as a sort of lens by means of which the otherwise scattered rays of public opinion could be concentrated to a focus and brought to bear upon a given point."[10]

By acts of 1885 and 1887, the General Court established a Board of Gas and Electric Light Commissioners to regulate companies which supplied power and light to the fast-growing municipalities in the state. Essentially the Board had the same duties as the Railroad Commission. But, in addition, the legislature armed this Board with "summary powers as to rates and service."[11] These included the power to investigate complaints, and upon investigation to order a reduction in price or an improvement in service; the power to fix rates upon the application of a service company; the right to prohibit companies from invading cities and towns serviced already by at least one gas and electric company; and the power to demand annual reports from the companies.[12]

On the face of it, the functions of both public service commissions in their original forms appeared to be to act primarily as coördinating agencies for public utilities, to protect them and the public from the effects of wasteful competition and recurrent disputes over service. Especially in the case of the Railroad Commission, the General Court fortified the restrictive functions with little more than the power to make recommendations and to give publicity to company affairs. Since, by the 1890's, insurgents in many western and southern states sought, not conciliatory and advisory instruments to eliminate the causes of disruptive conflicts, but rather weapons against the power of overbearing corporations, they regarded the Massachusetts body as the model illustration of a "weak commission".

It would be a mistake, however, to underestimate the effectiveness of investigatory and publicity functions in a state which was "an abode of restless reformers,"[13] and which had a long tradition of government intervention in the economic affairs of

[10] Quoted by Kirkland, *op. cit.*, II, 239.

[11] Irston R. Barnes, *Public Utility Control in Massachusetts* (New Haven and London, 1930), p. 15.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

[13] Kirkland, *op. cit.*, II, 244.

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its citizens.[14] Even more important, the General Court frequently appended additional powers to the commissions. In the case of the railroad board, these included requiring its approval for various technical innovations; giving it authority to review —and sometimes to set—commuter rates, and power to determine the public need for new roads and how much the roads and the localities were to pay toward the elimination of grade crossings. Statutes of 1887 and 1889 required the Railroad Commission to ascertain property valuation before a railroad could increase its capital stock, and before the board authorized a bond issue. After 1894, moreover, railroads and gas and electric utilities had to secure the approval of the commissions for all issues of stocks and bonds, and the terms of every lease, purchase and sale.[15]

In fact the powers which the acts of 1893 and 1894, especially, gave to the commissions make it fallacious to call those bodies "weak". This legislation included the then unprecedented requirement that all stock issues of more than 4 per cent of the total stock of a railroad, gas or electric company be sold at auction, or be sold proportionately to stockholders at a price estimated to be market value by the appropriate commission.[16] The purpose of such legislation was to keep the outstanding securities at a minimum by requiring issues to be sold at the highest possible prices. To the same end, the legislature prohibited stock dividends and capitalization of earnings.[17]

[14] See Oscar and Mary Flug Handlin, *Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy, 1774-1861* (New York and London, 1947), *passim*.

[15] Mass. Bd. R.R. Commissrs., *26th Ann. Rpt.* (1895), pp. 13-14, 127-134, 147, 149; *27th Ann. Rpt.* (1896), pp. 141-153, 168, 181; also, William A. Crafts (sec'y., Mass. Bd. R.R. Commissrs.), "The Second Decade of the Massachusetts Railroad Commission", *Railroad Gazette*, XXV (1893), 551; Kirkland, *op. cit.*, II, 248.

[16] Mass. Bd. R.R. Commissrs., *26th Ann. Rpt.*, pp. 13-14. Also Barnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 37, 58-59; Commonwealth of Massachusetts, *Report of the Commission on Commerce and Industry* (1908), p. 60.

[17] "This supervision", wrote Irston Barnes, "has included all types of securities and has been applied virtually from the beginning of public utility development in Massachusetts." Barnes, *op. cit.*, p. 3, also, pp. 77-78. "The entire course of legislation", the Gas and Electric Light Commission observed in 1913, "clearly indicates the well-founded conviction that the volume of securities outstanding against any public utility has a potent effect upon rates and quality of service, since prices are made and maintained to meet the expectations of stockholders as to dividends, and service may be seri-

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During the Progressive Era, some of the sharper critics of the practices of railroad corporations believed that Massachusetts overemphasized regulation of capitalization as compared with regulation of price and service.[18] Yet, as long as it was assumed that a stockholder had a right to earn a "fair return" on his capital, excessive rates followed perforce from excessive dividend demands which were created by the multiplication of stock disproportionate to physical value. Unless the state effectively prevented excessive capitalization, rate control would have been a meaningless gesture. In opposing an order to reduce rates, a utility company could always argue that reduced revenues would not permit stockholders to earn a "fair return", and would therefore amount to confiscation. Eventually, most Progressives at least tacitly accepted the principles of the Massachusetts laws.[19] As late as 1908, the *Chicago Tribune,* then moving toward an insurgent position, cited Massachusetts corporation law as a "model which the nation might well follow in regulating the great corporations . . . the control of which . . . has become such a problem for Congress."[20]

ously impaired by a continued endeavor to meet those expectations." Bd. Gas & Elec. Light Commissrs., *29th Ann. Rpt.* (1913), p. 12.

[18] See, e.g., Edward Bemis, "Control of the Capitalization of Public Service Corporations in Massachusetts", *American Economic Association Quarterly,* X (1909), 426.

[19] The contemporary economist-reformer, William Z. Ripley, pointed out: "While of course there is no direct relation between capitalization and prices, an excess of securities craving dividends is in itself an indirect incentive to unreasonable charges. . . . This was the underlying motive in the enactment of the Massachusetts Anti-Stock Watering Laws of 1894. For a divergence between the actual property value and capitalization may lead to exorbitant prices and dividends at the expense of the public." *Trusts, Pools and Corporations* (Boston, 1905), p. xxiii. Without ever referring to Massachusetts, Wisconsin insurgent Robert M. LaFollette acknowledged these principles in his repeated efforts after 1906 to authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to determine the physical valuation of interstate railroads preliminary to setting rates. But as early as 1901, Henry C. Adams, statistician for the I.C.C., argued for federal adoption of the Massachusetts techniques because they amounted to physical valuation for purposes of ascertaining just rates and just taxes. Testimony before the United States Industrial Commission on Transportation, *Commission Reports,* vol. IX (1901), House Document 178, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 373 *et seq.* See also testimony of W. Z. Ripley, *ibid.,* pp. 291 *et seq.*

[20] Quoted in the *Brockton Enterprise,* Dec. 17, 1908.

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Massachusetts law restricted private corporations nearly as much as it did the utilities. When corporate organization came to be widely adopted as a business form in the 1890's, many states competed for the business of issuing charters; but Massachusetts was slow to meet the competition.[21] In fact businesses which chose to incorporate in Massachusetts had a rugged time of it. Since Massachusetts taxed not only the value of the tangible property of a corporation but also the "corporate excess", that is, the market value of the securities in excess of property value, the more successful corporations fled Massachusetts to states with more lenient taxation laws. Massachusetts laws, moreover, discouraged holding companies, not only because the principal assets of holding companies were securities which were taxable even though representing other taxable securities,[22] but because the law required all corporations to secure special permission from the General Court in order to hold the securities of other corporations.[23] When the depression of the 1890's lifted and incorporations multiplied throughout the country, Massachusetts did not share in the movement. Annual incorporations in the state barely increased between 1897 and 1901. In the latter year almost twice as many corporations doing business in Massachusetts obtained foreign charters as obtained Massachusetts charters.[24]

In general, those who aimed their fire at the misdeeds of the "trusts" considered Massachusetts' techniques worth copying. President Roosevelt declared before a Boston audience in 1902: "Most of our difficulties [with trusts] would be in a fair way of solution if we had the power to put in the national statute books, and did put upon them, laws for the nation such as those you have here on the subject of corporations in Massachu-

[21] Henry R. Seager and Charles A. Gulick, Jr., *Trust and Corporation Problems* (New York and London, 1929), pp. 35 *et seq.*

[22] Harry G. Friedman, *The Taxation of Corporations in Massachusetts* (New York, 1907), pp. 78, 83.

[23] Seager and Gulick, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

[24] Grosvenor Calkins, "The Massachusetts Business Corporation Law", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XVIII (1904), 269-280, reprinted in Ripley, *op. cit.*, pp. 382-392. In 1897, 280 Massachusetts businesses incorporated under Massachusetts law, while 263 took foreign charters; in 1898, the numbers were 251 and 298, respectively; in 1899, 281 and 466; in 1900, 264 and 423; and in 1901, 211 and 524. Frederick J. Stimson and Charles G. Washburn, *Report of the Committee on Corporation Laws* (Printed as a Massachusetts Senate Document) (1903), p. 19.

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setts. . . ."[25] Charles E. Littlefield, chairman of a congressional subcommittee on trusts, urged copying at least the publicity features of Massachusetts laws, arguing that "None of the great combinations of which complaint is made . . . could have been financed" if the public knew about overcapitalization.[26]

## III

Massachusetts' contributions to "social justice" at the turn of the century were not confined to democratic political institutions and restraint of business practices. Contemporaries generally recognized its leadership in labor legislation. In a volume published in 1907, historian John H. Latané wrote: "In the effort to improve the condition of the laboring classes through direct legislation, Massachusetts has led the way, and her child-labor and factory laws have been followed by many of the other states."[27] Massachusetts pioneered in child labor legislation (1836); instituted the first state factory inspection system (1866); and first limited the day's work for women and minors to ten hours (1874). The Bay State was the first to establish a bureau of labor statistics, the first to compel corporations to pay employees weekly, and the first to forbid corporations to pay wages in store truck.

But Massachusetts' claim to fame does not rest on priority alone. As two careful students of the subject wrote in 1910:

> Massachusetts has been generally regarded as the center of advanced labor legislation in America. Part of that well-earned reputation is due to the priority of important laws passed in this Commonwealth which have been copied, often verbatim, by many other states; but it cannot be explained on that basis alone. Although several of the

[25] *Boston Herald,* Aug. 27, 1902. Roosevelt cited in particular the provisions in the Massachusetts law, (1) requiring that all stock be paid in before any corporate charter could be granted, (2) requiring auction sale or price fixing by commissions of stock issues by public service corporations, (3) holding corporate directors personally responsible for debts exceeding capitalization and for dividends which render the corporation insolvent, and (4) requiring publicity for a corporation's financial condition to the extent of ordering dissolution if such reports were not filed for two successive years.

[26] U. S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Trusts, *Majority Report on a Bill to Amend the Sherman Antitrust Act,* House Report 3375, to accompany H.R. 17, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. (1903), p. 18.

[27] *America as a World Power* (New York, 1907), vol. XXV of *The American Nation,* edited by Albert Bushnell Hart, p. 308.

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> states which have followed Massachusetts as a leader have at some points distinctly bettered her instruction, it is still true that not many other states in America have laws which go so far toward complete protection of employees as do those in Massachusetts.[28]

The same investigators also found that, "without a doubt", Massachusetts had a larger proportion of employers who made a serious effort to provide good working conditions for their employees than other states. They attributed this to the fact that Massachusetts factories on the average were older than factories in other states, and many such establishments had been run by families for generations. Labor laws, in fact, were often sponsored by precisely these familial factory owners in order to bring into line newer factory owners who might compete too successfully with the more paternalistic ones.[29] Moreover, labor legislation early became a "habit" with Massachusetts employers; they learned to live with regulations and to assume they embodied an indigenous social standard.

Massachusetts also led in the enforcement and administration of labor laws. During the enthusiastic Progressive years, New York and Wisconsin passed Massachusetts in providing certain advanced machinery for the enforcement of the laws. But even in this respect, the deficiencies were limited to milder penal provisions than other states had, some uncertainty in the relation between local and state inspection procedures, insufficiently comprehensive civil service examinations, and the failure to make factory inspection the sole occupation of inspectors. The same investigators who noted these deficiencies, however, also maintained: "It is not to other states of the Union that . . . [Massachusetts] must look for a model toward which to reconstruct existing methods. . . . Not only in her laws regulating conditions of labor, but in laws requiring their enforcement,

[28] Edith Reeves and Caroline Manning, "The Standing of Massachusetts in the Administration of Labor Legislation", *Labor Laws and Their Enforcement*, edited by Susan M. Kingsley (New York, 1911), p. 223. It is important to understand that Misses Reeves and Manning directed their study toward finding weaknesses in the Massachusetts legislation and administration. The quoted passage is an introductory one; the bent of the article is that, as progressive as Massachusetts was, it did not go far enough. See also Robert H. Whitten, "Trend of Legislation in the United States", [*New York*] *State Library Bulletin*, Legislation, No. 12 (Albany, 1902), p. 411.

[29] *Cf.* Handlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-205, and 241.

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does Massachusetts seem to stand toward the top in the United States."[30]

It is not difficult to list additional achievements, identified after 1900 with Progressivism, in which Massachusetts led the country. Massachusetts Congressman Augustus P. Gardner, for example, was able to quote in 1902 from a compendium of pure-food legislation prepared for the state legislature of Georgia: "Massachusetts may be said to have nearer a perfect code of pure-food laws than any other State or country which has given thought to the subject of preventing food adulteration under its myriad forms and disguises."[31] The New York State legislative reference service reported in 1902 that "the movement to encourage the establishment of free public libraries . . . [which] started in 1890 with the establishment of a free public library commission in Massachusetts" had equipped more than 1,800 Bay State towns with free libraries, leaving by 1901 less than .05 per cent of the state population without such service. "Following the example of Massachusetts," the report continued, "special library commissions . . . have now been provided in fourteen states. . . ."[32] In sum, as the reform-conscious *Independent* declared on the morn of the new century: "It is Massachusetts that leads all her sister commonwealths in progressive legislation, and in wisely directed reform movements."[33]

## IV

One might expect, therefore, that the nation's insurgents during the Progressive Era would have used Massachusetts as the model for advanced legislative techniques, for the responsiveness of its political institutions, for its quality of political behavior, for its techniques of regulating corporate practices, and for its methods of securing "social justice". One might expect, moreover, that the Bay State would have welcomed insurgency and the adoption of its laws, even without acknowledgment, by other states. But Massachusetts never caught the

[30] Reeves and Manning, *loc. cit.*, pp. 263-264.

[31] *Congressional Record*, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 18, 1902), p. 440. See also U.S. Congress, Senate, Com. on Mfrs., *Digest of the Pure Food and Drug Laws of the United States and Foreign Countries*, Senate Report 3 (1901), *passim*.

[32] Whitten, *loc. cit.*, pp. 429-430.

[33] "Contrasting Records of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts", *Independent*, LIII (July 4, 1901), 1568-1570.

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spirit of *change* which dominated the era, and consequently it appeared, at best, merely conservative. It was rather the "Wisconsin Idea", the "Iowa Idea", and (in New Jersey) simply the "New Idea" which quickened the hearts of men of good will and good hope during the Progressive Era. Historians have followed by neglecting Massachusetts' achievements and emphasizing its undeniable conservatism.

If Massachusetts did not share conspicuously in the "quest for social justice" characteristic of the American states during the earlier years of the twentieth century, it may well be because it had less to search for. What was "New" to reformers elsewhere in the country was often "Old" to Massachusetts. For example, its political leaders resisted formal democratic innovations in the state's political system, and therefore deserved the epithet "conservative" which contemporary insurgents and subsequent historians applied to them. Yet it is important to keep in mind that if Massachusetts did not have in name the kind of laws which Progressives demanded elsewhere in the country, it did have to a substantial degree the benefit of the practices which the reformers advocated. "There are many States", Theodore Roosevelt wrote to his friend Henry Cabot Lodge, "in which Legislatures have functioned badly, and in which the people are groping for a remedy"; for such states, the initiative and compulsory referendum appeared "the only remedy in sight." He agreed with Lodge that "I & R" were unnecessary in Massachusetts.[34] Roosevelt felt similarly about the recall of judges and judicial decisions: "You are absolutely right," he confided to his biographer, Charles G. Washburn. ". . . I have always said that in Massachusetts recall by the Legislature was enough. . . . In Missouri and California, more was needed."[35] He added ironically to another acquaintance, "It is rather funny to think that if the Massachusetts and Vermont methods of electing and removing Judges were advanced by me, I should be denounced as almost a Communist."[36] Massachusetts had

[34] Roosevelt to Lodge, Dec. 13, 1911, in Henry Cabot Lodge (ed.), *Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge* (New York, 1925), II, 416-417.

[35] Roosevelt to Washburn, March 31, 1915, in the Roosevelt Memorial Association Collection, Widener Library, Harvard University (hereafter, RMA MSS).

[36] Roosevelt to Louis A. Frothingham, Dec. 17, 1914, RMA MSS.

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enjoyed the practices which Roosevelt alluded to from the time it had become a state.

Similarly, Massachusetts achieved its advanced position on corporation regulation from a long tradition of conservative business practices under government supervision. Incorporation originated in Massachusetts as a device by which groups of private entrepreneurs served as agencies of the state toward a public purpose. The services which the corporate body was to provide for the commonweal justified the privileges which the state granted in the charter.[37] Massachusetts business at the beginning of the twentieth century had not entirely outgrown the discipline imposed by that early tradition. Whatever their social or political views, many in the Massachusetts business community—especially, but not exclusively, the dominant older families—tended to suspect the radical tendencies of American finance capitalism.[38]

"Overcapitalization is a fraud"—it was as plain as that to Massachusetts Congressman George P. Lawrence. In arguing for a national incorporation law and a stronger Interstate Commerce Commission, Lawrence announced his determination "to make these creatures of the State render honest service to the State."[39] Similarly, Senator Lodge wrote to Lucius Tuttle, president of the Boston & Maine Railroad, who was resisting expanded federal regulation of corporations in interstate commerce:

> I don't quite accept your proposition that these questions can be left to natural law because the railroads don't exist by natural laws. . . . They are founded on the grant of the highways of commerce and they are given by the government what amounts to a general power

[37] Oscar and Mary Handlin, "Origins of the American Business Corporation", *Journal of Economic History*, V (May 1945), 1-23.

[38] For example, George von L. Meyer, a State Street stockbroker who served as postmaster general under Roosevelt and secretary of the navy under Taft, asserted: "The laws of New Jersey and Delaware and even Maine which permit these corporations of enormous capital to be formed, often with very limited amount of cash paid in, are really a curse. . . ." Meyer continued, "If the corporation laws of Massachusetts, or those similar to them" were adopted by the federal government, the country would be spared the panics which periodically threatened the economy. Meyer to H. C. Lodge, Aug. 12, 1903, George von L. Meyer Papers, Mass. Historical Society, Boston, Mass.

[39] *Congressional Record*, 57th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 6, 1903), p. 1793.

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> to tax all persons who use it. . . . The taxing power cannot exist without any appeal of its abuse. . . . You substantially admit this by your approval of the principle of supervision adopted in Massachusetts.[40]

The events which motivated the passage of the "anti-stock watering" laws of 1894 further illustrate the distrust of financial practices then acceptable in most parts of the country. In 1892, the Connecticut River Railroad persuaded the General Court to permit it to issue to its stockholders at par 24,200 shares of stock, then selling on the market at $235. To many it appeared a gratuity to stockholders of more than $100 per share. The issue, moreover, would have doubled the total capitalization of the company upon which dividends had to be paid. A public uproar followed, and Governor William E. Russell vetoed the enabling legislation, declaring that it would place "an unnecessary burden . . . each year upon the business of the railroad, that is, upon the public. . . ."[41] The next year a new legislature passed the restrictive acts. As one economist complained some years later: "In most other states the matter would probably have attracted little attention at that time. . . . After all, the new stock was to be paid for in cash at the par value, and the proceeds were to be devoted to necessary improvements. . . . But in Massachusetts the project was assailed as 'indirect stock watering'."[42]

[40] Lodge to Tuttle, c. Jan. 1905, Henry Cabot Lodge papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.; hereafter "Lodge MSS". *Cf.* Kirkland, *op. cit.*, II, 232: "Although individual railroad managers and investors sometimes asserted that the railroad was in the same business and legal category as a factory, that the state ought to refrain from interfering with railroad management . . . their chatter was wishful and instinctive; it was neither representative of dominant thinking nor in accord with New England practice."

[41] Quoted in Barnes, *op. cit.*, p. 35n.

[42] Charles J. Bullock, "Control of the Capitalization of Public Service Corporations in Massachusetts", *American Economic Association Quarterly*, X (1909), 401. The Railroad Commission, in its report of 1894, commented favorably on the legislation: "It was the evident purpose of the Legislature . . . to guard against the dangers and temptations of . . . gratuitous capitalization, and to eliminate as far as possible the speculative element from the financial economy of the railroad and other corporations created for public use." Mass. Bd. R.R. Commissrs., *26th Ann. Rpt.* (1895), pp. 13-14. The Commission reaffirmed these sentiments in 1900. See *32nd Ann. Rpt.* (1900), pp. 93-94.

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Probably one reason for this kind of conservatism was that many in Massachusetts found the laws and the economic attitudes they expressed conducive to good business.[43] At a Senate hearing on railroad legislation, Senator Francis Newlands of Nevada asked Lucius Tuttle whether he considered Massachusetts' restrictive laws wise. Tuttle replied: "I think they are. . . . The conservative character of . . . our laws very greatly strengthens the market value in the minds of the investors in our securities."[44] Certainly the experience of Massachusetts railroads bore out Tuttle's observation. At the depth of the depression following the Panic of 1893, the Railroad Commission was able to report: "There has been no dearth of capital seeking investment; . . . [Massachusetts railroad stocks] are sought by conservative investors at higher prices today than twelve months ago; and the same is true of some of the street railway stocks."[45]

Massachusetts had had no need of a reform movement to alert its community to the excesses of modern corporate enterprise. On the other hand, most of the states conspicuous for reform movements after 1900 entered the Union just at the time when corporate enterprise was gaining independence from the original principles of incorporation. Populated by individuals "on the make", who had left established communities to break away from the traditions and institutions and anything else they held responsible for their past discontents, these states—it seems reasonable to argue—lacked the sources of a rooted tradition which might have enabled their citizens to look to the government as a legitimate agent of a unified and purposive community. By the end of the nineteenth century they began to learn, in the words of Frederick Jackson Turner, "that unre-

[43] The same conservative attitude sometimes extended to corporate enterprise conducted by Massachusetts businessmen outside the state. William B. Gates, Jr., historian of the Michigan copper mining industry, has written: "Conservative Boston financing and management also explains why rapid exploitation of properties for stock manipulative purposes played an insignificant part in the Michigan history, in marked contrast with certain periods of the Montana and Arizona story." *Michigan Copper and Boston Dollars* (Cambridge, 1951), p. 69; see also p. 189.

[44] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, *Hearings on Proposed Amendment of the Interstate Commerce Act*, Senate Document 243, 58th Cong., 3d Sess. (1905), pp. 947-948.

[45] Bd. of R.R. Commissrs., *26th Ann. Rpt.* (1895), p. 97. See also succeeding reports.

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strained competition and combination meant the triumph of the strongest, [and] the seizure in the interest of a dominant class of the strategic points of the nation's life"; that "between the ideal of individualism, unrestrained by society, and the ideal of democracy, was an innate conflict"; and "that their very ambitions and forcefulness had endangered their democracy."[46] By then, it was necessary to inaugurate sensational "exposés" to carry reform measures against the opposition of entrenched political interests; to wage dramatic campaigns on behalf of ordinary democratic principles; and to acclaim the "New" so that old virtues and social values could be restored. These were genuine causes. But Massachusetts did not have the same battle to fight.

In addition to legal and social traditions which made meliorative action "normal" in Massachusetts, its business community did not suffer from many of the specific grievances which motivated so many of the radical demands in the insurgent states. Massachusetts corporations did not have to depend upon great outside financial centers for funds.[47] Local stock ownership was widespread, and major owners were rarely more distant than Boston. Railroad directors and the merchants who depended upon them, as well as financiers and the manufacturers who required their services, tended to mingle in the same social milieu. These conditions tended to reduce the opportunities for misunderstandings as well as the temptations for underhanded or suspicious business practices.[48]

A clash of temperaments and of interests sharpened the alienation of Massachusetts from the Progressive Movement. Although Theodore Roosevelt, on the eve of his bolt from the Republican party, credited Massachusetts with an advanced position in many things identified with Progressivism, no one in 1911 would seri-

[46] F. J. Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (New York, 1920), p. 203.

[47] See testimony of Stuyvesant Fish before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce in 1905, *op. cit.*, p. 296. During the same hearing, Senator Newlands asked Lucius Tuttle, "Is it not a fact that all these conditions are of the very best in Massachusetts, as contrasted with other parts of the country, and is it not a fact that so far as the southern . . . and . . . western railroads are concerned most of them are financed through a few great financiers in New York?" Tuttle replied that it was so, and that the reason was that the western and southern railroads could not easily raise the capital any other way. *Ibid.*, p. 1002.

[48] See Kirkland, *op. cit.*, II, 249, 252, 255.

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ously have expected Massachusetts to contribute significantly to the insurgents' cause. "I have always insisted that a good many of you were progressives," Roosevelt wrote to Lodge, "only unfortunately without knowing it and therefore without being able to impress the fact upon the rest of the country."[49] He also noted that men like Lodge shared certain important values with the Progressives, in particular the premium they placed on social responsibility over individual liberty in the management of private property.[50] But Lodge could not "know" he was a Progressive—he was not—not only because of his profoundly conservative temperament, but also because he was circumstantially unsuited for the role of an insurgent.

The Progressives directed their assault not merely against abuses in American society, but also against vested political and economic interests which they held responsible for those abuses. Even if their temperament had allowed them to sympathize with the insurgents, Lodge and his colleagues were vulnerable as leaders in an incumbent political party. In addition, as representatives for established economic interests in their state, they had a responsibility which placed them even more certainly on the defensive than did political incumbency or conservative temperament. For, very particular interests—sectional, political and economic—provided much of the power behind the impulse for Progressive reform.[51] And although insurgent leaders usually assumed a moral rhetoric, the "evil" they condemned in many cases was merely the greater power or advantage of their competitors.

For many reasons, Massachusetts at the turn of the century held an advantageous competitive position in such enterprises as woolens, cottons and shoe manufacturing. Though it produced no wool, it made most of the woolen fabrics in the country and sold them back to the wool-growing regions. It produced

[49] Roosevelt to Lodge, May 31, 1911, RMA MSS.

[50] Lodge and many of the Massachusetts congressmen and state officials also shared with a great many of the Progressives a nationalistic fervor, with racist overtones, which led them to promote America's imperialist ventures in the 1890's, as well as the drive to restrict immigration and to build a large navy. See William E. Leuchtenburg, "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916", *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXIX (1953), 483-504.

[51] *Cf.* Arthur S. Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's?", *American Historical Review*, LXIV (July 1959), 833-851, esp. 834.

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no cotton but sold cottons in the South and fine cotton goods in the southern mill towns themselves. It produced no hides, but sold leather, boots and shoes throughout the Southwest and West. It was also an important producer of paper and paper products, machinery, wire, watches and tools—and similarly dependent upon the outside for its raw materials.

One reason it could do all this was that it had the advantage of skilled labor, and well-trained direction of that labor. Its financial facilities, moreover, were near by and it could obtain credit at low cost. Its industry had the advantage of proximity to the great export markets in New York City and its own capital, Boston. Certainly not least important, however, was the simple fact that Massachusetts industry was established *early*, and therefore enjoyed the economic advantages of priority in important markets, and political advantages as a vested interest.

Its accessibility to water transportation somewhat offset the great rail distances of the sources of its raw materials. Its economy was nevertheless extraordinarily dependent upon rail transportation—and conversely, as long as the chief terminals were in Boston, railroads servicing New England had a substantial interest in maintaining the prosperity of the region's economy.

It is small wonder, therefore, that New England businessmen suspected innovations in the law which might tend to remove or weaken their influence with railroad policy. For Massachusetts industry depended upon the favorable rates—privileged rates, if you will—which its railroads were able to obtain for it, compared with the rates obtained by nascent competitors nearer the chief domestic markets and the sources of raw materials. For example, the Boston & Albany Railroad and trunk lines connecting with it at the Hudson River gave wire manufacturers in Worcester, Massachusetts, special rates so that the total cost of shipping wire to points west of Pittsburg would not exceed the shipping cost from Pittsburg manufacturers. Without such differentials, the Worcester manufacturers would have gone out of business.[52] Similarly, railroads from cotton-producing regions in the South charged lower through-rates to Massachusetts than to nearer points in the Midwest, Georgia, or North Carolina. Partly this was because of water competition from New Orleans and Galves-

[52] *Hearings* (1905), Senate Document 243, *op. cit.*, p. 923.

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ton to Boston. But railroad men willingly admitted their desire to support the New England mills.

As Lucius Tuttle explained to Democratic Senator Edward W. Carmack of Tennessee during the hearings on the Esch-Townshend bill in 1905:

> Suppose a city has a population of 30,000 . . . engaged in the manufacture of shoes and the product of their manufacture is distributed to the world at a loss to the railroads; yet the carrying of the other things for those 30,000 people at . . . profitable rates compensates for the loss occasioned by the low rates. So it is all through the administration of railways. . . . [Tuttle went on:] Perhaps in the city of Lowell 40,000 out of the population of 80,000 are dependent upon textile industries for their living. If those mills for any reason are closed that [*sic*] 40,000 people cease to live in Lowell, for they have nothing else to do; the traffic of that [*sic*] 40,000 people over the railroads going into Lowell would cease.[53]

Carmack protested: "That is a case, then, where the railroads have practically created an industry and built up a great community by giving a very low rate for a very long haul. . . . And yet at the same time other communities have languished because they could not get equal rates for a short haul." Tuttle agreed this was so. As Carmack and insurgents elsewhere in the country viewed it, "These artificial conditions created by the railroads . . . counteracted the natural economical disadvantage" of a particular industrial site. The insurgents would have corrected these artificial conditions with a rate-setting commission. New Englanders, on the other hand, viewed exactly *that* kind of action as artificial.[54]

In any case, it is clear that Massachusetts had good reason to believe its prosperity depended greatly upon the very disparity between long and short haul rates which became one of the central points of the insurgent attack during the Progressive Era.[55] Consequently, although Massachusetts had pioneered in

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 919, 975-976.

[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 973-976. For some contemporary discussion of this issue, see William Z. Ripley, *Railroads: Rates and Regulation* (New York, 1912), pp. 159-162.

[55] The Boston Chamber of Commerce declared itself "keenly alive to the danger that would menace New England business interests, if by putting the rate-making power into the hands of the Interstate Commerce Commission, or some other Government tribunal, it should result in fixing rates mainly on a mileage basis, as might ultimately, under the circumstances, come to be the basis for transportation of freight." Boston Chamber of Commerce,

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the effective control of railroads, it dragged its feet against efforts to strengthen the federal regulatory bodies. The point is not to justify Massachusetts' resistance to the efforts of reformers throughout the country to end genuinely iniquitous conditions, but rather to explain it, as well as to shed some light on why Massachusetts' achievements have remained in shadow.

The tariff issue further illustrates the point. Probably no issue was more important in provoking revolt within and against the Republican party across the nation. As the twentieth century opened, the Dingley Tariff of 1897 governed American foreign trade. Although it is not clear that Massachusetts industries benefited inordinately from the Dingley provisions,[56] protectionism had become for many a tenet of the Republican creed and a test of party fealty. There was in fact a growing demand in Massachusetts for downward revision of the tariff rates: as new competitors entered the domestic markets, and transportation costs proved increasingly disadvantageous to Massachusetts industry, the state's businessmen turned to foreign markets and sources of raw materials. Nevertheless, most Republican leaders in the state were reluctant to urge revision because it might tend to undermine protectionism on which the party based its appeal to the labor element as well as to the sizable woolen, watchmaking, and other industries. They pointed out, moreover, that the rest of the country would not accept a revision which placed raw materials on the free list while maintaining the protective duties on manufactured products.

In any case, the difference on the tariff between Massachusetts and most Progressive leaders, especially those in Congress, was not protectionism versus free trade or tariff-for-revenue-only, but which interests were to benefit by particular tariff schedules. Robert M. La Follette, who helped to write the avowedly protectionist McKinley Tariff of 1890, saw nothing wrong with the "home market" idea in general, which, he said, "has been the basis of effective appeal to the farmers to support high protective

*20th Ann. Rpt.* (1906), p. 21. See also the debate between Senators Bristow of Kansas and Lodge on the Court of Commerce bill in 1910. *Congressional Record,* 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (May 10, 1910), pp. 6011-6016.

[56] In exchange for a duty on raw wool, Massachusetts wool manufacturers received a more-than-compensatory "protective" duty. Other manufactures also received protection. But the increase in the rates on hides, ores, coal, sugar, and such could in no way have benefited Massachusetts.

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duties": "The theory was sound. The argument was logical. . . . It was effective." But it was clear that so far the "wrong" interests were benefiting disproportionately.[57]

This is not to disparage the idealistic fervor which in general motivated Progressives such as La Follette. Rather, it is to point out that one explanation for the alienation of Massachusetts from the Progressive Movement, as a movement, was that many insurgents chose the state as an object for attack for a variety of reasons. Both in their capacity as representatives of particular interests competing with Massachusetts interests, and in their genuine conviction that Massachusetts interests had appropriated an undue share of the rewards of American society, insurgents tended to place the Bay State on the defensive.

Perhaps it is unnecessary to elaborate on the specific predicaments faced by Massachusetts and the Progressives. To explain the penumbral status of Massachusetts among Progressive insurgents (and, perhaps as a consequence, among many historians) it may be sufficient to note again that its achievements were often inspired by a tradition of conservatism. To a maturing nation, hurrying to catch up with its age in a brand-new century, the insurgent spirit of La Follette's Wisconsin as well as its program appeared more appropriate. Its program of responsible government, corporation control and social justice, then and subsequently advertised as "more comprehensive and far-reaching" than that of other states, and conspicuous as much for the struggle waged on its behalf as for its success, "became an article for export both to other states and to other countries." "But in 1900," writes its historian, "all this lay in the future."[58]

For Massachusetts in 1900, the achievement of most of this program lay in the past.

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[57] Robert M. La Follette, "The Farmer and the Tariff Bill", *La Follette's Magazine* (Sept. 13, 1913), p. 1.

[58] Maxwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 8 and 9.

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# FORMATIVE RELATIONS OF AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE*

HOW large a part did the federal government play in the early advancement of science, and thereby of private enterprise as well? This question bears on the larger perspective now needed to understand the greatly expanded federal promotion of science and technology, especially in the field of scientific research and development. Recent historical work has shown that the government at all levels, federal, state and local, actively promoted business and economic development in the period before the Civil War.[1] Such public action for the benefit of transportation, industry and agriculture, as well as national defense, was often closely related to the growth of science in this country. Since progress in these areas of federal support both required and stimulated scientific advances, the government was forced to take heed of the nation's needs as well as its potential for developing and diffusing scientific knowledge. This support of science became a major avenue for the encouragement of private enterprise.

A great deal more needs to be known, however, about government promotion of scientific development and the resulting stimulus to enterprise. How early did the government take a hand in fostering scientific advance? Why did it assume this rôle? What methods did it use to aid the growth of science? How great was the stimulus to industrial development? This survey can only suggest the general scope and character of this early promotion of science, thereby indicating how much remains to be done to secure an adequate understanding of the close relation between government and science and enterprise which prevailed before the Civil War.[2]

* This paper stems in good part from research in the history of American military and economic policy done under a grant from the Social Science Research Council.

[1] Of great value here are recent studies by Carter Goodrich, Oscar Handlin, Louis Hartz, and Milton S. Heath.

[2] The most comprehensive study of government and science is A. Hunter Dupree, *Science in the Federal Government* (Cambridge, 1957). For the early



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*Early Interest in Public Support of Science*

Even before the American Revolution a considerable interest in science prevailed in the American Colonies. The varied work of Benjamin Franklin, particularly his research in electricity, is quite significant in this regard. Several colonial members of the Royal Society of London, including Franklin, carried on active correspondence with members in England. George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were typical of a group of Americans with strong interests in exploration, surveying, and the application of science to agriculture.

The American Revolution, somewhat like the French Revolution later, produced an acute concern for the prestige and the needs of science in a country fighting for its independence and asserting its cultural nationalism. The Continental Army required men of science for several of its major activities. Military engineers were desperately needed, and this country had to look mainly to Europe for its trained engineers, France being the chief supplier of this talent. Military surveying was required, and geographers and surveyors of roads had to be secured. Artillerists and armorers were likewise in great demand. David Rittenhouse, early physicist and astronomer, rendered valuable ordnance service during the war by supervising the casting of cannon and the manufacture of gunpowder.[3] Among those who showed a great interest in the support of science at this time were Franklin, Washington, Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton and Benjamin Rush.

President Washington and his successors down to John Quincy Adams strongly urged the establishment of a national university which would be well grounded in the sciences.[4] They

period see Brooke Hindle, *The Pursuit of Science in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill, 1956). Two other useful works of recent date are Whitfield J. Bell, Jr., *Early American Science: Needs and Opportunities for Study* (Williamsburg, 1955), and Don K. Price, *Government and Science: Their Dynamic Relation in American Democracy* (New York, 1954).

[3] I. Bernard Cohen, "American Physicists at War: From the Revolution to the World Wars", *American Journal of Physics*, XIII (1945), 224-235. Earlier Rittenhouse had made a number of colonial boundary surveys. Hindle, *op. cit.*, pp. 134, 174-175, 229-230.

[4] See Edgar B. Wesley, *Proposed: The University of the United States* (Minneapolis, 1936), pp. 3-10; Dupree, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15, 33, 40-42.

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also advocated military schools designed to promote military science and engineering. Jefferson was instrumental in founding the Military Academy at West Point, to which James Madison and James Monroe in turn gave firm support. Particularly under Monroe, West Point assumed importance as a school of engineering. John C. Calhoun, Monroe's Secretary of War, actively fostered its improvement and favored the creation of military schools of practice. With the backing of Jefferson and Albert Gallatin, Ferdinand Rudolph Hassler, the Swiss mathematician, was selected to organize the Coast Survey. He planned its work before the War of 1812 and initiated actual operations following the war. Jefferson selected Jared Mansfield, noted mathematician and scientist, to be a professor at West Point and then Surveyor-General of the United States. Mansfield subsequently made the astronomical observations required to place federal land surveying on an accurate basis. For many years John Quincy Adams insistently sought the establishment of a national observatory.

The early Federalists or Hamiltonians were notable for their strong concern about science and its promotion by government. Although the Jeffersonians were perhaps less militant in this regard, Jefferson's own fond interest in science and its support by government was quite outstanding. Madison and Monroe took much the same official position, especially the latter after the War of 1812. This official concern with the progress of science seems to have waned considerably in the age of Jackson. The Jeffersonians consequently resembled the Federalists more than they did the Jacksonians in this sympathy for public sponsorship of science.[5] The idea of a national university became less popular after the 1820's and was finally dropped, at least in the formal utterances of presidents and other leading officials. The Military Academy, however, was rapidly developed after 1815 into a systematic school of military science, including engineering and its application to internal improvements. The view may be taken that, at least in the field of science, West Point was allowed to serve in lieu of a national university.

### *Government Efforts to Advance Science*

The American Revolution clearly demonstrated the urgency of science in a new country which had to protect itself and

[5] *Cf.* Bell, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-36; Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-9.

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improve its means of communication. This war particularly revealed the need for military engineers, geographers, and experts in the manufacture and use of artillery. To meet this lack of engineers, foreigners had to be employed during the Revolution, and to some extent for four or five decades thereafter. Their chief postwar services were in the construction of coastal defenses and the teaching of military science and engineering at West Point.[6] The public domain had to be surveyed and boundaries determined, which were major functions of government carried on primarily by native Americans. Under the Articles of Confederation, problems of coinage and weights and measures also led to complications.

The Constitution gave explicit recognition to a number of these pressing scientific matters. It made provisions for determining standards of weights and measures, developing a system of coinage, issuing patents and copyrights, and taking a census of the population. Soon after the Constitution was adopted, attention had to be given to several pressing technical problems, including land surveying, coastal fortifications, the survey of the coast, the development of military schools, and the creation of national armories and arsenals. In addition, the Cumberland Road was commenced as a federal project, and there was widespread advocacy of a national university.

Continued demands for a military school led in 1802 to the creation by law of the United States Military Academy, which was to devote itself primarily to the training of engineers and artillerists, the most technical or scientific branches of the military establishment. As early as 1794 a Corps of Artillerists and Engineers had been created to promote technical instruction in these services and to build harbor defenses. The act of 1802 creating the Military Academy separated the Corps of Engineers from the Artillery, and an Ordnance Department was later instituted. National armories were established at Springfield, Massachusetts, and Harpers Ferry, Virginia; and a program for procuring small arms on long-term contract was designed for the express purpose of creating a domestic small-arms industry. The national armories were operated in such a way as to foster

[6] William E. Birkhimer, *Historical Sketch of the Organization, Administration, Matériel and Tactics of the Artillery, United States Army* (Washington, 1884), pp. 1-33, 108-115, 166-167, 183-185, 191-192; Hindle, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-243.

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this private industry; they coöperated closely in technical matters to aid the private armorers of New England and the Pennsylvania–Harpers Ferry area.[7]

### *Stimulus of the War of 1812*

The War of 1812 acutely impressed upon government leaders the urgency of a number of major technical problems. Among the outstanding needs it demonstrated were those for improved inland transportation, seacoast fortifications, domestic manufacture of armaments, and skilled artillerists and engineers. Greatly increased attention was given to the development of industry, and in 1816 a protective tariff was enacted to stimulate the growth of American manufacturing. At this time the government took vigorous steps to develop West Point as a leading school of science and engineering. Concerted action was taken to secure an elaborate scheme of coastal defenses and to fortify strategic points along the Mississippi and the Great Lakes. The government acted on a wide front to improve transportation to the interior. It started using troops to build roads to the frontier military posts, and it commenced extending the Cumberland or National Road toward the Mississippi. It also gave financial assistance to a few canal companies, and in 1824 it assigned numerous Army engineers to the work of improving rivers and harbors and surveying routes for roads and canals to be built by state or private enterprise. These transportation improvements followed the plan laid down by Secretary of War Calhoun in his report of 1819 on roads and canals, which in turn incorporated the essentials of Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin's 1808 report on internal improvements.[8]

Government officials and military leaders worked out what was, in effect, a general plan of national defense following the War of 1812. This plan embodied coastal fortifications, interior defenses, the regular Army, the militia, the Navy, and transportation improvements, as well as the promotion of science and domestic industry. Much of this planning was centered in the

[7] Felicia Johnson Deyrup, *Arms Makers of the Connecticut Valley* (Northampton, 1948), pp. 5, 37-38, 41-50, 66-67; Constance McLaughlin Green, *Eli Whitney and the Birth of American Technology* (Boston, 1956), pp. 101-109, 123-130, 143-156, 167-175.

[8] See Carter Goodrich, "National Planning of Internal Improvements", Political Science Quarterly, LXIII (1948), 16-44.

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Board of Engineers for Fortifications, which was created in 1816. The year before, two distinguished Army engineers, Colonel William McRee and Major Sylvanus Thayer, were sent to Europe to procure knowledge and treatises on military science and engineering. After meeting two of Napoleon's outstanding engineers, Simon Bernard and Claudius Crozet, they joined with Gallatin and Lafayette in recommending that the government employ these two French engineers to help in developing a strong system of national defense.[9]

General Bernard was brought to this country in 1816 as Assistant Engineer in the same rank as General Joseph G. Swift, the Chief Engineer. The Board of Engineers for Fortifications was formed around General Bernard as its chief member, along with Colonels McRee and Joseph G. Totten. This board carefully examined the needs for coastal and interior fortifications and then formulated plans for a general system of coastal defenses and the project plans for individual works. They used several brigades of Army engineers to make topographical and hydrographic surveys, upon which their detailed plans were based. This planning of seaboard defenses was coördinated with Hassler's survey of the coast, upon which still other topographical engineers were employed. The General Survey Act was passed in 1824 to provide surveying for roads and canals of military and commercial importance. Bernard became the leading member of the Board of Engineers for Internal Improvements, created that year to direct these new surveying and planning activities. He served on these two interrelated boards with distinction and made many important surveys and tours of inspection throughout the country prior to his return to France in 1831.[10]

Crozet also came with Bernard to the United States in 1816 and became professor of engineering at West Point. Not long after Major Thayer returned from Europe, President Monroe installed Thayer as Superintendent of the Military Academy. With the firm support of Secretary of War Calhoun, West Point

[9] R. Ernest Dupuy, *The West Point Tradition in American Life* (New York, 1940), pp. 81, 92-100.

[10] William H. Carter, "Bernard", *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States*, LI (1912), 147-155; J. G. Barnard, "Eulogy of the Late Joseph G. Totten . . .", Smithsonian Institution, *Annual Report . . . 1865* (Washington, 1872), pp. 137-172.

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was rapidly built into an effective school of engineering through the efforts of Thayer, Crozet, Jared Mansfield, and the enlarged academic staff. Crozet introduced descriptive geometry and materials on military and civil engineering which he had acquired at France's famed Polytechnic School in Paris. In 1823 he left West Point to commence a long career as state engineer of Virginia. He was the leading founder of the Virginia Military Institute, which was developed as a military and engineering school upon the model of West Point and the Polytechnic School.[11]

The War of 1812, which stimulated this acute interest in national defense and economic development, actually initiated a systematic transfer of military science from Europe to the United States. Other Frenchmen in addition to Crozet taught at West Point in the next decade or two. French textbooks on engineering and mathematics were used at West Point, sometimes first in the original French and then in English translations. During the 1820's and in each later decade prior to the Civil War, American military men, particularly engineer and ordnance officers, followed McRee and Thayer to Europe to examine military schools and other military and technical institutions. In this way the country gained a great deal of technical knowledge about European scientific schools, fortifications, ordnance systems, industrial plants, and civil works, including canals, railways, harbors, and river improvements.[12]

### *Rôle of the Military in Promoting Science*

The War Department, as is now evident, was responsible for several major functions which were obviously quite technical in character. Among these were the construction of fortifications, exploration of the West, development of artillery and ordnance equipment, operation of West Point as an engineering and scientific school, and the execution of various civil-works programs. Of particular importance were the Engineer Department, including the Military Academy and Topographical

[11] Crozet's career is treated by William Couper in *Claudius Crozet: Scholar-Soldier-Educator-Engineer* (Charlottesville, 1936), and *One Hundred Years at V.M.I.* (Richmond, 1939-1940).

[12] Dupuy, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-138, 161, 191-201; Dirk J. Struik, *Yankee Science in the Making* (Boston, 1948), pp. 244-245.

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Bureau, the Artillery, the Ordnance Department, and the national armories. The work of these military agencies encompassed the transfer of technical knowledge from Europe, specialized training of Army officers for technical duties, military medicine, aid to the Coast Survey, and a wide range of activities in exploring, surveying, and constructing public works. These agencies were reasonably well protected from political pressures, had the aura of military justification, were often beneficial to industrial or business interests, and received considerable support from the Executive and Congress.[13]

The exploration carried on by Army officers was most varied and far-flung. It was designed to gain knowledge along many lines—geographical, topographical, hydrographical, geological, mineralogical, botanical, zoological and meteorological, also ethnological. The early expedition by Captains Lewis and Clark, planned by President Jefferson to explore the Louisiana Purchase, had scientific as well as geographical and political objectives. Among several other western explorations before the War of 1812 were those by Lieutenant Zebulon M. Pike. These expeditions in the West increased rapidly in number following the War of 1812, involving such Army explorers as Stephen H. Long, Bonneville and Fremont.[14]

The Army sponsored explorations by Schoolcraft, Edwin James, Nicollet, Featherstonhaugh, and others which produced considerable knowledge about the geology and mineral resources of the western country. Through the Treasury Department, ordnance officers, and Army engineers, the government after 1820 gave much attention to the lead mine regions of the Mississippi Valley. The lead lands of Illinois, Iowa and Missouri were explored, surveyed and frequently inspected as part of a program for leasing them to private miners for rapid exploitation. Soon after gold was discovered in California in 1848, mineralogical surveys were made there by government officials and Army officers. In these and other ways, the government had a significant part in advancing mineralogical knowledge and science, thereby aiding the mining industry for more than half

[13] Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-26.

[14] The work of Army explorers is evaluated in Edmund W. Gilbert, *The Exploration of Western America, 1800-1850: An Historical Geography* (Cambridge, England, 1933).

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a century before the United States Geological Survey was established in 1879.[15]

The knowledge contributed by these military explorations in the West went far beyond geography and natural resources. Materials were accumulated, for instance, concerning the Indian tribes, weather, botany and zoology of the regions explored. The western agents of the General Land Office also added to this knowledge. The Indian Office, which was part of the War Department until the Interior Department was created in 1849, amassed many ethnological and mineralogical data. The most systematic and highly organized exploration undertaken in this period consisted of the Pacific railroad surveys, commenced by the War Department in 1853. Several surveying parties were busy almost to the Civil War examining alternative routes for a railroad from the Mississippi to the Pacific. These railroad explorers collected detailed knowledge of the minerals, climate, agricultural resources, and plant and animal life along the several routes surveyed. Geologists, natural scientists, and other experts accompanied these surveying parties, as they had often done on earlier western expeditions.

The War Department also executed a wide variety of civil works in the period before 1860. The General Survey Act of 1824 involved the Army engineers in two decades of active surveying for major transportation projects, at the height of the nation-wide movement for internal improvements. Government engineers made surveys for innumerable roads and canals, even though built mainly by state or private enterprise. They also surveyed at government expense the routes for some forty or fifty railroads between 1827 and 1840 and were sometimes furloughed to locate and construct private or state-owned railroad and canal lines.[16]

The Engineer and Quartermaster Departments carried on extensive road building in the West, often with the labor of troops. They constructed military and territorial roads in the Mississippi Valley and Great Lakes regions, connecting the

[15] Institute for Government Research, *The U. S. Geological Survey* (New York, 1918), pp. 1-9; George Otis Smith, "A Century of Government Geological Surveys", *A Century of Science in America* (New Haven, 1918), pp. 193-216.

[16] Forest G. Hill, "Government Engineering Aid to Railroads Before the Civil War", *Journal of Economic History*, XI (1951), 235-246.

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Army posts on the Indian frontier with the settled areas. For two decades the Engineer Department supervised the extension of the National Road westward to the Mississippi. The War and Interior Departments continued to build territorial roads in the Far West until well after the Civil War.[17] In this road work and the surveying for canals and railroads, the Army engineers made effective use of their engineering training and experience. In fact, their talents were in great demand by states, territories and transportation companies. Since trained civil engineers were then very scarce, the work of these military engineers was extremely significant in advancing the nation's transportation system.

The Army engineers found another major outlet for their engineering skills in river and harbor improvements. Starting in 1824, they greatly improved steamboat navigation on the Ohio, Mississippi, Missouri and Red Rivers and completed numerous harbor and breakwater projects along the Atlantic Coast and the Great Lakes.[18] These works gave employment and training to many civilian engineers, while the Army engineers developed many methods, such as snag removal, dredging, and use of cement and other building materials, which aided the advance of construction techniques and civil engineering generally. They served as the chief construction agency for several government departments, particularly the Treasury. They supervised the erection of lighthouses along the Atlantic and the Great Lakes, thereby assuming a major rôle in the lighthouse program.[19] They likewise built custom houses, marine hospitals and post offices; and in Washington they supervised the construction of the Capitol and other public buildings, as well as the Washington Aqueduct.[20]

[17] *Cf.* W. Turrentine Jackson, *Wagon Roads West: A Study of Federal Road Survey and Construction in the Trans-Mississippi West, 1846-1869* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1952).

[18] See W. Stull Holt, *The Office of the Chief of Engineers* (Baltimore, 1923), and Louis C. Hunter, *Steamboats on the Western Rivers* (Cambridge, 1949).

[19] Arnold B. Johnson, *The Modern Light-House Service* (Washington, 1889), pp. 15-27; George Weiss, *The Lighthouse Service* (Baltimore, 1926), pp. 1-15.

[20] The varied civil activities of the topographical engineers are summarized in Henry P. Beers, "A History of the U. S. Topographical Engineers, 1813-1863", *Military Engineer,* XXXIV (1942), 287-291, 348-352.

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Army officers trained in military and civil engineering often resigned at an early age to enter private employment. West Point graduates became leading civil engineers and occupied influential positions in transportation, industry and scientific schools. War Department officials continually praised the work they did, not only in the scientific, technical and civil-works programs of the government, but also in their private careers. The government visualized that it was providing the skilled technicians required to promote the nation's industry, transportation and scientific education. It felt that through both their public service and civil careers, West Pointers were helping to disseminate science and accelerate economic development.[21] This favorable attitude toward the rôle of the military in disseminating science was prominently expressed in the messages of the Presidents and the annual reports of the Secretaries of War, Engineer Department, and Boards of Visitors to the Military Academy.

Why did the military establishment assume this major rôle in promoting and disseminating science? From the beginning the Army had to fulfill technical functions which required a good deal of scientific knowledge. Military men had the education, experience and discipline to carry on technical or scientific work required for both military and economic purposes.[22] Their work aided the westward movement, strengthened the militia, and facilitated industrial and educational progress. Furthermore, there was widespread popular approval of the military for assuming this highly beneficial rôle. There had always been great public hostility toward a large standing army, which would place a heavy economic burden on the country and might endanger individual freedoms. These objections, however, were happily offset by letting military personnel usefully promote the nation's science and industrial wealth.

Like the War Department, the Navy came to have major technical or scientific functions and interests. Although the Navy was commenced in the 1790's and achieved separate departmental status by 1798, it remained quite small until the

[21] Dupuy, *op. cit.*, pp. 368-369, 378-379, 382-384. The technical work of the Army engineers prior to the Civil War is discussed in Forest G. Hill, *Roads, Rails and Waterways: The Army Engineers and Early Transportation* (Norman, 1957).

[22] See Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-23, 123.

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War of 1812. While the widespread fear of a regular army hardly applied to the Navy, the compelling urge for governmental economy affected it adversely. Furthermore, the Navy was not immediately beneficial to westward expansion or domestic transportation and industry. Officers of the Navy envied the predominance of the War Department, particularly its highly organized and influential bureaus and Military Academy. After many years of insistent pleas by naval officers, the bureau system for separate functions was instituted in 1842, and the Naval Academy was finally created in 1845. Like West Point, it developed a scientific curriculum designed to provide the technical skills needed in the naval service, especially in navigation, marine architecture and mechanical engineering.[23]

The Navy took a strong interest in the survey and charting of coastal waters. It was active in securing breakwaters, harbors of refuge, dry docks and navy yards along the coasts. Naval officers worked closely with military engineers on various boards to select sites and design plans for these coastal installations, as well as lighthouses and harbor defenses. Navy yards were established at Portsmouth, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, Norfolk and Charleston on the Atlantic Coast and at Pensacola on the Gulf, while in the early 1850's the Mare Island Navy Yard was opened on the Pacific near San Francisco. These yards not only built and repaired vessels, but also worked on problems of naval artillery and ordnance. Before the Civil War the Washington Navy Yard made considerable progress in ordnance work, one of its major achievements being the rifled naval gun. The Navy's Bureau of Ordnance, created in 1842, actively experimented with improvements in its field. Naval experts also devoted some attention to protective armor and problems of steam power and iron vessels before the Civil War.

The Navy Department by the 1830's started gathering a large volume of nautical information, securing data from both merchant and naval vessels. The Depot of Charts and Instruments was created in 1830 to collect, test, correct and issue charts, instruments and nautical books. Out of this Depot developed the Hydrographic Office and the Naval Observatory. It made hydrographic surveys in various parts of the world and prepared

[23] The evolution of the Naval Academy is discussed in John Crane and James F. Kieley, *United States Naval Academy: The First Hundred Years* (New York, 1945).

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and distributed its own ocean charts. The Depot was headed in turn by Lieutenants L. M. Goldsborough, Charles Wilkes, James M. Gilliss and Matthew Fontaine Maury. Under their direction it made great strides in collecting and supplying hydrographic and navigational data for the Navy and the merchant marine. It also made systematic observations in astronomy, magnetism and meteorology. Maury became distinguished as a hydrographer and meteorologist; his Wind and Current Charts and his Sailing Directions were of great value to the nation's ocean shipping interests as well as the Navy.

Although John Quincy Adams could never persuade Congress to authorize a national observatory, the Navy Department finally succeeded in this endeavor. The Depot of Charts and Instruments started making astronomical observations in the 1830's; and by 1844 it secured the permanent Naval Observatory in Washington, built under the supervision of Gilliss. In planning for the Observatory, he went abroad and consulted noted European astronomers. From 1845 onward the Observatory did systematic astronomical work, gaining international recognition by the 1850's. This work permitted the preparation of a nautical almanac and the publication of other astronomical data, valuable alike to the merchant marine, other scientists, and the Navy itself. In the years 1849-1852 Gilliss made an astronomical expedition to Chile, which yielded much scientific information about that country.

The first scientific expedition and large-scale hydrographic surveying made by the United States Navy was the Wilkes Exploring Expedition to the Pacific Ocean and South Seas in the years 1838-1842. Wilkes took along a scientific staff and made detailed hydrographic, meteorological and magnetic observations. His work included the location of islands, reefs, whaling grounds and sailing routes; and the scientific results of the expedition were published in a series of detailed reports. Commodore Matthew C. Perry made an expedition to Japan in 1852-1854, which had scientific as well as diplomatic objectives. Extensive nautical and scientific surveys and observations were made around Japan. The North Pacific Exploring Expedition, 1853-1859, was directed in turn by Commodore Cadwalader Ringgold and Commander John Rodgers. This expedition carried on comprehensive surveying, charting and scientific work around Japan, the Bering Sea and the Arctic Ocean. After a late

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start, the Navy rapidly contributed its share to charting the oceans and enlarging the knowledge of meteorology, astronomy and terrestrial magnetism.[24] Its work was very beneficial to, and greatly favored by, the nation's commercial and shipping interests as American trade spread around the globe.

### *Other Government Scientific Activities*

The early scientific work of the War and Navy Departments is less difficult to comprehend than that scattered through a number of civilian departments and agencies. However diffused and piecemeal these other scientific activities may have been, they were nevertheless quite important. They need to be outlined here in their variety and major concentrations, in order to have a more balanced picture of early government promotion of science and enterprise.

The Treasury Department came to have a number of scientific functions. These included coinage and the mints, the Coast Survey, standards of weights and measures, lighthouse construction, leasing of the lead mines in the Mississippi Valley, and construction and operation of marine hospitals. In many of these activities, including the construction of public works, the Treasury used the services of Army engineers. Hassler was teaching at West Point when he was selected by President Jefferson and Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin to institute the survey of the coast. In 1843 he was succeeded by Alexander Dallas Bache, noted scientist and educator who was a West Pointer and briefly an Army engineer. Hassler and Bache employed Army engineers and naval officers in their triangulation and hydrographic surveys along the coasts. Especially under Bache, the Coast Survey carried on a wide range of scientific investigations and gained great prestige. These two men in turn headed the Office of Weights and Measures, the forerunner of the National Bureau of Standards. They did extensive work in determining, standardizing and publicizing accurate weights and measures. In connection with the Coast Survey, the Treasury possessed the instruments and trained personnel for this work in the science of measurement, which was a prac-

[24] The early scientific work of the Navy is described by Gustavus A. Weber in *The Hydrographic Office* and *The Naval Observatory* (both published at Baltimore, 1926).

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tical necessity in the operation of the custom houses and the conduct of foreign trade.[25]

The State Department played a significant rôle in the transfer of scientific knowledge from Europe to America. As Secretaries of State, Jefferson and John Quincy Adams made elaborate reports on weights and measures in 1790 and 1821, respectively. The Secretaries of State made other scientific reports, secured technical information and agricultural plants and seeds through American ministers in Europe, and arranged for Army and Navy officers to make scientific investigations there. The State Department was instrumental in acquiring technical treatises, models of weights and measures, and scientific instruments abroad for government use. Its various boundary commissions employed topographical engineers and astronomers who gained valuable training and geographical knowledge. The Secretaries of State also directed the early censuses and accumulated data about the Indian tribes and organized territories of the West through handling treaty relations with the Indians and official relations with territorial governments.

There was inevitably a strong scientific aspect to the work of the General Land Office, which yielded further knowledge about the West. It surveyed the public domain on a systematic basis, classified lands, and supervised their sale or disposition. Notably in the special-purpose survey and control of mineral and timber lands, the Land Office produced extensive information on the country's natural resources. It supervised the reservation of certain forest lands for naval purposes, the genesis of the government's work in forestry. Land agents also contributed geological data and reported weather observations from an early period. The Land Office thus aided the early growth of meteorology, alongside the Army engineers, post surgeons, Navy Hydrographic Office, Patent Office and Smithsonian Institution.[26]

The Smithsonian looms quite large in the history of government efforts to promote science. It was founded in 1846 to use

[25] See Benjamin A. Gould, "Address in Commemoration of Alexander Dallas Bache", American Association for the Advancement of Science, *Proceedings*, XVII (1868), 1-56; Gustavus A. Weber's two monographs on *The Bureau of Standards* and *The Coast and Geodetic Survey* (Baltimore, 1925 and 1923, respectively); Dupree, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-33, 51-56, 100-105.

[26] *Cf.* Gustavus A. Weber, *The Weather Bureau* (New York, 1922), pp. 1-3; Dupree, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-114.

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the bequest left by the Englishman James Smithson for advancing and disseminating science in this country. Government scientists such as Bache and Totten were among its founders; and Joseph Henry, foremost physicist of the day, became its director in the capacity of secretary. Congressional sentiments of the Jacksonian era prevented use of this bequest to found a national university or observatory. Instead, the Smithsonian promoted research in several scientific fields, notably geology, mineralogy, ethnology and meteorology. Before the Civil War it commenced preparing weather maps and forecasts based on telegraphic reports from various points.[27] The Smithsonian worked in close liaison with the Coast Survey, Engineer Department, Lighthouse Board, and other scientific agencies; and it maintained contact with such private scientific groups as the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American Philosophical Society, and the Franklin Institute. The Smithsonian thus rendered valuable service by associating together the scientific men in public and private life.[28]

This communication and exchange between government and private scientists bore fruit during the Civil War in the coordination of scientific research and advice for war purposes. President Lincoln actively supported the Smithsonian Institution, Coast Survey, Army and Navy Ordnance Bureaus, and other technical agencies in their research and experimentation on military equipment and techniques.[29] Coördination of this work became the task of a special commission, headed by Henry of the Smithsonian, Bache of the Coast Survey, and Admiral Charles Henry Davis, formerly Bache's assistant on the Coast Survey and the first editor of the Navy's *American Ephemeris and Nautical Almanac*. In 1863 these men were instrumental in chartering the National Academy of Sciences, founded largely as an agency to assist and advise the government on scientific problems. The function of the National Academy of Sciences as scientific adviser to the government was continued on a diminished scale in peacetime. A notable instance of this was its de-

[27] Weber, *The Weather Bureau*, pp. 1-3.

[28] Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-229; Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-18; Dupree, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-90.

[29] Robert V. Bruce, *Lincoln and the Tools of War* (Indianapolis and New York, 1956).

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tailed study and plan of 1878 to consolidate within two agencies, the Coast and Geodetic Survey and the Geological Survey, the government's proliferated surveying activities. Its recommendations led to the creation of the latter in 1879.[30]

The Steamboat Inspection Service represents the development of a government technical function of a regulatory character. Frequent boiler explosions on river and lake steamers prompted demands for the government to correct this hazard to navigation. To assure the safety of passengers on steam vessels, legislation as early as 1838 required the inspection of hulls, boilers, safety equipment and competency of crews. This work was the subject of frequent laws and, like similar technical functions, was made the responsibility of the Treasury Department. A "Steamboat Act" of 1852 set up a system of nine supervising inspectors who met annually as a board and employed numerous local inspectors in their respective districts.[31] The government showed a strong interest in the improvement not only of steamboats, but also of the telegraph, railroads, agricultural science, and other technological advances of similar economic significance.

The work of the Patent Office clearly revealed this concern of government for the progress of invention and science. The first patent law of 1790 placed the issuance of patents under the charge of the Secretary of State, and Jefferson took a keen interest in the work. Patent law was basically improved in 1836, when the Patent Office became a separate bureau in the State Department, until its transfer to the new Department of Interior in 1849. After 1836 the Patent Office developed technical competence, a scientific library, a collection of models, and a regular staff of examiners. It coöperated with the Smithsonian Institution in collecting and publishing meteorological data from many voluntary observers in the United States and neighboring countries. The Patent Office as early as 1836 secured plants and seeds abroad for distribution to farmers, often through individual Congressmen. After 1841 its Agricultural Division developed a research program in agricultural chemistry —soils, fertilizers, plant nutrition, animal feeding, the analysis of cereals, the culture of cotton, sugar cane and tobacco, and

[30] Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 223, 229-232; Dupree, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-148; Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-20.

[31] Lloyd M. Short, *Steamboat-Inspection Service* (New York, 1922), pp. 1-16; Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

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related subjects. The agricultural section of the Patent Office's annual reports carried the results of these scientific investigations, along with agricultural and meteorological statistics. It thus developed the scientific and informational aids to agriculture which became the work of the Department of Agriculture in 1862.[32]

Government activity was by no means lacking in the social sciences prior to the Civil War. Perhaps the most notable work was the decennial censuses, directed by the State Department until the Interior Department was established. Although the Census Office initially dealt in crude fashion with population alone, it gradually expanded the demographic detail on a more comprehensive basis. At the same time, it introduced broader inquiries on manufacturing, agriculture, commerce, mining, fisheries and education. By the Civil War the census was thus yielding an enlarged range of useful demographic, social and economic statistics.[33]

Valuable economic data resulted from the operation of still other government agencies. The Treasury Department amassed materials relating to foreign and domestic commerce, shipping, internal revenues, mining, and related subjects. Its collection of import duties, excise taxes and local tonnage duties enabled it to compile related data on a systematic and useful basis; and Congress often called upon it for special reports on the merchant marine, imports, exports and domestic manufacturing. The Army engineers collected data on inland transportation and trade, especially on the western rivers and the Great Lakes. The Interior Department, including the General Land Office, increased the knowledge of natural resources as to their location, extent and exploitation. The Indian Office was quite interested in the Indian trade and made contributions in the field of ethnology. Annual and special reports of government agencies promoted the gradual accumulation and use of economic and social knowledge. The enormous collection of congressional documents indicates how varied and extensive this government work became. These documents are of immense value for study of the country's economic and social development, including the

[32] Dupree, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 109-114; Price, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14; Gustavus A. Weber, *The Bureau of Chemistry and Soils*, pp. 1-13, and *The Patent Office* (Baltimore, 1928 and 1924, respectively), pp. 1-15.

[33] W. Stull Holt, *The Bureau of the Census* (Washington, 1929), pp. 1-18.

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growth of science and its dissemination in the interest of industry and trade.[34]

### *Significance of Government Promotion of Science*

When these many activities bearing on the promotion and application of science are put in perspective, it becomes clear that the government's early scientific endeavors were extremely important for territorial and industrial expansion. Federal officials often took a highly purposeful attitude toward the development and disssemination of scientific knowledge and skills. Various agencies, particularly the technical bureaus of the War and Navy Departments, played a large part in this work. They actively borrowed technical knowledge from Europe, developed education and training functions, and carried on extensive investigation and research activities. Elsewhere in the government, the most significant scientific work was found in the Coast Survey, Smithsonian Institution, and Patent Office. Other agencies deserving notice for their scientific interests were the Lighthouse Board and the Land, Indian, and Census Offices.

In this broad concern of government with the advancement of science, the United States resembled and was influenced by France even more than Great Britain. The industrial revolution in Britain produced many self-taught craftsmen and engineers who filled the technical needs of private industry in manufacturing and public services such as transportation and communication. In France, however, the government assumed major responsibility for training technical experts and employing them in military institutions and public utilities, as well as in many industrial activities.[35] American officials often took these French technical schools and public services as models as well as sources of technical knowledge and even of trained experts.

The Civil War roughly marks a major transition in American science and industry. The modern factory system was rapidly emerging by this time, and the experimental or laboratory sciences quickly came to the forefront of scientific and techno-

[34] The technical work of various government agencies is treated in the series of Service Monographs of the United States Government, prepared by the Institute for Government Research; several of these are cited above. See also Dupree, *op. cit.*

[35] See Arthur L. Dunham, *The Industrial Revolution in France, 1815-1848* (New York, 1955), pp. 13-15, 60, 66, 89, 399-407.

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logical advance. Because of their close relation to manufacturing, the crucial fields of scientific endeavor were physics and chemistry. Even during the Civil War most governmental calls for scientific help from the Smithsonian and the National Academy of Sciences fell within these two fields.[36] By and large, the government's earlier scientific work had been adapted chiefly to the practical needs of a preindustrial era. Although its activities in civil engineering, geology, mineralogy, astronomy, meteorology and agronomy continued to increase after 1865, they had to adapt to the experimental methods of pure science and the pace-setting advances in chemistry, physics and industrial technology. Meanwhile private scientists, industrial laboratories, and the new or reinvigorated universities and technological schools took the decisive lead in these latter fields and made great inroads into those in which the federal government had done much of the earlier pioneering. In this new, peaceful industrial era the scientific activities of government for several decades became considerably less crucial for the continued growth of industry than had been the case before the Civil War.[37] As a consequence, the era of 140 or 160 years ago exceeds that of 70 or 80 years ago in providing instructive parallels to the present day's close relationships of government and defense to science and private enterprise.

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[36] Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 223, 229-232.

[37] As Dupree (*op. cit.*, p. 2) observes, "Indeed, before the rise of the universities, private foundations, and industrial laboratories, the fate of science rested more exclusively with the government than it did later."

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## A NOTE ON SOME RECENT CAMPAIGN BIOGRAPHIES*

WITH presidential politics in the air the customary campaign biographies are in the bookstores. Unfortunately, many of the 1960 volumes are so bad that they richly deserve to remain unsold and unread. John Kenneth Galbraith has recently lamented the sad literary state of the average company history or corporation novel, but for really plumbing the depths of style neither of these can touch the old-fashioned campaign biography. Still, even a bad biography may be worth looking into. One can discover how well Nixon did at poker while in the service (he generally came out ahead), or how Truman's home precinct voted in Symington's Senate primary contest (114 for Symington to 20 for the Truman-endorsed candidate), or what Kennedy intended to do when the Flanders resolution against McCarthy first came up (he had prepared a speech indicating his support for censure, on narrow legal grounds, but then supported the majority which voted to establish the Watkins Committee to investigate the charges). In a more general way one is struck with the importance in politics of sheer hard work and the urge to get ahead, with the tendency for political involvement to be seemingly inherited (Rockefeller's *other* grandfather was Senator Aldrich of Rhode Island), and with the extent to which some of the most successful campaigners

* *John Kennedy: A Political Profile,* by James MacGregor Burns. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1960. x, 309 pp. $4.75.

*Richard Nixon: A Political and Personal Profile,* by Earl Mazo. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1959. 309 pp. $3.95.

*This Is Humphrey: The Story of the Senator,* by Michael Amrine. Garden City, Doubleday & Company, 1960. 261 pp. $3.95.

*Stuart Symington: Portrait of a Man with a Mission,* by Paul I. Wellman. Garden City, Doubleday & Company, 1960. 283 pp. $3.95.

*The Lyndon Johnson Story,* by Booth Mooney. New York, Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956. 178 pp. $3.75.

*Candidates, 1960: Behind the Headlines in the Presidential Race,* edited by Eric Sevareid. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1959. ix, 369 pp. $4.95.

*Nixon & Rockefeller: A Double Portrait,* by Stewart Alsop. Garden City, Doubleday & Company, 1960. 240 pp. $3.95.

*Front Runner, Dark Horse,* by Ralph G. Martin and Ed Plaut. Garden City, Doubleday & Company, 1960. 473 pp. $4.95.



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(Nixon and Kennedy, for example) do not enjoy work on the hustings.

Fortunately, at least two of the biographies escape many of the worst evils of the "campaign biography" genre. James M. Burns's *John Kennedy: A Political Profile* is definitely a superior product. As a participant in Massachusetts politics and a perceptive observer of Congress and the presidency, Burns has high qualifications for undertaking the study. And Kennedy, who may have been a bit surprised at the final product, provided Burns with "full access to past and current files of correspondence, legislative records, family records, and the like," plus extensive tape-recorded interviews. The result is a well-written and accurate account of Kennedy's life and career, with the emphasis upon his response to the challenges of political leadership. Burns is impressed with Kennedy's ability to move into an office, master it, and move on to bigger things. He also sees Kennedy as moving from a position of ideological detachment to a more firm commitment to social as well as economic liberalism.

As an ardent liberal (and ADA leader) Burns still has some lingering doubts about Kennedy as president. Even the frontpiece quotation (opposite page 3) reflects this. The key to Burns's problem may lie in what he regards as Kennedy's extreme self-possession, his lack of emotional commitment, and his distaste for becoming "captive" to any particular intellectual or ideological point of view. Readers, paradoxically, may have the same reservations for Burns's book. Like his subject, he maintains his self-possession on every page, lacks emotional commitment to Kennedy, and refuses to become a "captive" of his subject.

If Burns finds it difficult to become completely involved in the case of John Kennedy, the opposite is usually true in regard to Richard Nixon. Amid the assorted hatchet jobs and apologetics, however, Earl Mazo's *Richard Nixon: A Political and Personal Profile* is a carefully researched biography which strikes this reviewer as about as impartial as can be expected in this decade. Like a good logical positivist the author sticks largely to the facts, which are often enough controversial, and lets the reader make his own value judgments. Thus Mazo consults Nixon victims Jerry Voorhis and Helen Gahagan Douglas, as well as a variety of Republican sources. Mazo pulls no punches in describing Nixon's 1950 senatorial campaign (pp. 71-83), or his activities in the 1954 elections (pp. 152-57). But his most useful contributions are in the new details of the handling of the famed

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1952 "Nixon fund" episode (pp. 101-37), and in setting out a complete day-by-day account of Stassen's ill-fated 1956 "dump Nixon" movement.

After these two the quality of the remaining individual biographies drops. Michael Amrine's *This Is Humphrey* had the misfortune to appear only as Humphrey's presidential chances disappeared in the spring. Political scientists may still be interested in the accounts of Humphrey's relations with members of the Department at the University of Minnesota (where he received his B.A. in 1939), and of his brief foray into graduate work at Louisiana State University (pp. 68-76). Aside from this it is largely of routine interest only.

A work which falls well below even the debased standards of the genre is Paul I. Wellman's *Stuart Symington: Portrait of a Man with a Mission.* Symington is no favorite of the reviewer, but he surely deserves better than this. Mr. Wellman portrays Symington's career and character with all the subtlety the author has previously reserved for children's books about Indians and the Wild West. But perhaps one should expect that presidential "dark horses" would not draw the better biographies. The virtues of Lyndon Baines Johnson were praised with equal ineptness in a 1956 volume, of which no revised edition has been published (or is called for). *Afficiandos* with a strong stomach may consult Booth Mooney, *The Lyndon Johnson Story.*

Surely men of the caliber of Humphrey, Symington and Johnson deserve more serious attention. Why do political scientists pile up endless legislative case studies, without ever undertaking a serious "senatorial biography"? Until recently the situation was just the reverse in public law, where judicial biographies have been the norm and the serious judicial case study (as with Alan F. Westin or Clement E. Vose) the exception.

One alternative to the campaign biography is the new trend to "collective biography". For this, enterprising publishers draw on Washington correspondents for a series of brief portraits of major candidates. The most comprehensive such collection is *Candidates: 1960,* edited by Eric Sevareid. Nine Washington correspondents give informed pictures of the major candidates, including two rather opposing estimates of Nixon. Such brief treatment, however, will add little to what the proverbial intelligent layman already knows.

During 1958 and 1959 Stewart Alsop wrote long feature articles on Nixon and Rockefeller for the *Saturday Evening Post.* He draws on much of this same material for his *Nixon & Rockefeller: A Double Portrait.* Alsop is never dull, but with

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the emphasis here on personality and background rather than on policy the result lacks the usual Alsopian touch of "gloom and doom". He does suggest that Nixon, relying on political instinct, might be less conservative in office than Rockefeller, relying on expert staff studies. But Alsop seems to believe that the country might well survive under either Republican—perhaps he had just worked himself into a cheery mood for the benefit of *Post* readers.

Finally, Ralph G. Martin and Ed Plaut have produced something that is not quite fish nor fowl. *Front Runner, Dark Horse* is a study of the contrasting campaigns of Senators Kennedy and Symington. In a breezy sort of way, relying heavily on quoted dialogue, it is surprisingly interesting, especially on Kennedy. The authors manage to convey much of the bustle and excitement of the 1956 Democratic convention, and the hustle and confusion of Kennedy's 1960 Wisconsin campaign (at which point the book went to press). The Kennedy portrait is less complete than in Burns's book, but more detailed on recent events and written with less restraint.

Perhaps with the recent increase in popular interest in political novels and political drama we can hope for better things in the way of political biography come 1964.

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## REVIEWS

*The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800.* By R. R. PALMER. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959.—ix, 534 pp. $7.50.

In this first volume of an eventual two-volume work Robert Palmer presents a unique and original study that has no real parallel in the historical literature of any language. It is not merely the first serious attempt of which this reviewer is aware to view the American and French Revolutions in a single historical perspective; it is a powerful synoptic study that gathers in its scope all comparable contemporary movements throughout the area of Atlantic civilization. Indubitably, to write a comparative constitutional history of Western civilization between 1760 and 1791 that goes beyond mere institutional analysis to include social and intellectual currents in all the countries concerned is a notoriously difficult undertaking. It requires an unerring eye for fundamentals, a capacity for close analysis and hard thinking, for precise scholarship and broad historical understanding, a resolution to concentrate on essentials without getting lost in local detail, not to mention a knowledge of a variety of languages which few historians possess. In the opinion of this reviewer Mr. Palmer has mastered these difficulties with outstanding and brilliant success. If, because of the nature of the subject and the numerous countries considered, this volume does not always make the easiest reading, even the most critical reader will admire its superb clarity, its piercing and thorough scholarship, the richness and pithiness of its materials, and its remarkably good sense.

The central theme of this book is the conflict between the democratic and aristocratic elements which, beginning about 1760, reached its climax in the last decade of the century. While the materials for this conflict had been accumulating almost everywhere, it received a further impulse from the American Revolution which by its written constitution, its declaration of rights, and its concept of the people as the constituent power implemented by means of the constitutional convention dethroned England and set up America as a model for those who



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sought a better world. In its essence, this conflict was a revolt against aristocracy which was entrenched in a variety of "constituted bodies" such as estates, diets, parliaments, and municipal councils. Claiming sovereignty for themselves, these bodies were self-perpetuating and uniformly denied the right of representation to those democratic groups who sought to extend the social basis of participation in political life. By 1774, however, these "constituted bodies" were beginning to yield either to democratic pressures, as in Geneva in 1768, or to the pressure of enlightened monarchy which worked toward greater social equality, as in the cases of the Maupeou administration in France, Gustavus III in Sweden, and Maria Theresa and Joseph II in the Habsburg dominions. But almost simultaneously there began that "aristocratic resurgence" to which Mr. Palmer devotes his closest attention. By 1790 there had been in each of five countries (Great Britain, Ireland, Holland, Geneva and Switzerland) a substantial democratic movement which among the Dutch, Genevese and even the Belgians had reached the point of revolution. But nowhere outside of France had the American idea of the people as the constituent power taken root. These democratic movements failed, either because of foreign intervention, as in Holland and Geneva, or because of the lack of mass support, as in Great Britain and Ireland. One of Mr. Palmer's most impressive passages is devoted to the crystallization of the philosophy of conservatism, especially his searching examination of Edmund Burke, who while opposing Parliamentary reform in 1784 gave full expression to the same ideas which he later repeated in his *Reflections*. Briefly, the counter-revolutionary program was complete well before the French Revolution.

Most incisive of all are the final chapters on the French Revolution, which the author regards as more democratic and less bourgeois than most historians of the past half-century. Mr. Palmer contends that the Revolution could not possibly have succeeded had it been merely bourgeois, that its businessmen and lawyers could not have defeated the close alliance between the monarchy and the aristocracy as matters then stood. Indeed, a moderate revolution was not among the possible choices. No, this volume is not a mere summary of the work of others, it is Mr. Palmer's very own.

WALTER L. DORN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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*Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of Church and State on the International Plane.* By ROBERT A. GRAHAM, S.J. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959.—xii, 442 pp. $7.50.

The author of this book knows exactly what he wants to do, and this he does extremely well. He states at the outset that he does not intend to deal with the policy which the Vatican has pursued in its relations with the various civil governments. The book is an institutional study in which the author tries to describe and explain "the system of reciprocal permanent representation which the papacy has developed through the centuries to expedite through official channels any issue requiring negotiation or consultation with the several states."

In the course of this investigation the author brings together a mass of fascinating factual details which, if they were known at all, had never been assembled in an easily accessible form. Wilhelm von Humboldt had to establish himself as the first representative of a Protestant Power in Rome by cautious, almost underhanded methods. In 1823 Canning was worried whether an answer to a letter of the Pope might involve a violation of the Elizabethan statute which prohibited any formal communication with the Roman Pontiff. One learns about the origin of the customs that the papal nuncios have precedence in the diplomatic corps and that nuncios accredited to great Catholic Powers receive the Red Hat when they leave these countries. Contrary to what one might have expected, the difficulties and delays in establishing diplomatic relations with Turkey and China arose less from religious contrasts than from the vehement opposition of France, which feared that direct relations between the Vatican and these states would diminish French stature as the protector of Christianity in the Orient. Particularly interesting is the discussion of the Myron C. Taylor mission, in which the author shows that in 1941, in order to be able to have an American representative in Rome during wartime, Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., was officially named chargé d'affaires; thus from 1941 to 1944 there were formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Vatican.

In accordance with the purpose of the author to focus on the institutional aspects of papal diplomacy, these various historical facts are not presented in the course of a chronological survey of the development of papal diplomacy, but form the illustrative material of a systematically organized discussion. The first part of the book describes the agencies through which the diplomatic negotiations of the Vatican with civil governments are conducted. This part tells about the establishment of nunciatures

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at the Catholic Courts of Europe from the sixteenth century on, about the gradual development of diplomatic contacts with Protestant and non-Catholic Powers, about the evolution of the office of the Papal Secretary of State, and about the various congregations which play a rôle in the making of papal diplomacy.

The second part of the book is devoted to a discussion of the legal position of the Papacy in the international world. The central problem is the strange phenomenon that a ruler without true territorial sovereignty has remained the center of an active and important diplomatic corps. This part is chiefly concerned with legal theory, and the author discusses some of the theorists who, in the nineteenth century, denied the Pope's claim to be a sovereign. The Pope's international position is based, as the author suggests in a most interesting analysis, on the idea of the church as a "perfect society" and on the concept of "spiritual sovereignty".

The author believes that the continued existence of a diplomatic corps at the Vatican and the enlargement of this corps which has taken place in recent years prove that the modern state is increasingly willing to acknowledge the rights of the church. In the eighteenth century, when papal diplomacy was systematically developed and Protestant Powers began to have diplomatic representatives in Rome, the main purpose of the civil governments—Catholic and Protestant alike—was that of preventing their citizens, including bishops and priests, from having any contact with an outside power like the Pope. By appointing diplomatic representatives to Rome, the civil governments intended to create an agency through which all communications would have to be channeled so that supervision and, if necessary, prohibition of papal messages were easy. The establishment of a diplomatic mission in Rome was meant to facilitate the control of the church by the state. The author does not share the general view that the nineteenth century with its secularizing tendencies was a pure disadvantage for the position of the church in modern society. The liberal demand for the separation of church and state seems to the author to imply recognition of the fact that the church has a function of its own, a separate right of existence, and can have direct communication with its members. The author feels that these implications have been accepted by most governments in the twentieth century. The development of papal diplomacy from the eighteenth to the twentieth century can be summarized in the slogan: from the Placet to the Concordat.

One cannot help wondering whether the author's view that,

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in our time, a happy coexistence in the relations between church and state has been achieved in the Western World is not influenced by the limitation of his study to institutional and theoretical aspects. It may be doubtful whether the author's view can be fully maintained when power considerations are taken into account. The importance of such considerations for an understanding of the diplomatic position of the Vatican is evident. The bowing of the Vatican to the French opposition to diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Turkey and China (which, in the first half of the nineteenth century, was paralleled by delays caused by Spain in the establishment of relations between the Vatican and the Latin American republics) shows that Vatican diplomacy has always been acting in a given power situation, and that its moves are dependent on it. The question must be raised whether the present decline in tension between the church and the modern secularized state is not a temporary phenomenon, resulting from the need of the "cold war" and the general "restoration" climate of our age.

The manner in which the author has limited his subject has also prevented him from realizing, or at least from discussing, the problems which arise for Vatican diplomacy from quite recent developments connected with the emergence of mass democracy. The author quotes a statement by Antonelli, the Secretary of State of Pius IX, in which Antonelli explained that the legates are sent out by the Pope "to succor the spiritual needs of the faithful at close hand, to remedy the more urgent needs of the Church and to be more accurately informed on the true state of religious affairs so as to adopt appropriate measures." Thus a papal nuncio has two functions. He is entrusted with the negotiations of the Pope with the governments to which he is sent, and he is the adviser of the Pope about the situation of Catholicism in the countries to which he is accredited. The latter function may have appeared rather innocuous to the liberal governments of the nineteenth century to which religion was a private affair. But this part of the activity of papal diplomacy has gained new significance with the appearance of great Catholic mass parties on the political scene. It is clear that the relationship between papal nuncio, churchmen, and a national political party is fluid and difficult to define. Although I do not want to suggest that the nuncio directs the moves of the Catholic party, one has only to think of the relations between Pacelli and Kaas in order to realize to what extent a nuncio can become an important factor in the domestic policy of a country.

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The attempt of the author to divest papal diplomacy from the element of mystery with which it is surrounded in the public mind, and to provide a sure factual basis for the discussion of this subject, is most meritorious. The fascinating topic of the "political role" of the Vatican would be discussed with more sense and less speculation if everyone would read this careful, sober and intelligent book. My critical remarks only indicate that the author goes somewhat too far in "de-sensationalizing" his topic, by reducing Vatican diplomacy to the rôle of "ordinary" diplomacy.

FELIX GILBERT

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE

*The Prophet Unarmed. Trotsky: 1921-1929.* By ISAAC DEUTSCHER. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1959.—xv, 490 pp. $9.50.

In this book, the second of his three-volume biography of Trotsky, Mr. Deutscher covers the period from the end of the civil war until Trotsky's expulsion from the USSR. He writes with great sympathy not only for his hero, but also for the ideas which he came to stand for: historicism, the ultimate rightness of Bolshevik aims—however distorted by accidents on the road such as Stalin—or the ultimate universal victory of socialism. Sympathy with one's hero is essential for a biographer, and Mr. Deutscher's biography, which is by no means uncritically adulatory, gains as a result. His passion is engaged—when he chides, he chides with love. Mr. Deutscher writes with the felicity of style and the gift for the dramatic which have deservedly won him a great reading public. If occasionally his enthusiasm runs away with him—as I think it does, for example, in what seems to me a somewhat exaggerated assessment of Trotsky's merits as a literary critic—he provides the reader with enough material to judge for himself. He has written a masterly account of a brilliant failure, whose moment of glory lasted only so long as he had Lenin to guide his unruly and, in the last resort, quite unpractical talents. Mr. Deutscher is, of course, well at home in the sources and has delved deep not only in the published material, but in Trotsky's papers in the Houghton Library at Harvard. The last chapter, in particular, throws much new light both on Trotsky and on the minutiae of the currents of opinion among the Left opposition. It covers Trotsky's year of exile in Alma Ata, in constant touch with his political sympathizers in exile in other parts of the country, and in secret correspondence with friends in Moscow.

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Admirable as this book is as biography, it is perhaps inevitable that biographies, particularly those which are as attractively written as Mr. Deutscher's, should be read as if they were histories of the period. Now at this point the author's sympathies and political predilections turn from a virtue to a disadvantage: what the biographer gains, the historian loses. The treatment of Bukharin and of his policy generally seems to me to suffer most from this disadvantage. Bukharin emerges from Mr. Deutscher's account as very little more than the renegade defender of the rich peasants, which is how the Left opposition saw him. Even Mr. Deutscher's figure for the kulaks—10 per cent—seems to have been taken over from Left-wing polemics, since official estimates at the time usually put them at 4 per cent. (Even in the rural Smolensk district, kulaks were officially classified as 5 per cent of the peasants. See M. Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule,* 1958, p. 238.) There was much more than this to Bukharin's philosophy, which was inspired by Lenin's thought in his last years, as expressed in "On Co-operation", and no doubt in numerous conversations with Bukharin. This view started from the premise that circumstances had resulted in a premature socialist revolution in Russia, before the social conditions were ripe for it. Therefore class war, which had served its purpose in putting the Bolsheviks into power, must now give way to an era of peaceful evolution. Socialism and industrialization remained the objective, and the fact that the Bolsheviks would retain their monopoly of political power guaranteed ultimate success. But, to expropriate capital from the peasants rapidly and forcibly was to risk not only the collapse of Bolshevik rule, but also (as Bukharin later wrote in his "Notes of an Economist") a return to the prerevolutionary system of exploitation of the peasants by the state. Therefore a prosperous peasantry should be encouraged, as a step toward developing coöperation on the land and the development of industry financed by the peasants' savings. All this envisaged a considerable degree of fiscal compulsion and central direction. But in the process the social consciousness both of workers and of peasants, which should in theory have preceded the "socialist" revolution, would at any rate be created after the revolution. It was a consistent theory, which one cannot dismiss as unsound, merely because Stalin preferred the surgical method of all-out war on a scale undreamt of by the most extreme Left winger, and certainly not by Trotsky. Both Bukharin and Stalin held logical positions: it was in fact Trotsky who lacked any clear-cut solution.

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Mr. Deutscher has little to say on the most interesting problem of all: why was Trotsky such an ineffectual opponent in his struggle against Stalin? Looking back on the failure, he seems to invite us to see the process dialectically, with Stalin as a kind of antithesis to Trotsky's thesis, and with a suggestion that the present era represents a higher synthesis. A better case could be made for Bukharin as the "thesis", if the dialectic is to be invoked. But a simpler explanation for Trotsky's failure was his fear that to bring Stalin down would risk collapse of the whole machine of Bolshevik rule, and this Trotsky was not prepared to risk in 1923, when his opposition might have been effective. In 1926 and 1927, when despair drove him to take the risk, the machine was too strong for any action against it to make any difference.

LEONARD SCHAPIRO

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

*Vienna and the Young Hitler.* By WILLIAM A. JENKS. New York, Columbia University Press, 1960.—viii, 252 pp. $5.00.

Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf:* "Vienna was and remained for me the hardest, but also the most thorough, school of my life. . . . In that city I received the basis of a view of life generally and a political way of looking at things in particular . . . which never again deserted me."

Everything goes to show that Hitler was telling the truth when he wrote this, yet the years which he spent in Vienna, from 1907 to 1913, remain virtually blank pages in any life of the Fuehrer. In recent years Kubizek and Jetzinger have added substantially to our knowledge of Hitler's early days but they have not succeeded in penetrating the obscurity which surrounds the period in Vienna. However unreliable, Hitler's own account in the second and third chapters of *Mein Kampf* remains—and may well remain for good—by far the most important guide to these formative years.

Dr. Jenks makes no claim to add anything new to the meagre collection, already assembled, of facts bearing directly on Hitler's life in Vienna. Instead, he has set to work to reconstruct the events and the atmosphere in the Austrian capital in the twenty or thirty years before 1914 from which Hitler drew "the basic stock of my personal opinions". By this ingenious indirect approach, Dr. Jenks supplies a valuable and at times illuminating commentary on Hitler's own account in *Mein Kampf.*

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The author is at his best in dealing with the political background. If the chapter on the Social Democrats contains little that is unfamiliar, that on the national quarrels in Austria is admirably balanced in its impartiality and the studies of Lueger and Schoenerer are excellent. Dr. Jenks avoids the sweeping condemnation so often made of Lueger's Christian Social movement and Schoenerer's nationalist program. He brings out clearly the positive elements in both and establishes with care the different stages in the erratic evolution of Schoenerer's views from his early liberalism to the aggressive and intolerant nationalism of his later career.

His account of Lueger's successful administration of the Vienna municipality gives Dr. Jenks the opportunity to describe the social problems of the capital into which Hitler was plunged. He might, with advantage, have devoted more space to the economic changes which produced these problems, for the economic and social history of the Hapsburg Empire is far more in need of investigation than the barren quarrels of its political parties. Similarly, although the chapter on the Jews in Austria brings together some interesting information on the part played by the Jews in the different professions, Dr. Jenks is inclined to skirt the problem of anti-Semitism and to hold back from any analysis of its deeper causes, comparable with that which Hannah Arendt made in *The Burden of Our Times*. The impression left by these chapters, and even more by his account of Vienna's cultural life (which is little more than a catalogue of famous names), is that Dr. Jenks is by training a political historian and that, in the less familiar reaches of social and cultural history, he loses the confidence and penetration which mark his discussion of political issues. (To be honest, the present reviewer must add that he is all too conscious of the same limitations in his own understanding of history.)

A more obvious objection to Dr. Jenks's method is the difficulty of establishing any precise connection between the Vienna background and Hitler's own experiences. Beyond the often quoted references in *Mein Kampf*, there is little the author can do except to point out the scenes which Hitler *may* have witnessed, the speeches and newspaper articles by which he may have been influenced. In general terms, the argument is convincing enough, but hardly novel: the interest lies in advancing from the general to the particular, but here Dr. Jenks is driven back, as every investigator has been, to rely on conjecture.

Fortunately, for long stretches at a time, Dr. Jenks forgets Hitler and sets about analyzing Austrian politics before 1914

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without worrying about the obligations or the limitations of his title. These chapters, an extenson of the author's earlier study on the electoral reform of 1907, remain the solid core of his study. If the book as a whole adds nothing to previous knowledge of Hitler and the formation of his sinister genius, this part shows a mastery of the materials and a quality of judgment which lead the present reviewer to hope that Dr. Jenks will return to his major theme and give us that authoritative account of the politics of the later Empire which has long needed writing.

ALAN BULLOCK

ST. CATHERINE'S SOCIETY
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

*On the Game of Politics in France.* By NATHAN LEITES. With a Foreword by D. W. Brogan. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959.—xiii, 190 pp. $4.50.

To the grave of the Fourth Republic, political scientists have brought far more wreaths of thorns than bouquets. Nathan Leites's offering is one of the nastiest, although one of the most entertaining. For what he does in this book is to present us with the rules of the game of politics, not in France as the over-ambitious title suggests, but in the National Assembly of the late régime. He has deciphered the operational code of the Palais-Bourbon.

In six chapters, he describes what he considers to be some of the major patterns of parliamentary behavior. He uses as his sources both direct quotations from parliamentary debates and reports by that formidable set of French journalists who specialize in the analysis of parliamentary moves and in the diffusion of the gossip which they pick up in the Assembly's lobbies: men who range from distinguished commentators like Jacques Fauvet, to the French equivalent of the Hollywood columnists. What Mr. Leites finds (with the help, in particular, of *Le Canard Enchaîné*) is that French politics are not ideological any more, do not refer to history as they once used to, and cannot be explained any longer in terms of left and right. He finds a constant struggle against responsibility, a complicated ritual designed to postpone decisions, avoid commitments, and let *force majeure* settle issues. He finds a subtle fencing game played by men interested primarily in their own careers, who try to be in power as much of the time as possible, who know that the best means to this end are ambiguity and smoothness

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rather than arrogance or inflexibility, and who are masters in the art of preventing rivals from achieving their goals or from remaining in power too long. He finds, in other words, a Hobbesian universe whose "laws of nature" he describes, in which self-glorification rather than self-preservation is the prime motive, and whose fundamental grimness is relieved mainly by wit.

It is a cruel picture. Is it a true one? On the whole, I would say yes, but with reservations and limitations. First of all, there are two points on which I think that the author is wrong. Doctrines do play much more of a rôle than he states: had he gone outside of the Palais-Bourbon—"the house without windows"—and looked at the other side of politics—the relations of the parliamentarians with the party "militants" as well as with the voters—he would have seen that the Fourth Republic suffered both from the flexibility of the parliamentary game and from the rigidity which obsolete ideologies still produced. Another point where Mr. Leites's picture is less than accurate is his emphasis on the discontinuity of policies which are defined only in times of acute crisis. What he forgets here is that in many areas Parliament had stopped making policy long before the Constitution of 1958, and that a large amount of continuity was achieved through executive and administrative measures. The coexistence of parliamentary *"immobilisme"* with social and economic change fostered by the Republic is a baffling phenomenon, but it should not be ignored.

Secondly, this book raises in the reader's mind a host of crucial problems which the author never even mentions. His explanation of parliamentary tactics needs, in turn, an explanation which he does not provide. The first question is: why did the deputies behave as they did? Were they really dominated by a passion for personal power, or were they caught (as the Gaullists charged) in a *système* in which even men who were moved by far loftier motives were obliged to act as if they were moved by personal ambition, if they wanted to be effective? French parliamentary politics are uncomfortably close to international politics, about which a similar question is often raised (most recently by Mr. Kenneth Waltz). Mr. Leites's decision not to study the behavior of the two extremes of the left and right is unfortunate in this respect, for it would have added much depth to his description. Nor does he discuss the relation between the operational code he presents and the legal code which determines at least in part the deputies' behavior, that is, the Constitution and the Rules of the Assembly—as if one could interpret

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a tennis match by describing the players' game, but without any reference to the basic rules.

Another major question with which Mr. Leites fails to deal is whether the behavior of the deputies in France is simply one example of general parliamentary behavior, or whether it is radically different from the behavior of other comparable organizations. Many of the features he describes can be found wherever there is a body of politicians divided into rival and relatively undisciplined factions and endowed with a certain amount of power (for instance, American national conventions). Other features mentioned by Mr. Leites are indeed much more peculiarly French, but the question then arises whether they are produced by the original features of French parliamentarianism (that is, a system of government in which the life of the cabinet is constantly at stake and in which Parliament suffers no institutional restraints on its powers) or whether such traits go even deeper and can be found in any French régime—including the highly antiparliamentary Fifth Republic.

A last question Mr. Leites does not ask is whether the code of the deputies, which seems so frivolous and scandalous on the surface, did not play some useful rôles as well: was the emphasis of the Third and Fourth Republics on moderation and compromise necessarily bad, in a country whose political unity was far from ideal, or did this emphasis become intolerable only since the thirties, when politics suddenly became a necessity, after having been, as Robert de Jouvenel had put it, something of a luxury? These are all questions which will probably not receive definitive answers; but they should have been raised. Studying politics without asking such questions might be fun, but is hardly illuminating. Mr. Leites's book, therefore, is to a serious discussion of French politics what the *théâtre de boulevard* is to serious drama.

STANLEY HOFFMANN

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

*Oil and State in the Middle East.* By GEORGE LENCZOWSKI. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1960.—xix, 379 pp. $6.75.

Seldom does a book appear which, like the one under review, is original in concept, authoritative in treatment, timely in publication, and fundamental in its bearing on important national and international issues. This volume dealing with factors affecting the production and transportation of Middle East oil and resultant political, social and economic problems is a major

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piece of work by any standard. It represents a prodigious amount of investigation both in printed sources and in the field of practical oil operations. The author deserves great credit for his perseverance and skill in ferreting out and setting forth for the first time so comprehensively information essential to a thorough understanding of the problems and situations faced by the oil industry in its Middle East operations.

The main theme of the volume is an account of the oil companies' relations with the governments, the general public, and the indigenous employees in the host countries. The theme has many ramifications, however, only a few of which can be touched upon here. The author notes, for example, that as the native populace, imbued with nationalistic fervor and now aware of the value of oil in the economy of advanced nations, becomes an increasingly important factor in the attitudes manifested by the governments of most of the oil-producing and oil-transit countries, the companies no longer can hope for either anonymity in their operations or a restriction of their relations with the respective host countries to simple company-government business relationships. The peoples of these countries are prone to put political above purely economic considerations—the more so, in all probability, because the returns from oil operations almost never have descended to the public level to the extent that had been anticipated or hoped for. Consequently, there has been developing a considerable measure of resentment at concessions and concessionaires, some—but by no means all—of which may have been due to Communist influences. Moreover, it is noted, the oil-producing and oil-transporting states are not motivated by international considerations except as the presence of oil installations provides a means for the working off of political animosities as in the case of the sabotaging, with official connivance, of the Iraq Petroleum Company's pipe line in Syria at the time of the Suez crisis.

The author does not view the Pan-Arab labor movement with equanimity, for in this he sees unhappy omens for the future. He notes that the Federation of Arab Labor Unions, which he believes to have been infiltrated by Communist agents, has given the Arab nationalist cause a new weapon with wide potentialities. The Arab League being torn with internal dissension, he considers that Arab unity may more readily be achieved through the working classes, particularly since FALU is regarded by its leaders as primarily a political instrument. At the same time, its assumed rôle as a national and liberating force could, he thinks, degenerate into something of a totalitarian order. For its leaders "to hobnob continuously with

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Communist leaders from China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Russia, to sign manifestoes couched in terms taken from the Soviet vocabulary, and to pretend that this means 'positive' neutrality—all this is an obvious exercise in hypocrisy and dissimulation." It is this movement, he says, that brings a "revolutionary specter" to the foreign-owned oil industry.

Dr. Lenczowski does not find that the companies invariably have been right or wise in their policies and in their dealings with governments and employees, but he points out that, by and large, they have gone beyond their contractual obligation at considerable cost and pains in extending benefits from the West in terms of housing, schools and working conditions. Nevertheless, he believes that from now on Western oil companies will be operating in Middle East oil fields more or less on sufferance. He thinks that their best chance for security in their Middle East operations is to dissociate themselves as far as possible from the official policies of their home governments. He concludes that "if training is needed for the host countries' nationals to make them useful to the industry, education in international living is no less necessary to Westerners if the industry wants to survive and prosper in the midst of an alien environment."

HALFORD L. HOSKINS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Advise and Consent: A Novel of Washington Politics.* By ALLEN DRURY. Garden City, Doubleday & Company, 1959.—616 pp. $5.75.

Few political novels have notable literary merit and those that do rank as literature usually say little about political institutions. The novelist is more concerned with ideology, with human motivation and conflict, or the impact of ambition and compromise. Anything less than an abstract novel of ideas will, of course, say something about institutional practices, but in most cases the details are passed over lightly or, worse still, are mishandled so badly that a knowledgeable reader winces at what he reads. However regrettable, this is understandable, for a good novelist is a man of letters, and, although there are exceptions to this, most literary men are little inclined to devote much time to the study of political machinery even though they may be interested in politics and political figures. Without saying anything about the literary merit of *Advise and Consent*—and probably the less said on that score the better—Allen Drury is an exception to the rule about attention being paid to political

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institutions; indeed the hero of the book is the United States Senate, not Bob Munson, the Majority Leader around whom the story is woven. Fifteen years in the press gallery equipped Drury to discuss the Senate with a verisimilitude and air of authenticity of description quite unusual for a political novel. In fact the novel is so much a story of the Senate that it is appropriate to examine it as a piece of political science writing, for in effect it has been taken as such by many of the millions who have read it in the last year. (How long would it take for Ogg and Ray and its competitors to reach as many readers? Five years? Ten?)

Unquestionably the chief claim to fame of *Advise and Consent* is the journalistic realism that it achieves; the reader has a sense that this must be the way the Senate works for it sounds so plausible. The rules, the mysterious terminology, the deferential rites of the Senate are not caricatured, as they might be in the hands of a writer less familiar with the upper chamber. Drury handles these adroitly and probably understandably for the uninitiated. And while there are some gross oversimplifications in the book, he does not commit the cardinal sin of reducing issues to two-sided simplicity; instead he examines his contested issue from many different perspectives, showing the multiplicity of forces that affect the making of political choices. By moving his camera from actor to actor and from scene to scene he manages to convey some of the complexity of the legislative process rather than to make it seem monochromatic.

If realism is the asset of the book, it is paradoxically also its downfall, for the distortions of reality are so serious that the average reader is likely to be more entertained than enlightened by it. The distortions in part are for literary purposes—the overdramatization, for example. Senators are not really so quixotic as Drury makes them, and Supreme Court justices are not very likely to misappropriate documents with blackmail in mind. The overemphasis on personal politics no doubt lends drama to the story, but it does not lend accuracy. Hurt feelings and personal indiscretions unquestionably play a part in political decision-making from time to time, and anyone who has observed the legislative process closely knows this, but it does not follow that the legislative process is primarily an affair of colliding personalities. Legislators are not atomic units adrift on random courses—party affiliation and factional ties, to mention only two factors, take precedence over personal foibles for most legislators most of the time. Drury complains that the "civics books . . . told you about the machinery, but they never let on that human beings were what made it run; they talked grandly

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about a government of laws, not of men, concealing from the idealistic and the young the apparently too harsh fact that it is men who make and administer laws, and so in the last analysis it is the men who determine whether the laws shall function" (p. 42). If the civics books err in de-emphasizing the men in our laws, Drury has erred no less in overemphasizing them.

Not all the departures from realism can be attributed to the demands of the craft of fiction, however. Other reviewers have questioned the accuracy of his presentation of the morals of politicians. Being in politics implies difficult moral choices, of course, and presidents in particular must have to make decisions that could hardly be fitted to the Kantian imperative, but the ruthlessness that Drury attributes to his president has surely not been characteristic of the holders of the office of president. Given the readiness of the average American to jump to the conclusion that all politicians are of a low order of humanity, one wonders at the net results of widely disseminating the notion that our most august leaders resort to theft and blackmail to achieve their objectives. His effort to show subtly that such immorality is justified hardly improves the situation.

Without specifically saying so, Drury has written an anti-political-party tract. To begin with, the parties have no names —just Majority and Minority—although this is perhaps necessary to avoid offending touchy partisan readers. More significantly is it not odd that the minority party does not make any effort to organize with regard to the confirmation fight? Drury's preconceptions about politics appear to take precedence here over his sense of accuracy as a reporter, for surely there has been no major confirmation fight, particularly not one where confirmation was denied, in which the minority party organization played no special rôle. To ask us to believe that this could happen in a season of presidential election maneuvering is to ask too much. And who would suppose that Senator Everett Dirksen would be invited into Senator Lyndon Johnson's office to discuss a crucial development in the battle for the Democratic presidential nomination? Yet Drury calls the minority leader to such a conference (p. 565). In the final analysis Drury tells us that political parties amount to little or nothing in decision-making in the United States Senate, which just plainly is not the case.

Finally it is significant that this is an apologia for the Senate; an *ex parte* presentation by a seasoned senator could not be more honeyed, nor more likely to obscure the imperfections and spotlight the virtues of The Club. In a sense this is a fictionalized version of William S. White's *The Citadel,* which saw the Senate in similarly benevolent terms. The diffusion of power,

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the filibuster, the hamstringing conventions and rules, all are passed over or explained away. Drury neither as a journalist-observer nor as a novelist has any obligation to present a balanced picture of the Senate, and if he desires he is justified in emphasizing its conservative virtures. He is not writing a political science treatise in the strict sense after all. But if the book is to be evaluated by political scientists in terms of its political science implications, then it must be judged in terms of its departures from reality whether these stem from literary requirements or from the value judgments that motivate the author.

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*Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society.* By RALF DAHRENDORF. From the German edition of 1957, translated, revised, and expanded by the author. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959.—xvi, 336 pp. $6.50.

This book is one of the most thoughtful attempts to cut through the profuse tangle that has grown up around the topic of class since Marx. Dahrendorf devotes himself to a fourfold task: a critique of Marx's class theory, a critical analysis of some more recent writings on the subject of class, an exposition of his own theory, and an application of this theory to aspects of post-capitalist society.

The point of departure for the critique of Marx is Dahrendorf's imaginative and fair completion of the famous unfinished chapter 52 in volume III of *The Capital.* Not satisfied with the usual, empirical refutation of Marx's predictions, Dahrendorf confronts on conceptual grounds the theoretical assumptions of Marx. He rejects the assumed identity of legal ownership and effective control of property; the identification of political and economic power; the limitation of the idea of class to self-conscious groups seeking their objective interests in an organized manner; and the assumption that class conflict is the one dominant form of social conflict and tends toward revolutionary change. On the other hand, Dahrendorf retains Marx's insight that an important source of social conflict is immanent in the social structure itself, and he makes this idea the starting point for his own theory of class.

Classes are, for Dahrendorf, conflict groups generated by the unequal distribution of authority in such "imperatively organized associations" (Max Weber's *Herrschaftsverbände*) as the state, industry, the army, the church (p. 204). This use of the

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class concept is adopted with deliberate intent. Since Dahrendorf assumes authority structures to be dichotomous, there are in each association two inherently antagonistic groups, those with authority and those without. Implied in each of the opposed authority positions is a latent interest to maintain or to gain authority, respectively. Dahrendorf elaborates the factors which determine whether these latent interests become manifest and express themselves in conflict. Depending on a number of specified factors, this class conflict, generated within an authority structure, may be of varying degrees of violence and intensity, and the resulting social change may be more gradual or more radical.

The crucial conceptual distinctions in this theory are introduced as postulates. The theory is deliberately limited in its applicability: since authority position is defined as the single basis of class, only conflicts over authority are considered. Moreover, the limitation to "imperatively organized associations" excludes all social positions outside of such associations as irrelevant for class analysis. As a result, the theory focuses attention on separate segmental structures rather than on society as a whole, though Dahrendorf contributes a number of ideas toward a more synthetic view. These limitations are the price paid for the greater precision of the theoretical model. Nevertheless, some of the deliberate simplifications might appear problematical to the reader, as for instance the view that authority is dichotomous.

Another assumption which creates difficulty in concrete cases is the separation of conflict over authority from questions of reward distribution. Dahrendorf makes a sharp distinction between classes as conflict groups based on authority position, and stratification as the continuum of unequally distributed rewards. Rewards may be equalized, yet authority structures persist. Dahrendorf maintains that the interest of the subjected groups to achieve authority is independent of the absolute level of rewards they enjoy (p. 200). However, to the question why authority is then desired, he answers (p. 232) that it is an instrumental value, sought for the purpose of realizing specific interests. But if authority is only a means, conflict over authority is not a logical necessity as long as the actually desired ends may be achieved in some other way. Similarly, if the specific interests fall into the category of rewards, class becomes linked again to the distribution of rewards, that is, stratification. Fortunately, the problem is only on the level of theoretical abstraction, for in the empirical reality the association between authority position and rewards is ubiquitous, and Dahrendorf

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recognizes that the extent of deprivation suffered by the inferior group is a crucial factor determining their disposition to engage in conflict.

There is another difficulty in the concept of interests inhering in the differential positions rather than in the individuals who occupy them. The type of social change Dahrendorf seeks to analyze results from a partial or complete turnover of the personnel in the authority positions or from an acceptance by the powerful of the claims of the subjected. In both cases, change depends on whether the rôle incumbents act against the latent interest to maintain the *status quo* which presumably inheres in their position of authority. Dahrendorf, recognizing this difficulty, points to the fact that a number of intervening variables determine whether or not, in concrete reality, a rôle player acts out the latent, abstract interests of his position.

Dahrendorf's theory is explicitly based upon one of the two alternative views of society which he calls the integration theory (for instance Parsons) and the coercion theory. He justifies his own choice of the coercion model by its usefulness for his analytical purpose. His deliberate one-sidedness may also be a reaction, for didactic purposes, against what he feels is a prevailing one-sidedness in the other direction in contemporary sociology.

However, a theory based exclusively on the coercion model provides an incomplete view even of such concrete social phenomena as Dahrendorf deals with. The variables of his model —for instance, the actual extent of deprivation suffered by the subjected, or the existence of conflict-regulating institutions—go a far way in determining manifest conflict, but there are limiting factors which his theory must neglect. Thus, an ideologically based consensus—whether of traditional origin or induced by indoctrination in totalitarian régimes—which defines subordinated positions in terms of coöperation and willing acceptance of leadership, can be a reality preventing the theoretically expected conflict. Dahrendorf, indeed, does not overlook this fact. If one should argue that to assume a latent interest even in the absence of manifest conflict is not very meaningful for social analysis, Dahrendorf may counter that this assumption at least sensitizes the observer to possible sources of conflict. Dahrendorf has well demonstrated the fruitfulness of his approach, though it remains true that concrete social phenomena need for their exhaustive explanation the variables of both the coercion and the integration model.

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*The Long Way to Freedom.* By JAMES T. SHOTWELL. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1960.—639 pp. $7.50.

After a long and busy life as one of the first of our modern captains of academic industry, James T. Shotwell has found time and energy to complete in this, his 86th year, what Lord Acton merely projected: a history of freedom from the beginnings of human society to the present. His book is a full-throated affirmation of the liberal creed and view of history as formulated about the turn of the twentieth century. To a reader of a different generation, Shotwell's book has therefore an antique Roman flavor. It speaks in the accents—and one is tempted to say with the naïveté—of an age now past. Yet one cannot withhold admiration from so doughty a champion of good causes, and his sturdy optimism for the future—as for the past—is perhaps a wholesome challenge to the easy pessimism and fashionable self-pity which we of a younger generation are prone to indulge.

Shotwell sees the history of freedom as a series of partial but promising victories over superstition, war, and economic exploitation. From this point of view, his history really begins with the ancient Greeks, who, he says, invented politics, that is, the applications of reason to public affairs. This he contrasts with oriental societies, where government rested upon superstition and taboo, and thus excluded freedom. Rome added the concept of law to the Greek inheritance, but the classical world broke down because of its failure to control either the "war system" or the economic exploitation implicit in slavery.

Shotwell's view of Christianity is distinctly ambiguous. He sees the teaching of Jesus—"imitation of the loving kindness of God" (p. 136)—as an escape from the shackles of priestly taboo, and therefore a great step forward in the history of freedom; but he interprets the later development of Christianity as a return toward the ritual bonds of prehistoric superstition. Yet, with a logic I find hard to follow, he adds: "that is not to say that the forms of worship which Christianity adopted were necessarily the intrusion of elements foreign to the mind of Jesus . . ." (p. 137).

The history of western Europe for Shotwell begins by recapitulating the advances made by the Greeks and Romans: war and politics, forming national monarchies, begin once again the liberation of mankind from its servitude. In modern times economics comes to the fore with the commercial revolution to lift

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European humanity beyond the classical limits. This opens new possibilities for economic and political tyranny—the absolutisms of early modern Europe—and for a more perfect freedom, as developed in England, the American colonies and, rather less impressively, in revolutionary France. Next comes the industrial revolution, speedily followed by the application of science to warfare in the nineteenth century: and these, also, have the double-edged capacity of either liberating or enslaving men more completely than ever before.

The first 400 pages of the book develop these views of the history of freedom, while the remaining third of the volume deals with contemporary issues—communism, World War I and the League, Fascism, Nazism and Japanese imperialism, World War II and the Cold War, the British Commonwealth, the Asian awakening, the United States in the twentieth century, and the United Nations. Shotwell's general theme tends to disappear from view in this concluding part of his book, which, indeed, is rather personal reminiscences of public events than serious scholarship. (For example, three out of six pages on World War I are devoted to remarks about the activities of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.)

In general, the book should be taken as a profession of faith rather than as a synthesis of historical scholarship. Shotwell has presumably been too busy to keep up with major historiographical controversies during the past forty years, and they have left almost no trace in his book. Moreover, there are numerous errors of fact or highly questionable statements scattered through his pages. (For example, the assertion that in the time of Pericles Attica was cultivated mostly by slave labor [p. 97], or the dicta that the Roman empire was "fascism in its most splendid form" [p. 116], and "In Philip of Spain we have the first clear prototype of Adolph Hitler" [p. 276].) The book is further marred by frequent misprints and erratic citations.

Even as a profession of faith, the book must be judged the work of an unsystematic thinker. Indeed, Shotwell begins by denying the possibility or need of defining the key term of his whole book, "Freedom" (p. 21). The result, at least for this reader, is a sense of confusion and uncertainty. Successive chapters seem to treat of very different sorts of freedom, and, indeed, the relevance of some long passages of the book to the theme of freedom in any sense of the word is hard to find.

In view of the tantalizing ambiguities and terrifying paradoxes of human freedom, perhaps Lord Acton was right in making his "History of Liberty" the "greatest history that never was written" (p. 305). Professor Shotwell, rushing in where his

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great predecessor feared to tread, has not improved upon Lord Acton's self-restraint.

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*War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking.* By H. S. DINERSTEIN. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.—xii, 268 pp. $5.50.

Dr. Dinerstein, a member of the RAND Corporation, has made a very useful contribution to our knowledge of how Soviet military doctrine (and thereby much of Soviet foreign policy) is responding to or guiding recent developments in military technology. While not as comprehensive or, in all instances, as tightly reasoned as Raymond Garthoff's earlier work (*Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age,* 1958), Dinerstein's book makes a bold effort to reach definite answers on two highly important subjects.

The first is the part played by military issues in the factional disputes among the members of the Presidium since Stalin's death. Dinerstein's analysis rests on a painstaking use of press and periodical statements and is particularly persuasive in its treatment of the period between December 1953 and February 1955 that terminated in the displacement of Malenkov as Premier. Malenkov emerges as a sort of Bolshevik Eisenhower, convinced that each side's nuclear capabilities had rendered World War III unthinkable and that the time had come to reduce the burden of defense expenditures and to seek accommodation at the summit. Khrushchev, on the other hand, found little in the posture or policies of the West to persuade him that Washington was equally unconvinced of the likelihood of war (1954 was the year of the threatened intervention in Indo-China and the pressure on France to rearm Germany through the EDC) and argued in favor of increased defense spending. In the Soviet Union, Dinerstein demonstrates, public discussion of the likelihood of war is conditioned more by the needs of domestic politics than by the actual state of affairs in the outside world. Still, it would appear that Malenkov's struggle with Khrushchev was not made any easier by the fact that it was Dulles rather than the later-day Eisenhower with whom the Soviet Union then had to contend, and history may one day record Malenkov as the only genuine casualty of the doctrine of massive retaliation.

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It seems clear that the issue of more versus fewer rubles for defense was one of the matters at stake in this struggle. But what, exactly, were the differences between the contending factions with respect to the kinds of weapons and strategies they preferred to buy? It is Dinerstein's belief that the political struggle was connected with the development by the Soviet military of the doctrine of preëmptive attack and that Khrushchev was in favor of providing the capability to implement this doctrine whereas Malenkov was not. The evidence available to him on this point, however, is most spotty, and his case is far from conclusive.

Dinerstein's treatment of Soviet policy with respect to preemptive attack is at once the more consequential and the more controversial part of his book. It is his conclusion, based on an examination of both the doctrine and military posture of the Soviets, that they are firmly committed to a preëmptive strike strategy. While the current military situation hardly encourages either side to start an all-out war, it can permit rather impressive advantages to the side that strikes first. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the Soviet military, like our own, are drawn to the idea that if they could somehow anticipate that the other was about to strike, they could then strike first and catch the carriers of the would-be first striker on the ground. Dinerstein amply illustrates that such a strategy has received serious consideration in Soviet military journals. But whether the content of this discussion is sufficient to permit a judgment regarding the extent to which the Soviets have wedded themselves to this doctrine, forsaking all others, is something else again. In this connection, one wishes that Dinerstein (and Garthoff before him) had helped the reader to understand why the leading proponent of the doctrine should be a Marshal of the Tank Forces and had provided some information on the positions he held when he wrote his articles.

Recognizing the deficiencies in the information available to him, Dinerstein has endeavored to find further evidence for his hypothesis in the character of Soviet military capabilities. Unfortunately, this is the weakest part of his book. One needs more accurate missiles to take out carriers than cities, and air defense systems will be more effective against a force that has been whittled down by a first strike than against one which has not. But the fact that the Russians have made substantial investments in active air defense and are interested in enhancing the accuracy of their missiles is hardly evidence that they—any more than we—have committed themselves to the doctrine of

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preëmptive attack. The degree of commitment is worth stressing, because the choices made in military doctrine are no less important than those made with respect to weapons in determining the stability of the balance of terror. (Here one must distinguish among an initiating first strike [you start the war]; a preëmptive first strike [he is about to start the war so you strike him first]; a fast second strike [his carriers are on the way, but you launch your retaliatory blow before you are hit]; and a slow second strike [you retaliate only after you are hit].) A world in which both sides had committed themselves to slow second-strike doctrines and capabilities would, *ceteris paribus*, be less likely to see World War III than one in which both sides had cast their lots with preëmptive strike doctrine and capabilities.

Currently, American doctrine embraces all four strategies (the possibility of an initiating first strike is clearly implied in the doctrine of massive retaliation), although we appear to be in better shape to strike first than to strike second. The Soviet Union, which has a strong counterforce tradition in its military doctrine, may be similarly unbalanced in its capabilites. Whether Soviet doctrine is also as multi-schooled as our own is a matter over which we are still entitled to ponder, despite Dinerstein's efforts to resolve it. Reservations about the degree of Soviet commitment to the doctrine of preëmptive attack should not, however, obscure the fact that even a partial commitment has important foreign policy implications. One of Dinerstein's most interesting contributions is the information he presents regarding the signs through which the Russians believe they will be able to detect an impending American strike. The idea that Marxist-Leninist science will provide this insight (through an analysis of such phenomena as the strengthening of fascist tendencies within the United States or the formation by that nation of aggressive military coalitions abroad) will not impress the American reader as either plausible or comforting. The reader might also wonder, while he is at it, about the kind of evidence upon which we expect to detect an impending Russian attack. But before one sweeps away the whole discussion of preëmptive doctrine on the grounds that it can hardly be taken seriously by either side, it would be well to remember that in the not distant past man has developed military doctrines (and fought wars with them) on the basis of equally tenuous or even more fallacious concepts.

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*Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis.* By KENNETH N. WALTZ. New York, Columbia University Press, 1959.—viii, 263 pp. $5.50.

Mr. Waltz has written a vigorous and incisive analysis of how to go about, and how not to go about, analyzing the causes of international conflict. The scheme of his study is to examine classical political theory for what it can contribute to an understanding of his subject, and then to appraise several representative approaches to it with the critical tools which he has shaped out of the classical theory. Waltz finds that there are three common images of international conflict each of which offers a partial explanation of the causes of war, but none of which, by itself, is adequate. They are that the causes of war can be traced ultimately to (1) human nature, (2) the internal structure of nation states, and (3) the anarchic character of international relations. In order to explore the difficulties of these "images" he examines the work of some behavioral scientists who have addressed themselves to the reduction of interstate violence through the control or manipulation of human nature, international socialism and its pathetic attempt to cope with the coming of World War I in terms of its assertion that wars were the consequence of the internal class strife within states, and the rigidities and limiting assumptions of several approaches to international conflict from the fields of economics, politics and history which try to cope with the proposition that international conflict is unavoidable because of the inherent nature of international politics.

The argument follows a familiar path to sound appraisal: the pointing out by the expert that the problem is not so simple as many think; and the emphasis on the multiplicity of causes and the interrelationship of factors. The conclusion is inevitable: that all three factors are essential to a thorough (or even a very respectable) treatment of international conflict.

This summary does not do full justice to the book, for the value of it is in the skill with which the thesis is expounded, its organized analysis of studies about war and the disposition which it makes of them: the elimination from further serious consideration of some relatively useless studies, and the handling with considerable skill of others within the framework of Waltz's own analysis. Whatever difficulties there are in this study lie not in how well Mr. Waltz plays within the boundaries of his own game, but in the limitations of the game itself, inherent and otherwise.

The inherent difficulties are largely procrustean in character:

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they derive from the difficulty of imposing one's own set of categories upon another writer. For those who come to international politics casually, as did many of the behavioral scientists with whom Waltz deals, the limits of their efforts are clear and their classification not particularly difficult. Indeed, the analytical scheme was evidently designed with these limited approaches particularly in mind. But categorizing theorists of broader scope, like Hans J. Morgenthau, whose breadth is vast, whose boundaries, amorphous, and whose internal relationships, labyrinthine, is no easier than putting a jellyfish into a pigeonhole. It illustrates one of the difficulties of Waltz's approach: that since he is arguing for a multi-factoral analysis as the only possible valid one, he is in no position to press very hard the search for a single ultimate emphasis in the approaches of others.

Not so inherent in the scheme of this study, though understandable in terms of its approach, is the choice of behavioral scientists the examination of whose efforts is intended to indicate what contributions the disciplines in that area might make to an understanding of war. The author has limited himself predominantly to social psychologists—to people whose work, except for a few unfortunate forays, is limited to nonpolitical studies of men and society. The target they offer is, indeed, a tempting one, for it shows scholars and scientists at their worst, carrying their disciplines into unfamiliar territory where they are bound to be misused, and where, by a process of rational selection, only the most pretentious "experts" will go. It is certainly useful to have done with many of these people once and for all. But in the process the contributions which their disciplines can make to the study of war has not been thoroughly examined. The author has looked at those contributions at their worst. Their better side is the cautious and slow infusion of the techniques and insights of the behavioral disciplines into the work of the "professional" students of international politics and war. The people who have done this kind of work, when they are mentioned at all in this study, have appeared in the footnotes quoted in criticism of the social psychologists who are amateurs in the study of international politics. It should be noted, however, that an adequate examination of his subject from this direction would have involved Mr. Waltz in a project of such major proportions that he would have had to reshape his whole inquiry. In this respect, at least, his selection of social scientists to appraise was also an "inherent" consequence of his approach.

This omission may further be explained by the methods of the book. Classical theory has been used to define the classical problems of international politics, after which, in each case,

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Mr. Waltz has turned to those who attempted solutions. But the most constructive efforts to utilize the behavioral methods in international politics, which have come from people who are familiar with the theoretical pitfalls in dealing with that subject, have usually attempted to redefine the problems in order to take the fullest advantage possible of the behavioral techniques available. Whether these efforts have been fruitful or not, it would appear that because they have not addressed themselves to the problems of international politics in the classical categories of Waltz's analysis, he has ignored them. This is unfortunate because he might have provided an important test of the worth of their efforts.

Beyond this omission, however, the book stands as an important ground-clearing operation and a sharp and critical study of a wide range of international relations theory. In addition to the professional behaviorists who are amateur students of politics, it is well to be done as much as possible with the approaches of the classical liberals to international conflict, both those who ignore it for the more manageable domestic scene, and those who, with Sir Norman Angell, wish to flatten it out onto a balance sheet. The grosser errors of classical liberalism have long been identified. Mr. Waltz has sifted out a considerable number of smaller ones.

It should be clear that this book does not attempt to construct a theory of international relations. Rather, it plays the negative though valuable rôle of analysis. Yet, on the whole, it should be valuable for those who are interested in reconstruction, for—and this is the real mark of its worth—it has been remarkably successful in cutting away to reveal the foundations of a sound theory.

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*Alliance Policy in the Cold War.* Edited by ARNOLD WOLFERS. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959.—ix, 314 pp. $6.00.

*NATO and American Security.* Edited by KLAUS KNORR. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959.—vii, 342 pp. $6.00.

Both these collections offer valuable guides to the theory and practice of modern coalitions. Indeed, by defining "alliance policy" to cover "all efforts to prevent other countries from siding with . . . the Soviet opponent", and by giving consideration to isolationism, collective security and the United Nations, there are few aspects of American policies for national security

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with which the volume edited by Professor Wolfers does not deal. Professor Knorr's book, a product of conferences held at Princeton in January 1958, offers a more minute examination of its narrower but still spacious subject. So many contributors propound such numerous arguments, in fact, as to provide the reader with a virtual surfeit of material for his own speculations. The more welcome, then, is Mr. Knorr's own judicious and lucid summation of the debate in a final chaper. One might well begin with this essay as a chart for the confused seas which precede.

With such a variety of authors—there are twenty in the two books—it is worth noting general agreement on several aspects of NATO, the core of the American system. All recognize a crisis of confidence, though Mr. Wolfers justly points to previous lesions which have healed rapidly under pressure. Everyone wants an increase in conventional forces. Roger Hilsman, who contributes a succinct history of NATO strategy to each volume, argues convincingly that, with some thirty divisions as a nucleus, NATO would have a sporting chance of repelling even a major assault without recourse to nuclear weapons. This possibility is especially attractive inasmuch as these writers are pessimistic about tactical atomic weapons, fearing the possibility that they would lead to total war less than the probability that with their aid the Russians would win. Today the fashion in limited nuclear operations seems rather to have shifted to graduated retaliation. To avoid the snowballing effects of appeasement, some contributors to *NATO* argue that even limited aggression, if it cannot be contained conventionally, should be answered by punitive nuclear strikes on shipping, bases or even cities. This reviewer remains unconvinced that this is a practical alternative to massive retaliation, for it is hard to believe that such hostilities could be limited or that, in the reciprocal exchange of blows which advocates of the policy admit would probably ensue, there is any reason to expect the Russians to give up first. For Russian prestige, as well as American, will then be at stake. Nor is it easy to discount adverse third party reactions to the initiator of nuclear warfare.

Similar doubts admittedly surround massive retaliation itself and several contributors discuss the implications for alliance policy of the decreasing credibility of American retaliation for less than a full-scale attack on the United States. The solution most acceptable to most of the authors is a unified deterrent under positive joint control, but none underestimates the difficulty of designing such a system. As to independent nuclear forces for America's major allies, there is a sharp difference of

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opinion: the case against is formidable, but A. L. Burns, Hilsman and Denis Healey muster strong and, on the whole, adequate arguments in favor of national deterrents. That two of these three are not American raises a question as to whether the negative view may be somewhat influenced by just that exclusively American outlook which makes allies reluctant to leave their fate entirely to Washington.

Only a few of the other topics debated can be mentioned here. Mr. Wolfers subtly investigates relations between collective defense and collective security, a subject likely to have repeated future relevance. Robert Good, Charles Burton Marshall and, in part, James King give rare and useful consideration to alliances with ex-colonial nations. Mr. Nitze—another performer on both halves of the bill—pleads eloquently for a constructive element in Cold War policy. On this there are perhaps two contrasting emphases in *Alliance Policy,* for Mr. Nitze seems far more hopeful of reconciling American interests amicably with those of other nations than, say, Mr. Good, who stresses emerging conflict within the free world. Both volumes have informative chapters on Soviet alliances; that by Cyril Black and Frederick Yeager *(NATO)* is especially comprehensive. Incidentally, the recent surge of interest in alliances reveals a sad abuse of the word "internecine".

The military issues of our time are so comprehensive that it is difficult to isolate the problems that may be peculiar to working in alliances. With its broader terms of reference, *Alliance Policy* offers the more direct treatment of this theoretical question. Professor Morgenthau's essay in the classification and analysis of alliances in general is particularly stimulating. Both books constantly remind us that alliances are merely devices to be valued in the broad context of national policy over time. Explicit agreements should reflect fundamental alignment of interests and not be accorded such loyalty in their own right as to override basic purposes. A special case of this, illuminated by *Alliance Policy,* is undue deference to peripheral and vacillating allies. Perhaps uncertain associates must be wooed like marginal voters, but small wonder then if Britain and France sometimes bolt the party.

The essence of any alliance, in fact, varies each day as the underlying pattern of interests evolves. Mr. Wolfers' general treatment warns of the danger which must flow from ignoring such evolution. Mr. Knorr's detailed reappraisal of a particular alliance reveals the great difficulty of applying this excellent precept in practice.

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*The State and Economic Growth.* Edited by HUGH G. J. AITKEN. New York, Social Science Research Council, 1959.—x, 389 pp. $3.75.

In this volume, the Committee on Economic Growth of the Social Science Research Council applies the comparative method to the study of the rôle of the state in promoting development. Papers by various authors examine periods of economic growth in no less than ten nations or areas. In the hope of avoiding a merely kaleidoscopic effect, the Committee provided the contributors in advance with a schema classifying cases of economic growth in terms of three pairs of opposites—expansionist or intrinsic, dominant or satellitic, and autonomous or induced. These somewhat forbidding terms may be made understandable by noting that our own nineteenth-century growth falls under the first of each of these categories since the United States was a new and frontier country, big enough to be largely self-sufficient, in which decisions regarding the allocation of resources were made mainly by private agencies. Switzerland is unlike the United States in the first two of these respects but is described as even more completely autonomous, with a faith in laisser faire not yet "undermined even by full-employment theory." The growth of Russia, on the other hand, has been induced both under the Tsars and under the Soviets.

Several of the authors express uneasiness with these categories. Henry W. Broude finds some difficulty in classifying nineteenth-century America as dominant, in view of the importation of European capital, and still more difficulty in classifying it as autonomous. Our "laisser faire menu" was, as he points out, "highly seasoned with selective exceptions." He presents a table distinguishing those items in the federal budget which had particular direct or "leverage effects" in "facilitating economic activity," a novel procedure which might profitably be extended to the budgets of the states. Noel G. Butlin describes Australia as an obstinately independent satellite and flatly denies the possibility of applying to it the distinction between autonomous and induced growth. Unlike most of his collaborators, who emphasize the promotive effects of government action, Butlin is more interested in calling attention to impediments to development caused by what he describes as government "poaching of resources of labor and investible funds."

The contributors differ also in their professional skills and interests. Hugh Aitken writes as an economic historian on Canada's resistance to absorption by the economy of the United

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States. From the transportation improvements of the early nineteenth century, which gave rise to Lord Durham's remark that in North America the primary function of government was development rather than defense, to the St. Lawrence Seaway, "primary responsibility for maintaining and strengthening this policy of defensive nationalism has fallen on the state." Edwin P. Reubens writes as an analyst of economic development on the case of Manchuria, in which "several different 'states' " operated "not only in succession but sometimes also in parallel." Of particular interest is his judgment that the economic policy of the South Manchuria Railway Company, that extraordinary mixed enterprise of the Japanese government and private interests, was on the whole based on sound long-run principles of development.

With these diversities in approach, and with the bewildering variety of circumstances in the ten selected areas, the symposium offers no easy basis for synthetic treatment. For most readers the three final chapters devoted to summary and analysis will add relatively little to the substantial though uneven contribution of the area chapters themselves. There is, however, one generalization common to a number of the authors which is worth citing because it appears to represent something of a consensus in current development theory. This relates to the timing of the promotive efforts of government, particularly in supplying transportation facilities and other forms of social overhead. "In many countries the provision of such capital is left largely to the state because the investment is necessarily so massive, and the returns so distant, so uncertain, and often so difficult for private investors to appropriate." This type of government activity is most needed in the earlier stages of development and is likely to decrease in importance, as it did in nineteenth-century America, as private enterprise attains greater strength. In Eastern Europe, however, the reliance on government action, as Nicholas Spulber points out, increased precisely at the point at which it might on this theory have been expected to decrease. Clearly, the generalization applies only "in a relatively autonomous society." Perhaps, indeed, the test of such a society lies not in the state's abstinence from vigorous promotive action but in its readiness to withdraw from the rôle as the progress of development permits.

CARTER GOODRICH

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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*Algeria in Turmoil: A History of the Rebellion.* By MICHAEL K. CLARK. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.—xvii, 466 pp. $6.00.

In 1954 a series of terrorist outbreaks flared up in Algeria. The world was startled to learn of these acts of violence, for Algeria had until then given the impression of being relatively immune to the disorders and tensions that had gripped her North African neighbors, Tunisia and Morocco, in the postwar period. But the pattern of events was about to be reversed. Tunisia and Morocco were soon to regain at least a semblance of internal peace and stability, since France shortly thereafter agreed to meet their demands for political independence; whereas Algeria was to become the scene of intensified nationalist agitation and guerilla warfare, the end of which is not yet in sight.

In this book the author, a *New York Times* correspondent who for several years watched Algerian developments at close range, describes and analyzes the Algerian uprising from its beginnings to the extraordinary events of 1958 that toppled the Fourth Republic and put De Gaulle at the helm of France's political destiny. To many students of international affairs it has seemed that the Algerian struggle is merely another manifestation of the conflict between colonialism and anti-colonialism and that the latter, given its powerful hold on contemporary world opinion, could be expected sooner or later to prevail in Algeria, just as it did in Indonesia, Indochina, Tunisia, Morocco and elsewhere. The author, however, rejects this thesis. He puts great emphasis on the uniqueness of the Algerian case, this uniqueness being derived chiefly from the presence of one million Frenchmen who, along with nine million Moslems, call Algeria their home. In view of the existence of two distinct cultural and ethnic communities in the same country, he argues that any measure or proposal that implies the domination of one community by the other cannot lead to a lasting solution of the Algerian problem. Moreover, he is convinced that the creation of a Moslem state of Algeria would result in economic and cultural decay.

As for a compromise solution, he doubts its effectiveness. In his view, a French offer of some kind of compromise agreement is likely to be interpreted by the nationalist rebels as a sign of weakness and thus add to their determination to hold out for total compliance with their demands. Though he sees the Algerian problem as the work of numerous and complex forces, he considers the inability of French governments under the

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Fourth Republic to formulate and carry out a clear policy to be the chief responsible factor.

On this last point few observers of the Algerian scene would disagree. But how is the Algerian problem to be solved? The author repeatedly asserts that the first need is the restoration of security. Beyond that, he suggests that the answer may lie in "racial partnership", even though, as he admits, nowhere in the world can one find a true example of such a partnership. He fails, moreover, to make clear what form "racial partnership" should take on in Algeria. At one point he declares himself in favor of a policy of "integration" (p. 428), a synonym for assimilation. Elsewhere, he refers to assimilation as a "myth" (p. 47) and doubts the Algerian Moslem's capacity for it (p. 338). It seems to this reviewer that when it comes to positive suggestions, the author's views are just as obscure and ambiguous as those which he criticizes.

The analysis of the Algerian problem presented in this book is therefore essentially negative. As such, however, it provides much food for thought; hence it should be considered a valuable addition to the growing political literature on North Africa.

MARK KARP

BOSTON UNIVERSITY

*Intelligence and Democratic Action.* By FRANK H. KNIGHT. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960.—vii, 177 pp. $3.75.

Frank Knight, one of the great names of twentieth-century economic theory, belongs among a select company which includes J. M. Keynes, D. H. Robertson, Jacob Viner, A. C. Pigou, and no more than one or two others. Although this engaging book, based on a set of University of Virginia lectures, is relatively minor Knight, it does briefly sketch some of the characteristic attitudes and emphases of its author's long and contentious career. As always, Professor Knight examines economics within the context of human behavior in general. With variations of his own, his conception of how people act is skeptical and conservative. In his opinion, few humans behave rationally, and still fewer understand the nature of choice. As for ethics, he finds rather more historical evidence for the human sense of beauty than for any persistent attachment to the notion of right and wrong.

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Like many students of democracy before him, Professor Knight still attaches hope to education, but he regards the process as slow and uncertain. What education ought to teach the citizens of a democracy above all is a proposition which transcends the strictly economic: in all aspects of life, the necessity exists to choose among appealing alternatives. Every choice compels the chooser to give up at least one alternative in order to grasp another. Much of Professor Knight's criticism of his liberal economic colleagues derives from his belief that they have evaded the full implications of this economic imperative.

The recurrent emphasis of these lectures is upon the requirements of intelligent action in a democracy. Not only must the intelligent citizen weigh alternatives, he must also respect the facts and resist his prejudices. It is an irony of this book that, according to this reviewer's judgment (or prejudices), Professor Knight has so often yielded to his own prejudices. Is labor-union monopoly really a more substantial threat to democratic procedures than business monopoly? Is it accurate to say that "the importance of the prejudice against business can hardly be overstressed"? Do existing property arrangements spring entirely from free choice? Fortunately, Professor Knight's readers can protect themselves against his prejudices by exercising their intelligences according to the prescription of their eminently qualified guide.

A concluding word ought to be said about Professor Knight's delightfully epigrammatic style. Surely he must be unique among economists who can say, "New expressions of opinion are very often interesting in proportion as they are unreasonable. Man is the opinionated animal." Or, "the Church in the Middle Ages always said that it only controlled faith and morals—that is, only what people thought and what they did." It is an enduring pity that the masters of the epigram are so much more often conservative than they are liberal.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN

BARNARD COLLEGE

*What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies.* By LEO STRAUSS. Glencoe, The Free Press, 1959.—315 pp. $6.00.

Leo Strauss, the Robert M. Hutchins Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, is today one of the few dominant figures in the area of political theory. His teaching has attracted a devoted group of younger scholars into his orbit, and it is gratifying to find in the title

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essay of this collection a summary in his own words of the intellectual position he occupies, which serves as the common base for those who think of themselves essentially as his students.

Against the skepticism of our times, Strauss is attempting to revive political philosophy. This he defines as "the conscious, coherent and relentless effort to replace opinions about the political fundamentals by knowledge regarding them" (p. 12). Strauss believes that knowledge about the political fundamentals is attainable; that the quest for it constitutes the ultimate challenge to the political thinker; and that universally valid truths are contained in "the classic form of political philosophy" represented by the teaching of Plato and Aristotle.

According to Strauss, classical political philosophy achieved what might be called a break-through to the true nature of things. The possibility of this break-through derives from a unique instant in human history, that "fertile moment when all political traditions were shaken, and there was not yet in existence a tradition of political philosophy." At this precious moment, Plato and Aristotle "see the political things with a freshness and directness which have never been equalled" (p. 27). Strauss is dedicated to the effort to rediscover the truths which he believes classical political philosophy achieved, and to make these truths triumphant over modern doctrines which in his judgment are corrupt.

At the heart of classical political philosophy Strauss finds this credo: "the aim of human life, and hence of social life, is not freedom but virtue" (p. 36). Virtue is a matter of morally good character, and its achievement normally depends on education. Freedom is too ambiguous to be the goal of life, because it is freedom for evil as well as for good. Strauss believes that it is the displacement of virtue as the aim of life which has corrupted modern society. He ascribes this displacement originally to Machiavelli, "the founder of modern political philosophy" (p. 40).

Strauss indicts Machiavelli for consciously lowering the standards of social action. Machiavelli's philosophy, he says, rests on the denial of morality as something substantial. Its claim is that "one cannot define the good of society, the common good, in terms of virtue, but one must define virtue in terms of the common good." From this it follows that "if man is not by nature ordered toward virtue or perfection, if there is no natural end of man, man can set for himself almost any end he desires: man is almost infinitely malleable" (p. 42). Strauss asserts that "the shift from formation of character to the trust in institutions is

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the characteristic corollary of the belief in the almost infinite malleability of man" (p. 43). After Machiavelli the denial that formation of character, or the pursuit of virtue, should be the chief end of society was made also by Hobbes, who "mitigated" what Strauss calls "the revolting character" of Machiavelli's thought (p. 47). And ultimately, "Machiavelli's discovery or invention of the need for an immoral or amoral substitute for morality became victorious through Locke's discovery or invention that that substitute is acquisitiveness" (p. 49).

The great enemies of classical political philosophy in our day Strauss identifies as Science and History, or more specifically positivism and historicism, and he counterattacks them in turn. He ridicules the attempt to construct value-free social science as logically impossible. He insists on the validity of prescientific knowledge which by its very nature is not susceptible to scientific proof. Historicism he condemns because its claim that human thought is essentially historical, that is, historically conditioned, denies the possibility of universally valid answers to universal questions, such as the question of the nature of the good society. The essay concludes with a brief condemnation of the handling of the Machiavellian themes by Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hegel and Nietzsche.

It is impossible in a short space to do more than simply note the contents of the remainder of the volume. Gathered together here is a covey of writings published in journals the world over since 1941. Included are five independent essays: "Political Philosophy and History", "On Classical Political Philosophy", "How Fārābī Read Plato's *Laws*", "Maimonides' Statement on Political Science", and "Locke's Doctrine of Natural Law". Three other major essays are not independent in the sense that they involve Strauss in discourse with other scholars. Thus "Restatement on Xenophon's *Hiero*" is a discussion by Strauss of reviews of his *On Tyranny* by Eric Voegelin, with whom Strauss argues, and by Alexandre Kojève, whom Strauss on the whole admires. "On the Basis of Hobbes' Political Philosophy" is an extended critique of a work on Hobbes by Raymond Polin, and in "On a Forgotten Kind of Writing" Strauss defends himself against a hostile review of his *Persecution and the Art of Writing* by George H. Sabine. There is also a eulogy of Kurt Riezler, once Strauss's colleague on the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, and there are sixteen much shorter book reviews.

Every study included is distinguished by Strauss's erudition and by a profound seriousness of purpose and tone. It is undoubtedly useful to have so much of the work of an eminent

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scholar brought together between two covers, but the utility of the volume could have been much enhanced by more informative editing. To make two of the most obvious suggestions, it would have been helpful if an editorial note had instructed readers as to who Fārābī was and why Strauss thinks his work worth noting, and a similar identification of Alexandre Kojève would have done much to enlighten this reviewer.

STEVEN MULLER

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

*The Conservative Illusion.* By M. MORTON AUERBACH. New York, Columbia University Press, 1959.—xiv, 359 pp. $6.75.

Mr. Auerbach has attempted "an evaluation of Conservatism in general and the New Conservatism in particular." His general conclusion is clearly indicated by the title. The first part of his task is founded on a conception that sees conservatism as one of the "four alternative formulations from which one can begin an evaluation of human society." The author finds Plato to be the original and most acutely consistent source of conservatism, and traces the history of this train of thought through the Stoics, St. Augustine, John of Salisbury and Edmund Burke. In his two concluding chapters he discusses some of the difficulties and contradictions into which he believes the historical advocates of conservatism have been led by the inner logic of the position itself.

The interpretation of the New Conservative movement is preceded by one chapter on the general problem of Conservative thought in the American environment and another on the Southern Agrarians. In three chapters dealing with the writings of the New Conservatives, proper, he offers critiques of the writings of Russell Kirk, Richard M. Weaver, Anthony Harrigan, Frederick L. Wilhelmsen, Herbert Agar, John Hallowell, Peter Viereck, Clinton Rossiter and Peter Drucker. Taken together, these five chapters constitute the most rigorous and comprehensive analysis to which recent American Conservative thought has been subjected.

Certain difficulties appear, however, in connection with Auerbach's general interpretation of Conservative thought. The supreme value of conservatism, he argues, is harmony—in the individual and in society. The preconditions of this harmony are "the minimizing of individual desires . . . and the maximizing of love and affection" (pp. 7-8). With this conception of

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conservatism, he is able to identify it as a perennial alternative of social thought. Carefully worked out in its logic, this conception is used consistently in the critiques of the several writers.

The first objection I must raise is that, although this interpretation departs sharply from the prevailing interpretations of conservatism, it does not give serious attention to the task of refuting or showing its superiority to these older interpretations. Acceptance of Auerbach's conceptualization would involve us in a process of redefining terms and overhauling concepts which would go far beyond the borders of conservatism. This might be justified by certain insights and clarifications which would result from following his suggestions, but it is reasonable that we require him to persuade us of it. Unfortunately, he has given the far greater part of his effort to the setting forth of his own system, and has given only cursory attention to the criticism of rival interpretations.

Secondly, I would suggest that Auerbach's interpretation might be hard to defend even if he had given it more effort. His idea of harmony as the core concept of Conservative thought is substantive, as opposed to the idea of opposition to change, which may be called relational. To define Burke's conservatism (to take an example) in terms of the faith in prescription and tradition and the pessimism which influenced his defense of existing institutions is, in Auerbach's view, to confuse "a technique of action with a total ideology." Burke's opposition to change, on this view, is subordinate to his belief in aristocracy because his opposition to change presumed the accidental fact that an aristocracy existed. Had he been compelled to choose between aristocracy and opposition to change per se, he would have chosen the former. Therefore, Burke's conservatism must be defined not in terms of opposition to change but in terms of his substantive ideas about the best form of society. This argument would be perfectly acceptable if Burke's thought *were* in fact a "total ideology". But it was not. The *Reflections* were not about revolution, but about *the* Revolution in France. Burke was never forced to choose between aristocracy and opposition to change, and was therefore never compelled to subordinate one to the other. True, in a different situation he might have had to make this choice, but in so doing he would have transformed himself. Burke, then, must be taken on his own terms: his doctrines must be given the importance that he gave them, and not rearranged to achieve logical inclusiveness. And this holds true for Burke's followers.

If this leaves us with a view of conservatism as a somewhat

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amorphous collection of practical wisdom, dubious metaphors and resonant platitudes, amounting to something far short of a full political philosophy, then so be it. The effort to build an interpretation on a solid logical foundation runs counter to the style and purpose of Conservative thought and imposes more rationality on the subject-matter than it ever had on its own account. In dealing with "Conservatives" like Plato and St. Augustine, this interpretation runs into a slightly different kind of difficulty: their thought is simply too complex to be organized around any one concept or value such as harmony, and the attempt to do so yields as many distortions as insights.

But whether or not these reservations are justified, this book can be credited with some solid achievements. The long second chapter is, I believe, a genuine contribution to the literature of Burkean interpretation. And in the analyses of the Southern Agrarians and the New Conservatives, Auerbach often seems to have brought more vigor and insight to his task than the writer whose work he is criticizing.

PHILLIP C. CHAPMAN

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

*English Political Caricature: A Study of Opinion and Propaganda.* Vol. I: *To 1792;* Vol. II: *1793-1832.* By M. DOROTHY GEORGE. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, New York Oxford University Press, 1960.—xii, 237 pp., 96 Plates; xii, 275 pp., 96 Plates. 70*s.* net each; $11.20 each.

These two handsome volumes are the product of a lifetime devoted to the history of English pictorial satire—a field in which Mrs. Dorothy George reigns supreme. She has compiled the great catalogue of prints in the British Museum; and in the volumes under review she has provided a detailed commentary on the contents of English caricature from the seventeenth to the early nineteenth century, together with a magnificent collection of almost 200 plates to serve as illustrations. The frontispiece in volume one is Wenceslaus Hollar's engraving of 1641 which bears the caption "The World is Ruled and Governed by Opinion"; the final plate in volume two is a lithograph by Robert Seymour on the Reform Bill of 1832.

It was Martin Luther, as Mrs. George reminds us, who really began the long history of pictorial satire, being the first to use "pictorial propaganda on a massive scale, and in the service of a revolutionary movement." This long history, however, was one of slow change. In England it was not until the eighteenth

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century—with the advent of the caricature from Italy and with the work of Hogarth and of such talented amateurs as George Townshend—that the political caricature came into its own. The late eighteenth and early nineteenth century saw its classic age, the great days of Gillray and Rowlandson, when caricaturists spared no one, least of all the royal family. Then in 1832 vitality suddenly oozed out of the caricature: "it had become socially unacceptable, even shocking." In Miss Edgeworth's novel, *Helen,* published in 1833, a vulgar Irishwoman attempts to enliven a country-house party by handing around some political caricatures. The company is plainly embarrassed; and the Irish lady concludes that "the world is grown mighty nice."

Mrs. George is of the opinion that historians have been culpably neglectful of the pictorial satire as an aid to historical understanding. There is no doubt of their neglect; few historians, I should imagine, would be familiar with many of the plates in Mrs. George's volumes. Are they, however, always to be blamed for their neglect? After all, it is not always clear that the political caricature helps us to understand the past correctly; indeed, it may in some cases obscure the truth, even mislead. What, for example, is to be made of the evidence supplied by the caricatures which appeared so numerously during the affair of Queen Caroline in 1820-21? This was a crisis, according to Mrs. George, in which "more than in any other the prints seem to record the emotions of the country." It is true, of course, that the caricatures reveal a savage dislike of George, to the point even of making a popular hero of Bergami, the Queen's suspected paramour. But they tell us nothing of (and thus conceal) those political forces which made something more of the Queen's affair than its being simply, as Mrs. George describes it, "a transitory fever". Or again, what is to be made of the caricatures which appeared in 1822, putting the blame for agricultural distress at the door of the farmer who aped the manners of the gentry? One would be wrong to conclude—as one might be tempted to do from the evidence—that this opinion was widely held. In short, the vivid evidence of the caricature is likely to need careful scrutiny.

Mrs. George might well have placed us more in her debt if she had insisted on putting more questions to her fascinating material. Who, for example, bought caricatures? How were they distributed? Were they much known outside London (those dealing with agricultural depression in 1822 suggest that they were not)? Why did they suffer so drastic an eclipse in the 1830's? What if anything had the changing nature of public opinion (which Mrs. George presumably takes to be the same

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in the nineteenth as in the seventeenth century) to do with the rise and fall of the caricature? It might be worth while trying to answer these questions; but without Mrs. George's work it would have been impossible to ask them.

DAVID SPRING

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

*The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development, 1883-1936.* By JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD. New York, Columbia University Press, 1959.—x, 354 pp. $7.50.

A volume devoted exclusively to Bulgarian developments is by itself a rarity in our professional literature and is welcome, so to say, by default. It is, of course, the more gratifying when such an undertaking proves to stand up on its own merit. This is the case with Professor Joseph Rothschild's work. The author is thoroughly familiar with the source material, mainly of Communist origin, much of which is shared for the first time with the American reader. Well organized in twelve short and comprehensive chapters the text unfolds in minute and fresh detail the history of the Communist party of Bulgaria from its early days down to the 1936 purge of the then underground cadres—and the history of the Bulgarian party is, indeed, worth while exploring. As the author rightly points out, Bulgarian Communists were to be found in the first Marxist circles in Russia as well as in leading positions in the Communist international movement in which "they played a role out of all proportion to their numbers . . ." (p. 300). This and the almost pathetic attachment to the Russian "big brothers" made the Bulgarian Communists the most devoted and obedient, and also dearest to Moscow's heart, of all foreign parties, a fact which helps explain present-day Bulgarian domestic and foreign policy; or, as the author concludes, "Among the most backward of European countries, Bulgaria produced international Communism's best bolsheviks" (p. 302).

There can be little disagreement with the appraisal of the origins and development of the Communist party given by the author who is well aware of the danger of projecting its present-day importance into the past. Professor Rothschild makes it clear that the party "never became proletarian despite the fact that industrialization . . . was creating a small proletariat" (p. 26) and that the occasional increase in its strength was "a resentment against the lost war, not an endorsement of socialism"

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(p. 45). He also leaves no doubt as to its methods of achieving its difficult goal. Yet, in trying to find the place of the party and its ideas in Bulgaria's over-all context and development, the author seems to take an intransigent approach toward almost all political forces, personalities and régimes in modern Bulgarian history, which tends to enhance, by default, the rôle of the Communists. It is conceded that a discussion of general Bulgarian history would have led the author, as it would the reviewer, beyond his intended purpose. But, within the author's stretched framework, it is an oversimplification to view pre-communist history in terms of "terror" and "corruption", which incidentally tend to be mutually exclusive, or to generalize that the "intelligentsia despised the peasantry" or that the small land-owning Bulgarian peasant, apparently impressed by the Communist program, "was not prepared . . . to resist the capture of power by the Communists . . .", as the author states in his Conclusion and tries to substantiate in the text with many black-or-white arguments.

These are disagreements on the broader interpretation of Bulgarian history which should not detract from the merit of Professor Rothschild's history of the Bulgarian Communist party. His is a solid *pièce de résistance* and an extremely valuable addition to the growing number of publications on the East European Communist parties. An appendix on labor legislation and organization before World War I and an excellent bibliography enhance the author's contribution.

L. A. D. DELLIN

THE UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

*The Emergence of Modern Lithuania.* By ALFRED ERICH SENN. New York, Columbia University Press, 1959.—x, 272 pp. $6.00.

*Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States, 1918-1940.* By ALBERT N. TARULIS. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1959.—xii, 276 pp. $5.50.

The history of the Baltic States, whose all too brief independent existence came to an end in the summer of 1940, has been sadly neglected by writers of history. Thus it is with great pleasure that one welcomes the publication of two books which attempt to bridge this gap in historical knowledge.

Of the two studies here under review, Dr. Senn's is the more important one, since it is a basic scholarly study of a limited topic—that of Lithuania's evolution from the confused situation

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of late 1917 to constitutional government and international recognition in 1920. Based on painstaking work in libraries from Los Angeles to Moscow, on extensive unpublished personal archives of prominent participants in the events described, and on interviews with surviving participants, this book takes its place as the unrivaled authority on the emergence of the Lithuanian national state.

In addition to bringing out the factual story, Dr. Senn has done a most commendable job of clarifying the confusing position of the Lithuanian provisional government before May 1920. He discusses all the factors which contributed to its rise, its composition, and its internal and external tribulations and triumphs. He evades none of the seemingly hopeless entanglements caused by conflicting Bolshevik, German, Polish, French, Lithuanian, and *émigré* Lithuanian propaganda during 1918 and 1919. Examining all claims and all available evidence with great care and scholarly detachment, Dr. Senn extracts conclusions which will be difficult to refute. He discounts claims that independence was a purely native achievement, although without native determination it could not have been accomplished. He rejects Poland's charge that the Lithuanian national movement was a German invention and the *Taryba* (State Council) and provisional government German tools, but he also credits the presence of the German army in Lithuania through 1919 on Entente orders with preventing the Poles or the Bolsheviks from overrunning the country. Independent Lithuania, says Dr. Senn, was at the same time "an outgrowth of the Russian revolutions," "a by-product of the First World War," "a reflection of the twentieth century *Zeitgeist* of democracy and national self-determination," and the culmination of a national movement.

Dr. Senn's clarity of presentation falters briefly when he writes about the constitution of November 2, 1918 (p. 40). Exactly who had an influence upon its formulation, and did the further debate in March and April of 1919 result in a new constitution (as he says on p. 100) or merely extensive revisions (p. 138)? It might also have been wise to alter the title of the concluding chapter; "Lithuania as a National State" implies a survey of the period 1920-40, not a summary of the book's conclusions. But these are minor criticisms of an otherwise outstanding contribution to our knowledge of Lithuanian history.

Dr. Tarulis' book does not break new ground; practically all the material on which his account is based is already available in print. However, in bringing together for the first time most

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of the available evidence on Soviet policy toward the Baltic States, this volume performs a very useful service.

A native of Lithuania and an eyewitness to the Soviet occupation of his country in 1940, Dr. Tarulis understandably writes with less detachment than Dr. Senn. There is a tendency in his book to exaggerate the accomplishments of the Baltic peoples. For example, he states that Estonia and Lithuania rid themselves of the Red Army in 1919 (p. 51), even though it is quite obvious that all three Baltic States would have been helpless before the advancing Russians had it not been for the unexpected success of Polish arms, which forced the Russians to slow down in the Baltic and eventually withdraw. And without the presence of the German army the Baltic States would probably not have survived long enough to benefit from Poland's victories. The achievements of the Baltic peoples in their struggle for independence are impressive enough without also crediting them with military merits beyond their capacities.

The greater part of the book (156 out of 256 text pages) is devoted to the events of 1939-40. Very much has already been written about Nazi-Soviet relations and general diplomatic activities in this period, and Dr. Tarulis can add little new. His chief contribution is to single out the "Baltic story" from the wealth of available information, a worth-while task which he performs admirably. It would have been gratifying if he had given a similarly solid account of the period 1920-39, which occupies only thirty-two pages of the book.

HANS PETER KROSBY
FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY

*Constitutional Development in Pakistan.* By G. W. CHOUDHURY. Issued in co-operation with the Institute of Pacific Relations by the Pakistan Branch of Longmans, Green and Co., London, New York, Toronto, 1959.—x, 272 pp. Rs.8/–; 21*s.*; $4.50.

To a very large extent serious writing about the government and politics of Pakistan has come from Westerners. It is not that Pakistanis lack either talent or interest in political affairs but that, for a variety of reasons, they have chosen to engage in immediate and partisan debates rather than a more dispassionate examination. Indeed, except for some sections of the judiciary, it has been hard to find representatives of a reasonably impartial public opinion. Standards of political morality were varied according to which party was in power.

Dr. Choudhury's book is to be welcomed on two counts: it is

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by a Pakistani and, even more rare, an *East* Pakistani. It provides a clear account of the successive stages of the framing of the constitution of 1956. It begins with a discussion of the interim constitution and the work of the two Constituent Assemblies. There is an extended discussion of the place of Islam in public life and the status of the minorities. It also contains an analysis of the difficulties in obtaining a fair balance between the interests of East and West Pakistan. The concluding section of the book is an examination of the main provisions of the 1956 constitution.

The tone is predominantly academic and nonpolitical and the book concerns itself with constitutional machinery rather than the struggle for power. Of course, in Pakistan the two were intimately related and any account of the delays in approving the constitution is bound to refer to the recurring state of political chaos. Nonetheless the reader is left somewhat puzzled concerning the reasons for the breakdown of the constitution. Dr. Choudhury had the misfortune to prepare his book for the press at the very moment of the military take-over. (The preface is dated December 1958.) It is unfair therefore to expect him to provide a comprehensive explanation of events that had not occurred at the time of writing. But it would be equally unreasonable to expect the reader to refrain from seeking such an explanation now that the 1956 constitution has been discarded.

Dr. Choudhury's final chapter is entitled "Democracy in Pakistan", where, all too briefly, he discusses some of the central issues of the suitability of a parliamentary constitution for his country. He concludes that "the real threats to democracy in Pakistan are, however, not ideological but rather the policies and actions of self-seeking and corrupt politicians who have dominated the political scene since the death of Jinnah and Liaquat." Such men, he says, lacked the "parliamentary spirit". No doubt this is true, but it remains to be asked why the constitutional system produced so few men of integrity. One answer is that Pakistan never held a nation-wide election and that the members of the legislatures owed their positions to intrigue and wealth rather than to public support. In East Pakistan, however, there was one true general election which produced the least manageable legislature in the country and a cabinet whose record of corruption was as bad as any.

President Ayub has said that the new constitution which he is proposing "should be such that suits our circumstances and conditions, and secondly that it should not admit of political instability under any circumstances." Dr. Choudhury has given

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us a lucid account of the making and content of the constitution of 1956 but he would be the last to claim that it could measure up to the President's second condition.

KEITH CALLARD

McGILL UNIVERSITY

*New Patterns of Democracy in India.* By VERA MICHELES DEAN. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959.—xiv, 226 pp. $4.75.

*India: Toward an Understanding.* By GEORGE K. CHACKO. New York, Bookman Associates, 1959.—212 pp. $4.50.

*Soviet Russia and Indian Communism: 1917-1947.* With an Epilogue Covering the Situation Today. By DAVID N. DRUHE. New York, Bookman Associates, 1959.—429 pp. $8.50.

A reading of the three works under review would be helpful to anyone who is relatively unacquainted with India and who would like to know more about it. The books by Mrs. Dean and Druhe are informative rather than interpretative. Chacko's little volume does attempt to contribute to an understanding of India, as the title suggests; but unfortunately it is more often naïve than profound.

Mrs. Dean presents in a clear, straightforward way a capsule review of some of the highlights of India's long history and a summary of some of the major developments since independence. She professes to feel "entirely at home in India," and she is obviously a great admirer of that country. In her view the Indian achievement has been a great one: "Thus, without mobilizing the entire population for national tasks, without subordinating the individual to the state, without trying to brainwash citizens into excluding all private thought and feeling, the Indian government, in spite of the appalling problems with which it has been confronted since independence, has succeeded in maintaining an orderly society, based on voluntary cooperation by a wide variety of religious, linguistic, economic, and social groups, and guided, through their own decisions, by objectives common to a majority" (p. 162). Mrs. Dean realizes that "it will be an accomplishment of outstanding magnitude if India succeeds in maintaining the substance of democratic institutions during its transition from primitive agriculture to a modern agro-industrial economy" (p. 209). However, she finds that "the omens for the future are on the whole favorable" (p. 208).

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Since her treatment is necessarily episodic and highly selective, it is tantalizing for anyone who wishes to probe beneath the surface of Indian life. It is also marred for the serious student by a number of factual errors and too many questionable statements. All kinds of qualifications should have been made to such assertions as the following: Indians "have long possessed the ingredients of democracy" (p. 26); there is a "remarkable affinity between the ideas and attitudes of the English and the Indian peoples" (p. 69); India is "a genuine democracy functioning under non-Western conditions" (p. 99); for India "the dilemmas of power politics" are "a direct result of its as yet unadjusted relations with Pakistan" (p. 186); "what happened in Tibet stirred Asians far more than events in Hungary, because the Hungarian revolt was regarded as a struggle between two white peoples" (p. 184).

George K. Chacko, an Indian living in America, seeks to contribute to an understanding of India by discussing some of her current problems and experiments against a background of Indian thought and ways of life. "Sooner or later," he points out, "the zealous reformer will bounce against the intangible, but rather inflexible, boundaries of the age-old structure of Indian life" (p. 83). Problems of family planning in India can be better appreciated if one bears in mind such wise comments as the following: "An unhurried approach to life that defies analysis and an unconcern that baffles ordinary codes of conduct naturally presents considerable problems to birth control methods which employ the idea of limitation" (p. 43). "Safeguards against slips are called for in the nature of measures aimed at not merely educating the people in the techniques of family limitation but also in demonstrating to them that the philosophy behind such limitation is congenial to the philosophy of their own living" (p. 52).

One has to search diligently to find such insightful observations in this little book, much of which consists of trite preachments or vague generalizations. Some of the sentences have to be seen to be believed. Consider this gem, for example: "The proud blossoms of the morrow will be cherished and reared as priceless leaders when material problems cease to squeeze the joy and color out of living" (pp. 45-46). If the charitable reader works his way to the last chapter, his interest will be piqued by the title: "Concrete Projects for Contemporary Times"; but he will soon discover that this chapter also runs true to form, for most of it is devoted to objective testing. Doubtless the introduction of objective testing on a wider scale in Indian schools would be desirable, but it would hardly rate a high priority on

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a list of the "concrete projects" which India should undertake in her struggle for national and human survival.

Both Mrs. Dean and Mr. Chacko seem to believe that "the eventual choice" for India, to use Mrs. Dean's words, must be either democracy or communism. Mrs. Dean thinks that communism "might come for lack of a viable alternative" (p. 207); Chacko holds that "whether the outcome for India will be democracy or communism depends on the state of her inner stability" (p. 8). It is surprising that two such informed observers should pose the alternatives facing India in such a starkly simple fashion. For India democracy is a hope and communism is a danger, but there are other hopes and other dangers. Mrs. Dean qualifies her own artificially posed question by referring to "the danger of disunity leading to disintegration" and to "the usurpation of overweening power by authoritarian leaders or groups" (pp. 204-205).

Strangely enough, Druhe's study, by far the most substantial of the three books under review, refers only vaguely to "the potential Red menace" to India, even though it is a thoroughly documented account of Communist designs and pressures on India and the close links between the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the international Communist movement during the period from 1917 to 1947. This solid work would have been even more valuable if it had not been preceded by two even more important studies of Indian communism: *Moscow and the Communist Party of India,* by John H. Kautsky (1956), and *Communism in India,* by Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller (1959). Kautsky presents almost as much factual material and a great deal more interpretation. Overstreet and Windmiller give a much clearer narrative of the history of the CPI and much more attention to the organization and leadership of the party.

Nevertheless, the Druhe volume is useful, even though it suffers in comparison with the other two books on the same general subject. It is somewhat more comprehensive than Kautsky and is much shorter than the formidable volume by Overstreet and Windmiller. It contains excellent discussions of the Soviet designs on India, efforts to organize an invasion of the subcontinent, the rôle of the Communist party of Great Britain in directing—and chastising—the CPI, the famous Meerut conspiracy case of 1930-1933, the activities of the Communists in labor, peasant, student and intellectual movements, the gains of the CPI during World War II when Britain and the Soviet Union were fighting a common enemy and when the leaders of the Indian National Congress were in jail, the reverses suffered

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by the CPI in the two years prior to the independence of India and Pakistan, and the relations between the CPI and the Indian National Congress.

The three volumes under review have at least one point in common: they are shockingly overpriced.

Norman D. Palmer

University of Pennsylvania

*Mexican Government in Transition.* By Robert E. Scott. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1959.—333 pp. $5.75.

The Mexican Revolution is the most profound and enduring movement for economic, social and political change which has taken place in this hemisphere during the twentieth century. Some aspects of this transformation, such as the military events of the early years, the agrarian reform and the drive toward industrialization, have been extensively studied and written about and are comparatively well known. However, there has been no attempt hitherto to study in detail the kind of political structure which has arisen in Mexico during the last half century. Professor Scott has made an admirable contribution to filling this vacuum in our knowledge.

The author has spent several years studying this problem on the spot. He has immersed himself in the realities of Mexico, while maintaining a scholarly standard of objective judgment. His book is particularly refreshing because it attempts to go behind the formal framework of government and to discover the way in which things actually work in the increasingly complex Mexican system.

Professor Scott lays his principal emphasis on the development of the government party (now known as the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*) which has dominated the political scene for more than thirty years. He traces its growth from a loose confederation of local groups dominated by regional caudillos and topped by the most powerful national "Jefe", General Plutarco Elias Calles, to a nation-wide organization with a power and momentum of its own, which is to a wide degree independent of the particular individuals who happen to be managing it at any given moment.

The development of this official party has had a profound impact on all aspects of Mexican political life. In the first place, it has provided a mechanism through which the increasingly numerous and complex interest groups can find political expression. The peasant sector and the labor sector have from the beginning shared influence in the party with the "popular"

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sector, a miscellaneous element which covers a wide range of interests. The steady growth in number, diversity and power of the groups making up the popular sector foreshadows the ultimate end of the collegiate form of the party, and its conversion into an individual membership organization in which people of all walks of life will find room to express their ideas and opinions.

A second effect of the official party has been the development of a general feeling of acceptance of the basic postulates of the Revolution by a wide range of Mexican society. Interest groups as varied as the ex-landlords converted into "small farmers", the new industrialist class, professional groups, and others have found it convenient to become affiliated to the popular section of the government party in order to become politically effective. This has had the result of bringing them to accept the Revolution, at least passively. Even groups formally outside the government party, such as the Catholic Church, and certain economic forces have found ways of making their pressure felt, and thus are less interested than formerly in overthrowing the Revolution.

This process has meant that the revolutionary party has necessarily become a more moderate group. It has come to include both a more radical Left wing and a conservative Right wing, with the great majority of the party being somewhere in between. Professor Scott ably illustrates this development in his discussion of the way in which the party chooses its presidential candidate.

The development of the revolutionary party has had the result that politics has become much more a process of accommodating conflicting interest groups, and much less a clash between ideological extremes. This has had its impact even on the opposition parties, the principal of which are the *Partido Accion Nacional* on the Right and the *Partido Popular* on the Left. The author sees these parties tending to follow the lead of the official party in seeking to represent a broader grouping of interests and becoming less concerned with extreme ideological positions. He thinks that this trend will in the foreseeable future lead to the development of two major parties instead of one, both of which will be seeking to build around them the widest possible coalition of economic and social interest groups. The parties will not differ extremely in their ideology and program, and both will be loyal to the basic lines of the revolutionary development during the last fifty years.

Finally, Professor Scott traces the effect of the rise of the revolutionary party on the institution of the presidency. It has given

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the chief executive a wide range of impersonal controls which he can use to maintain his influence. The president has thus been transformed from a super-caudillo, whose position depends upon his personal influence on lesser regional and local leaders, into an individual at the head of a complicated and powerful state mechanism which is able effectively to defy the challenge of any single leader. This has meant the decline, though certainly by no means the extinction, of the element of "personalism" in Mexican politics. It has made it possible for such a relatively colorless figure as former President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines effectively to control the state apparatus during his tenure in office in spite of violent tugging from more magnetic figures on both Left and Right, and for him to pass on his mantle to a successor of his own choosing.

This reviewer is not quite so optimistic as is Professor Scott about the stability of the Mexican political situation. Although the author mentions the dangers to the régime inherent in the dissatisfaction with the present situation among important labor and peasant groups, he does so only in passing and seems certain that the official party will be able to meet their demands adequately enough to keep them from any serious subversive movement. The reviewer hopes that he is correct, but feels that the Mexican revolutionary movement is going through a crisis which may well have unfortunate repercussions, particularly in view of revolutionary developments in other Latin American nations, some of them Mexico's close neighbors.

However, regardless of the outcome of present trends, Professor Scott has presented us with a book which is invaluable for an understanding of contemporary Mexico.

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## BOOK NOTES

In *War in the Modern World* (Durham, Duke University Press, 1959; xv, 400 pp. $10.00), Theodore Ropp has written a survey of wars and warfare since the fifteenth century. Using a broad definition of his subject, he deals alternately with tactics, strategy, weaponry, organization, and military theory. All that he has consciously omitted is any systematic account of operations or battles, feeling, as he says in his preface, that such studies need to be minute in order to be meaningful. Roughly half of his survey deals with the centuries before 1914. Though this segment is inevitably selective, it does give fairly detailed coverage to Spain and France, the successive military giants of the continent; it takes up Britain as a sea power, and tells rather more than one would expect about warfare in North America. The second part, treating World Wars I and II and the interwar years, is fuller. On the other hand, it tends to be more conventional and less comprehensive. The hundred-odd pages on the two wars run almost as year-by-year summaries of operations, colored with asides on generalship, conditions among the troops, and changes effected by new weapons. While Ropp manages to seem leisurely when writing of four hundred years, he appears hurried and distracted when dealing with only thirty. The trouble may come from his using the same definitions for both periods, even though "war" and "warfare" had come to have entirely new meanings. Or the trouble may be that so much has been written on the two wars and the twenties that no one mind can keep control of both the early period and the contemporary. Even so, Ropp's book is a remarkable achievement. Some of the subjects it handles, such as Spanish forces in the sixteenth century and French military organization in the eighteenth, have scarcely been touched by twentieth-century scholarship. If Ropp sometimes seems to be accumulating fly-speck facts, it is because the facts were hard to come by and there are few others. The first half of his book is a synthesis written, as his admirable bibliographical notes indicate, with very little monographic literature to synthesize. The work is an excellent textbook for a course that is hardly ever taught.—Ernest R. May, Harvard University.

Scott Greer's *Last Man In: Racial Access to Union Power* (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1959; 189 pp. $4.00) is a comparative study of ethnic group relations in twenty-one local labor unions in the Los Angeles area, researched originally in 1952. The formation in May 1960 of the Negro-American Labor



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Council to press for the end of racial discrimination in unions would seem to make this study extraordinarily topical. While Negro unionists will be seeking to tear down job barriers, it is equally clear that they will seek more power and jobs within unions commensurate with their strength. Professor Greer is concerned, not with the aspirations of Negro or Mexican workers (who form a large ethnic bloc in Los Angeles), but with the "structure" of the locals in order to see which factors facilitate or retard participation by ethnic groups in the union. He divided locals by various types: the kind of job (ranging from clerical to common laborer); the control structure (whether by the international, from above; or the rank and file, from below); and "plant or hall" orientation (whether the local's activities are concentrated at or near the job site through steward meetings, special meetings and the like, or in a hall, at some distance from the plant). Greer finds the "plant-hall" typology to be the most useful as a predictive instrument. The need to involve people in plant activities, he points out, means that ethnic groups have easy access to union position; hall-oriented locals, however, can be controlled by small cadres, and opposition is more difficult. The analysis is sophisticated and intelligent, though the writing is often excessively jargonish. Yet several comments are in order. Ideology seems to play little part in the analysis, so the predisposition of union leaders to accept or reject ethnic groups is minimized. The quality of ethnic leadership, that is, the question whether high Negro activity in some locals could be accounted for by personal factors, is ignored. In fact, by focusing on "organizational constraints" alone, one could argue that the analysis would apply to *any* opposition group that challenged an established leadership, and the distinctive aspects, which derive from the special cultural character of the ethnic problems, are really irrelevant to Professor Greer's study. This is really, then, a study of factors which make for increased or decreased participation in organizations, rather than a study of ethnic groups. One other observation is in order. Organizational theory, with its current emphasis on constraints has a curious conservative bias which needs exploration. It used to be, with William Graham Sumner, that the *mores* are slow to change, and therefore deliberate social change necessarily was ineffective; Gunnar Myrdal disposed of that argument. But now we seem to have shifted from "attitudes" to "organizations", and the argument is that since "organizational needs" are guiding criteria of leadership decisions, organizations are bound to resist changes, or to accept them slowly.

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It is questionable whether these are "inherent" needs either for leaders who want to maintain power, or for organizations that want to minimize strains; it may well be that in crisis situations organizations have to innovate or accept rapid change in order to survive. The willingness of the A.F.L.–C.I.O. unions to share power with the clamoring Negro unionists will be one test of that proposition.—DANIEL BELL, Columbia University.

Professor Carl Beck's monograph—*Contempt of Congress: A Study of the Prosecutions Initiated by the Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1957* (New Orleans, The Hauser Press, 1959; xv, 263 pp. $4.50)—should have been entitled *Investigations Revisited.* While this volume gives an able summary of the cases and controversies arising from twelve years of work of the Un-American Activities Committee, it offers the reader no new ideas on the subject. For teachers of constitutional law or of Congress, *Contempt of Congress* provides a handy reference for many well-known and a few little-known facts and figures. But it is not much more than an inventory of evils. The passage of time since the offerings of Carr, Taylor and many others and the subsidence of McCarthyist passion have not been to the author's advantage. There is no new point of view, no new thesis. What is the rôle of the investigatory process as an instrument of government? How does it relate to the constitutional crisis brought upon us by the growth of executive power? To what extent does the use (and abuse) of investigation of agencies and of individuals follow inevitably the broader and broader grants of legislative power to administrative officers? A study of coercion involving only one legislative committee can hardly attack these questions. Why, then, focus on the one committee, especially following Carr's masterful work? If McCarthy's demise and the *Watkins* and *Barenblatt* cases provide the answer (that is, bringing Carr up to date), then a long journal article would certainly suffice. On the other hand, this single-committee study could have given us some new insights if it had focused, for example, upon the Un-American Activities Committee as the last enclave of isolationism in retreat. But the most tantalizing information in the entire volume is contained in Appendixes B and C, where the author has tabulated the contempt actions for *all* committees and subcommittees since 1944. Herein lies the basis of a definitive work on coercion, an opportunity to break off the constitutional law ties which bind his work so closely and so unfavorably to earlier studies. To use the author's words in a different context, this would indeed "force

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the issues to be decided in the political not the judicial arena" (p. 189). As it is, *Contempt of Congress* is one revisit too many. —THEODORE LOWI, Cornell University.

The appearance of *America Votes 3: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics, 1958* (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1959; xii, 465 pp. $12.50) is a welcome indication that this indispensably valuable compilation will be available on a current basis to students of American elections. Edited once more by Richard M. Scammon for the Governmental Affairs Institute and again supported financially by the Edgar B. Stern Family Fund, the volume follows the essential format of its two predecessors, adding to them the data on the 1958 elections and including for the first time a summary tabulation of the 1956 presidential preference primaries. The data on Alaska and Hawaii have been brought into the state-by-state tabulations, and both the maps and the tables reflect the latest alterations in the boundaries of congressional districts. State-wide and, for Representatives, congressional district primary results are again presented, so that in this single volume the student has available to him the results of the most recent presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial elections as well as those for Representative in elections since the last boundary changes or since 1946. The series to date thus provides the basic election data on these offices for the dozen years since World War II. May it long continue!—DAVID B. TRUMAN, Columbia University.

In her prize-winning dissertation—*Power and Property in Inca Peru* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1958; viii, 190 pp. $5.00)—Mrs. Sally Falk Moore has benefited from both her legal and anthropological training. Her interpretation of Inca social and political structure shows how closely related Hohfeld's "legal realism" is to the behavioral, in-the-field interests of modern anthropology. These approaches are indispensable but particularly handy when we deal with stratified societies where law and the ideal norms must constantly be checked against actual behavior. Since the sources of our information on the New World's "high civilizations" are almost exclusively the chronicles of alien soldiers, monks and administrators, we see how important is anthropology's current effort to reconsider Aztec, Chimú, Maya or Inca political and economic organization in the light of what behavioral detail can be rescued from among the hasty, European-centered generalizations. Mrs. Moore's basic conclusion is a sound one: the rigid and planned cen-

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tralization of the Inca state, so frequently argued by modern commentators, is a myth; pre-Incaic, ethnic ruling lineages continued to exercise administrative responsibility in a wide variety of ways depending on local and traditional arrangements; conflict, instability and rebellion characterized Inca rule as many another conquest state despite the transplanted garrisons, the strategic roads and frequent inspection by the king's relatives. Even the famous decimal administrative hierarchy which was allegedly veneered over the pre-Incaic cultural multiplicity is shown by the author to have been only a "partially applied piece of political" pretension. Although Mrs. Moore's primary aim was to examine the Inca legal and political system, the distorted and fragmentary nature of the evidence has forced her to shift much of her attention to economic matters. Sixteenth-century European observers could ignore policy design and decision-making by an already decapitated Inca state, but they could not side-step land tenure or the revenues of the hierarchy since their own invasion and settlement stumbled continuously into enduring Andean economic arrangements. The first half of the book is thus concerned with land and taxation. Nevertheless one can discern that the Inca political system emphasized the sacred nature of the king and the state, while tolerating the continued presence of vigorous kinship-based, self-sufficient, peasant communities. Mrs. Moore is impressed with the prevalence of physical over economic punishment for crimes and tries to discern the penalties which were imposed by the state from those traditionally enforced by the conquered, local cultures. She makes a good case for the fluidity and lack of specialization of the Cuzco bureaucracy; since most matters at the local level continued to be taken care of by traditional authorities, the royal official conquered, inspected, and engaged in administrative review, but was not the socialist planner of our popular reading.—JOHN V. MURRA, Vassar College.

*Peter the Great,* by Vasili Klyuchevsky, translated by Liliana Archibald (New York, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1959; xi, 282 pp. $6.75), is a new translation of volume four of Klyuchevsky's five-volume *History of Russia* which was first published in Russian between 1904 and 1911; volume four appeared in 1910. The earlier English translation of Klyuchevsky's classic by C. J. Hogarth, as Miss Archibald notes, is out of print and "is, in any case, both inaccurate and difficult to read." Pursuance of the new English version of the work of the master confirms the

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impression of both its outstanding merits and grievous failings as a comprehensive history of Russia. Klyuchevsky presents a broad and remarkably informative picture of Russia's economic and social evolution; however, he leaves out not only the entire field of foreign relations, which is essential to an understanding of the Petrine reforms, but also such vital aspects of the tsar's life as his conflict with his son Alexis. Consideration of this unhappy story would have probably necessitated a revision of some of Klyuchevsky's appraisals of his hero. Rendition into English of a Russian text dealing with the economic and social conditions of the pre-reform era presents formidable difficulties which Miss Archibald, who has taught Russian history in the University of Otago in New Zealand, has not entirely overcome. Her translation, while a marked improvement on Hogarth's, does not convey the literary charm of the original and is at times obscure and even inaccurate, especially in the pages dealing with the evolution of serfdom. Her annotations and bibliographical references are thoughtful and serviceable except for at least one unfortunate slip. Miss Archibald repeats the long-discredited statement that Peter married Catherine in 1707 while their marriage actually took place in 1712. This detail is of some importance because it bears on the legitimacy of Peter's two daughters, Anne, later Duchess of Holstein and mother of the future Emperor Peter III, and the future Empress Elizabeth. The genealogical diagram is difficult to follow, but the two illustrations and the map are very good.—MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY, Columbia University.

*Islamic Law in the Modern World* (Introduction by Saba Habachy; New York, New York University Press, 1959; xx, 106 pp. $2.75) reproduces a series of lectures given by Dr. J. N. D. Anderson at New York University. The subject is really too vast to be covered adequately in such a small book; therefore the author has succeeded in giving only a broad outline. He obviously had no option, because he was not addressing a body of experts on Islamic Law, the lectures having been organized primarily "for the benefit of the interested members of the legal and business community." One who is not already acquainted with the subject will find the book informative. The value of the treatise would have been greatly enhanced if the author had not incorporated in it uncalled-for controversial value judgments. Saba Habachy's Introduction is extremely well written and brings out the importance of understanding the significance of the Islamic Law from the point of view of the West.—I. H. QURESHI, Columbia University.

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